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IN THE TRENCHES: THE LOCAL POLITICS OF CIVIC EDUCATION 
 
 
Eleni Maria Mantas-Kourounis 
 
Civic education is once again at the center of education policy debates. Over the past five 
years, policy reform has been enacted in 46 states and, with some exceptions, has consisted of 
states embracing two initiatives: the College, Career, and Civic Life Framework for Social 
Studies (C3) and the Civic Education Initiative (CEI). Both initiatives were born out of sustained 
advocacy efforts of nonprofit organizations responding to a perceived marginalization of civic 
education as state and national education policies became more narrowly focused on testing, 
math, and literacy. They offer competing visions of civic education with the C3 focusing on 
inquiry, skills, and dispositions and the CEI on content and testing. Both aim to enhance civic 
outcomes of students and come at a time of high polarization in American politics when many 
view civic education as a possible solution to the erosion of democratic ideals.  
The dissertation examines what, if anything, happened when these state mandates hit the 
local level. It mobilizes a theoretical framework based on policy feedback and a qualitative 
research design to analyze the implementation and sustainability of civic education policies in 
school districts in Utah and Connecticut. It finds that in both states implementation of the 
policies varied between and, in some cases within, the school districts, but policy sustainability 
was challenged only in Utah. The varied implementation outcomes are attributed primarily to 
how willing teachers were to implement the policies, while the varied sustainability outcomes 
stem from differences in policy design and that school districts in Utah were asked to respond to 
dual, conflicting mandates. 
The findings suggest that school districts operate in institutional contexts that leave them 
room to ignore or superficially respond to state mandates. The findings also suggest that teachers 
react differently to legislative initiatives than to those coming from state education officials with 
the former more likely to be seen as top-down mandates to be ignored or resisted.  Finally, the 
findings demonstrate that sustainable policy outcomes are not always equitable, suggesting that 
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 In 2013, the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) released the College, Career, 
and Civic Life Framework for State Social Studies Standards (C3). The goal was to establish a 
Framework that would incentivize state departments of education to develop social studies 
standards “that support students in learning to be actively engaged in civic life.”1 The premise of 
the C3 is that through inquiry and the cultivation of skills and dispositions in all areas of social 
studies (civics, geography, economics, and history) students will become college, career, and 
civic ready. The C3 remains intentionally devoid of content, which it leaves up to states to 
determine. That same year the Joe Foss Institute launched a competing educational approach 
aiming also to strengthen civic outcomes: the Civic Education Initiative (CEI). The CEI aimed to 
incentivize state legislatures to enact legislation making the passing of the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services naturalization exam a requirement for high school graduation. The premise 
of this initiative was that by preparing to pass the exam students would gain “the tools they need 
to become informed and engaged citizens” (McClure, 2017). Both initiatives gained quick 
momentum and within a few years managed to capture the bureaucratic and legislative agendas 
of 46 states.  
Almost 100 years before the C3 and the CEI, another entity published its own report on 
the same topic: the 1916 Report of the Committee on Social Studies. That report made explicit 
that social studies (consisting of civics, geography, economics, and history) was uniquely 
positioned to educate for citizenship (Nelson, 1994). The goals of that Committee have been 
 
1 National Council for the Social Studies (2013), College, Career, and Civic Life Framework for State Social Studies Standards, 





contested and competing interpretations suggest that it is unclear whether the Committee’s 
proposal aimed at a “mastery of social knowledge or for challenging students to think, criticize, 
even reject, or occasion, the conventional wisdom of the day” (Nelson, 1994, p. viii). By 
solidifying the link between the social studies and citizenship education the report paved the way 
for conversations and debates that followed about the ability of social studies, and its civics 
subset, to foster civic outcomes. Arguably, the Committee’s goals paved the way for the current 
competing visions of civic education.  
The C3 and the CEI attempt to offer answers to a debate that started more than 100 years 
ago and, in many respects, remains unresolved: can civic education affect civic outcomes?  Part 
of the problem with answering this question stems from the lack of a unified definition of what 
constitutes civic education and civic outcomes. What makes the task of answering the question 
even more problematic is that competing definitions of civic education and civic outcomes have 
deep ideological and increasingly, partisan roots. Some, mostly on the political left, view civic 
education as an educational experience grounded in critical thinking, deliberation, experiential 
learning, and tolerance of diverse views. Others, mostly on the political right, view civic 
education as an educational experience grounded in mastery of content and knowledge that 
reinforce dominant views and foster patriotism. This tension makes it unlikely that a uniform 
definition of civic education will ever emerge.  
What is likely, however, is that these competing definitions of civic education will 
remain active in American society and that versions of each will continue to appear in America’s 
public schools. The CEI and the C3 constitute the latest manifestations of these competing 
visions. These developments strengthen the cautionary note that there is a “politics in educating 




much like all policy, is affected by competing actors, interests, ideologies, and resources. To 
think otherwise misses a key point: education, including civic education, is policy and policy is 
affected by politics. The current civic education reform is not any different.  
This dissertation does not aim to answer the question of whether civic education can 
affect civic outcomes. It does not seek to evaluate the strengths or weaknesses of the C3 and the 
CEI as pedagogical interventions Rather, the focus of this study is to understand the degree to 
which these national initiatives that successfully captured state policy agenda trickled down to 
America’s classrooms and, if they did, the degree to which they still remain visible. In doing so, 
the study gets closer to being able to answer the larger “so what” question. That is, so what if the 
national initiatives captured state policy agendas? Did these national initiatives actually have a 
tangible impact on public education? This dissertation argues that to answer these larger 
questions we need to look at what, if anything, happened when these state mandates inspired by 
national initiatives actually hit the local level. This study examines the implementation outcomes 
of the state policies at the school district level and the degree to which these policies remained 
sustainable post-implementation. The time is ripe for such a study given that several years have 
passed since both national initiatives surfaced on state policy agendas offering sufficient time to 
assess implementation and sustainability.  
To assess implementation and sustainability this dissertation mobilizes a theoretical 
framework drawing upon scholarship of enactment, implementation, and policy feedback. By 
combining elements of these three bodies of scholarship, this dissertation addresses what has 
been identified as a limitation of traditional implementation studies in education. More 
specifically, such studies have been critiqued for offering “little insight into the way political 




examine implementation as a “largely administrative exercise” and look only at factors “that 
explain variation across jurisdictions” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016).  McDonnell and 
Weatherford argue that studies that examine the response of local actors during implementation 
(e.g. Cohen & Moffitt, 2009; McLaughlin, 1987; Spillane et al, 2009) conceptualize 
implementation as “the response of professionals to externally imposed policy intervention, not 
as a political action” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016). In other words, for critics, 
implementation studies erroneously neglect politics.  
This dissertation responds to this critique by examining the implementation of civic 
education reform through the lens of policy feedback.  Feedback scholars seek to answer the 
following questions: “how do policies, once enacted, reshape politics, and how might such 
transformation in turn affect subsequent policymaking?” (Mettler and Sorelle, 2014, p. 151).  
Feedback scholars are primarily interested in understanding how the politics generated after 
enactment of policy A contribute to the creation of new policy B. They argue that the answer can 
be found by looking at how the politics of enactment and post-enactment interact to generate 
feedback effects that prompt interest groups to mobilize for or against the enacted policy. 
Feedback scholars pay particular attention to the way characteristics of the policy design 
determined at enactment shape public opinion and public behavior (Jacobs and Mettler, 2018).  
They argue that elements of the policy design play a critical role in determining how the public 
will interpret a policy. If the interpretations are negative, interest groups have greater incentive to 
launch mobilization efforts seeking to challenge a policy and to create a new one. These 
interpretations become most visible during policy implementation, as “public perceptions of 
gains and losses during implementation act as an intervening mechanism to explain policy 




Feedback scholars view the traditional implementation literature as relevant to their quest 
in that it too “explores what happens after a bill becomes a law” (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2013, p. 
1075). They do not deny that the will and capacity of implementers matter in explaining post-
enactment outcomes of policies, but they emphasize that traditional implementation literature 
fails to account for how the politics of enactment (that is, “how the policy intent was 
communicated and the implementation assistance provided them”) also shape will and capacity 
(McDonnell and Weatherford, p. 240). Additionally, feedback scholars caution that looking at 
implementation only as an outcome of “the motivation and capacity of street-level bureaucrats” 
(McDonnell and Weatherford, p. 240) fails to account for the impact not only of elements of the 
policy design determined at enactment, but also for the “forces arising from an uncertain and 
contentious political environment” (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2013, p. 1072). The feedback effects 
that become visible during implementation “are contingent on the interplay between policy 
design, political conditions, and individual motivations” (Jacobs and Mettler, 2018, p. 350).  
 Thus, an analysis of implementation outcomes through a feedback lens calls for these 
outcomes to be assessed by looking at how characteristics of policy design determined at 
enactment and forces of the external political environment constrained or aided the will and 
capacity of implementers.  McDonnell (2009) noted the utility of the policy feedback framework 
to the study of the politics of education and argued that education scholars should add it to their 
“analytical repertoire” to understand not only “what kind of policies politics create” but also 
what “kind of politics education policies create” (p. 417).  This study builds upon these calls and 
mobilizes the policy feedback framework to analyze the implementation and sustainability of the 
recent civic education policy reform. The policy feedback perspective is fitting because it 




policy sustainability.  The conceptual framework guiding this study hypothesizes that district 
level implementation outcomes can be understood by analyzing how elements of the original 
policy design and competing priorities constrained or aided the will and capacity of district level 
implementers. It views this interaction as a politics generated during implementation. It further 
hypothesizes that the feedback effects that become visible during implementation contribute to 
subsequent mobilization efforts of interest groups that may seek to challenge or strengthen the 
sustainability of the existing policy.   
This dissertation utilizes the feedback perspective not only to assess whether the political 
dynamics generated after enactment of policy A created new policy B, but also to illuminate how 
these political dynamics affected implementation outcomes. It places implementation at the very 
center of policy feedback and considers feedback scholarship as a needed subset of 
implementation research. 
Using this theoretical framework, this study analyzed civic education reform in Utah and 
Connecticut. In Utah, civic education reform came as a result of legislative and bureaucratic 
action at the state level. More specifically, legislation adopted in 2015 made the passing of the 
citizenship test a requirement for high school graduation, while the Utah Core Standards for the 
Social Studies adopted in 2016 by the Utah State Board of Education sought to bring the C3 
Framework to Utah’s public schools. Connecticut opted to only embrace a C3-inspired civic 
education reform with the 2015 Connecticut Social Studies Frameworks adopted by the 
Connecticut State Department of Education. This dissertation analyzes the implementation of 
these civic education reforms in four districts in each state. It also analyzes the degree to which 




  The analysis finds that in both Utah and Connecticut implementation of the policies 
varied between and, in some cases within, the school districts studied, but the sustainability of 
the policies was challenged only in Utah. The varied implementation outcomes are attributed 
primarily to the degree of willingness of teachers (more so than district administrators) to 
implement the policies. That willingness had much to do with how teachers interpreted the 
policies, and these interpretations were the product of policy design and competing priorities 
coming from the external political environment. The analysis also finds that although districts in 
both states exhibited a similar level of variability in terms of implementation outcomes, the paths 
that they took in terms of sustainability were different. The varied sustainability outcomes stem 
from differences in the policy design and that school districts in Utah were asked to respond to 
dual, conflicting mandates.  
The findings offer policy feedback scholarship an additional empirical case study 
demonstrating that policy sustainability is contingent upon elements of a policy’s design. 
Additionally, the findings from Connecticut and Utah suggest that school districts operate in 
institutional contexts that leave them room to ignore or superficially respond to state mandates 
and national initiatives. The findings also suggest that teachers react differently to initiatives 
from the legislatures than to those coming from state education officials with the former more 
likely to be seen as a top-down mandate to be regarded warily, ignored, or resisted.  Finally, the 
findings demonstrate that sustainable policy outcomes are not always equitable outcomes, 
suggesting that those looking to civic education policies as a means to foster equitable civic 
outcomes, may have to look elsewhere.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 places the civic education policies in a 




Child Left Behind (NCLB) era. It argues that the recent reform was an indirect byproduct of 
federal education policies, most notably NCLB, as it was the perception that it marginalized civic 
education that led to the nonprofit “call to action” to generate new policies. The chapter provides 
a detailed description of the origins and goals of the C3 and CEI and demonstrates that both are 
deeply rooted in a civic education narrative that assumes that schools have a civic mission. It 
identifies the recent reform as paradoxical given that scholarly consensus does not exist on the 
actual relationship between civic education and civic outcomes. The chapter argues that the state-
centric Common Core offered a window of opportunity that transformed the “call to action” into 
national policy reform initiatives that unfolded at a time when some raised concerns about the 
state and future of American democracy.  
Chapter 3 offers a review of the literature of implementation. Given this study’s focus on 
education, the chapter then looks at how education studies intersect with the implementation 
literature and its directions. Finally, the chapter also reviews the literature on policy feedback, 
arguing that this study answers a call for wider application of this theoretical perspective to 
studies of education policies. Chapter 4 introduces the conceptual framework that guides the 
analysis of the study. Chapter 5 focuses on the methodology. It introduces the study’s research 
questions, the criteria that led to case selection, the data, and methods used. It also discusses the 
study’s limitations.  
Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the politics of implementation of civic education 
policies in Utah. It mobilizes the theoretical framework to analyze the policy design phase and 
the implementation phase of the Utah’s version of Civic Education Initiative (Senate Bill 60-
SB60) and the Utah Core Standards for the Social Studies. The analysis looks at implementation 




implementation. Chapter 7 undertakes the same type of analysis for Connecticut’s Social Studies 
Frameworks. The final chapter summarizes the key findings and identifies wider lessons for both 





























CHAPTER II  
CIVIC EDUCATION POST-NCLB: A “SPUTNIK” MOMENT? 
 
Over the past six years, civic education policy reform has been enacted in 43 states and, 
with few exceptions, has taken two forms. First, at the bureaucratic level, many state departments 
of education revamped social studies standards to align with the College, Career, and Civic Life 
Framework for Social Studies Standards (C3). Second, at the legislative level, many states 
introduced and, in many cases, adopted legislation aligning with the Civic Education Initiative 
(CEI). Proponents of both approaches are motivated by the assumption that civic education will 
increase political knowledge, interest, and participation among America’s youth.  Also, both 
sides lament that the era of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) with its emphasis on testing, reading, 
and mathematics shifted attention away from civic education and consequently generated 
alarming consequences for the current, challenged, state of American democracy. Proponents of 
both sides disagree, however, on what civic education actually looks like and on how it should 
be delivered. The CEI movement seeks to ensure that students acquire civic content knowledge 
and considers making the passing of the USCIS civics test a high school graduation requirement 
the most optimal way attain this goal. In contrast, the C3 movement focuses on students gaining 
civic skills and dispositions and considers an inquiry-based pedagogical approach in the four 
areas of the social studies—history, geography, civics, and economics—as the best way to 
achieve it.  
These new conflicting approaches, which as will be discussed later in this chapter are the 
latest manifestations of an old debate, have gained momentum in recent years as states have 
adopted one of the strategies or both. Figure 1 below offers a visual illustration of the civic 





Figure 1. Civic Education Policy Reform, 2014-2021 
 
Source: Data compiled by author through a systematic and comprehensive review of the Department of Education websites and 
the websites of state legislatures of all 50 states.  
 
The recent civic education reform constitutes the output of state legislatures and 
bureaucracies reacting to the influence of nonprofit organizations that mobilized in the wake of 
NCLB to ensure that civic education, as they perceived it, remained a part of American public 
education. In this regard, state policies were indirectly affected by federal involvement in 
education even if the latter did not issue an explicit mandate requiring states and localities to 
focus on civic education.  More specifically, as will be discussed below, the NCLB’s focus on 




counter what was perceived as the marginalization of social studies and its civic education 
subcategory.  The nonprofit-led “call to action” gained momentum in the early 2010s as states 
adopted Common Core Standards and nonprofit national initiatives sought to entice state 
bureaucracies and legislatures to ensure through policy reform that social studies, and its civic 
education subset, retained a seat at the new “standards-driven” table.  The C3 Framework and the 
CEI were products of this “call to action” and managed to successfully capture legislative and 
bureaucratic agendas across the country.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses federal education initiatives related to 
civic education post-NCLB, arguing that the recent reform was an indirect byproduct of federal 
education policies, most notably NCLB. Second, it describes the role of nonprofit organizations 
in launching in the wake of NCLB a “call to action” that sparked the recent policy reform. It 
argues that the policy platforms advanced by C3 and the CEI are deeply rooted in a civic 
education narrative that assumes that schools have a civic mission and identifies the recent 
reform as paradoxical given that little scholarly consensus exists on the actual relationship 
between civic education and civic outcomes. Third, it argues that the state-centric Common Core 
offered a window of opportunity that transformed the call to action into national policy reform 
initiatives and offers detailed accounts of the two most prominent initiatives: the C3 and the CEI. 
Finally, it discusses the timing of the recent civic education reform and argues that this study’s 
focus on the implementation of this reform sheds light on the extent to which the “call for 
action” and subsequent state legislative and bureaucratic mandates that it generated did in fact 






Post-NCLB Federal Initiatives on Civic Education 
 Since the founding, civic education has been explicitly connected to the viability of 
American democratic institutions. Even before the creation of public schools, the founders 
highlighted that preservation of the American republic required a well-educated citizenry and 
one well-versed in the civic virtues and ideals that this system espoused. “The advancement and 
diffusion of knowledge is the only guardian of true liberty,” noted James Madison.2 George 
Washington viewed “the assimilation of the principles, opinions, and manners of our country-
men by the common education of a portion of our youth from every quarter” as a step that would 
ensure “our prospect of permanent union.”3 Jefferson, in arguing for public education, noted that, 
“every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone. The people 
themselves therefore are its only safe depositories. And to render even them safe their minds 
must be improved to a certain degree.”4 Summarizing the views of the founders on the 
relationship between an educated citizenry and the American republic, Zackin notes: “Anxiety 
about the character of the citizenry originated with the American Revolution itself and the sense 
that the new republic was engaged in a dangerous experiment, which required an educated 
citizenry. … Public education in America has long been, and continues to be, understood not 
only as a means of elevating the individual and preparing him for the responsibilities of 
citizenship, but also of protecting the republic itself” (Zackin, 2013, 73-74).  
 Contemporary American presidents have expressed similar sentiments. Ronald Reagan 
argued that “Since the founding of this Nation, education and democracy have gone hand in 
 
2 See https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-post-2008-celebrating-james-madison-and-freedom-information-act. 
3 George Washington, “Eight Annual Message,” December 7, 1796, accessed at 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washs08.asp.  





hand.”5 Bill Clinton called on schools to “teach character education, to teach good values and 
good citizenship.”6 In his inaugural address, George W. Bush argued that “We are bound by 
ideals that … teach us what it means to be citizens. Every child must be taught these 
principles.”7 Barack Obama, commenting on the decline of civic education in America’s schools, 
noted: “The loss of quality civic education from so many of our classrooms has left too many 
young Americans without the most basic knowledge of who our forefathers are, or what they did, 
or the significance of the founding documents that bear their names…It is up to us to teach them 
… that it is vital to participate in our democracy and make our voices heard.”7F8 
The professed commitment to the ideals of civic education, however, rarely translated 
into significant policy action, as civic education has not been a high priority at the federal level 
(Jamieson, 2013). As will be discussed below, steps taken by the three most recent 
administrations demonstrate an acknowledgement of the significance of civic education, but also 
high variation in how it was interpreted. Each administration’s position on civic education was 
informed by its respective political ideology and the political climate of the time.   
 
Policies and Ideologies: Bush, Obama, and Trump on Civic Education 
In the aftermath of 9/11, and a few months before the start of the war in Iraq, the George 
W. Bush administration launched a civic education initiative spearheaded by the USA Freedom 
Corps aiming to “encourage American history and civic education all around the country.”8F9 
 
5 Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Education, September 10, 1988, accessed at 
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/radio-address-nation-education-3.  
6 William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1996, accessed at 
https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html. 
7 George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2001, accessed at https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/inaugural-address.html. 
8 Barack Obama, Speech on Patriotism, June 30, 2008, accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/us/politics/30text-
obama.html. 





Bush’s initiative was part of a larger goal identified a month after 9/11 to “capture the spirit of 
service and citizenship and make institutional changes that would sustain it” (Bridgeland, 2011). 
Bush thought that changes needed to be made to address the absence of a cohesive patriotic 
response to 9/11 and the “blame-us mentality” that the administration found “disturbing” 
(Bridgeland, 2011). The administration believed that the “convergence could hardly happen if 
people did not even understand the basics of the American story—of American history” and 
identified civic education as a way to strengthen “the public’s knowledge of American history, 
values, and civic traditions” (Bridgeland, 2011).  
Bush announced the initiatives in 2002 and they included: 1) the establishment of a 
program called We the People, administered by the National Endowment of the Humanities, to 
support, among other things, the development of history and civics curricula and competitions 
for high school students on the topics of liberty, justice, and freedom; 2) the development of a 
national archive of documents that schools could access online called Our Documents; 3) a 
forum at the White House to discuss civic education.10  Bush believed that the initiatives would 
help students understand “the history of our country, the ideals that make our country strong” 
because at the time of war it is “especially important … that our children understand the context 
of why we fight.”10 F11  
Bush noted that the primary responsibility of teaching history and civics rested with 
schools and teachers, but that the federal government should help because “ignorance of 
American history and civics weakens our sense of citizenship … American children are not born 
knowing what they should cherish—are not born knowing why they should cherish American 
 
10 Remarks by the President on Teaching American History and Civics, September 17, 2002, accessed at https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020917-7.html. 





values. A love of democratic principles must be taught.”12 Additionally, in 2003, as part of its 
effort to strengthen civic education, the Bush administration’s Department of Education modified 
the National Assessment of Education Progress to assess students in fourth, eight, and twelfth 
grades in subjects of history and civics every four years. The students had been previously 
assessed on these subjects every eight years (Bridgeland, 2011).  
Ten years later, in 2012, during the Barack Obama administration, the U.S. Department 
of Education published Advancing Civic Learning and Engagement in Democracy: A Road Map 
and Call to Action. At a White House forum on the day the report was released, Secretary of 
Education Arne Duncan touted it as an opportunity to engage in a new type of civic learning: 
“The goals of traditional civic education—to increase civic knowledge, voter participation, and 
volunteerism—are all still fundamental. But the new generation of civic learning puts students at 
the center. It includes both learning and practice—not just rote memorization of names, dates, 
and processes.”12F13  
Unlike the Bush administration’s focus on civic education to strengthen patriotism, 
service, and citizenship in light of foreign policy challenges, the Obama administration seems to 
have been less interested in supporting civic education to increase civic knowledge, participation, 
and volunteerism, and more interested in connecting civic education to educational goals related 
to equity and career readiness. For Duncan, civic education was very much complementary to 
these larger goals. According to Duncan, “preparing all students for informed, engaged 
participation in civic and democratic life … is entirely consistent with the goals of increasing 
student achievement and closing achievement gaps. … It is consistent with preparing students for 
 
12 President Introduces History and Civic Education Initiatives, September 17, 2002, accessed at https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020917-1.html.  





21st century careers … high-quality civic learning equips students with the very skills they need 
to succeed in the 21st century—the ability to communicate effectively, to work collectively, to 
ask critical questions, and to thrive in diverse workplaces.”14  
According to Duncan, this new type of civic education required the inputs not just of 
educators and schools but also of “visionary leaders” including higher education faculty and 
deans, “creative” nonprofits, foundations, business leaders, actors, jurists, artists, and lawmakers. 
It also required, according to Duncan, federal, state, and local leaders to “promote high-quality 
civic learning and establish public-private partnerships.”14F15 The report identified nine areas by 
which the Department of Education intended to support civic education, including: catalyzing 
schools and higher education institutions to increase and enhance civic learning; identifying civic 
indicators to be placed in department youth surveys; identifying best practices in civic learning 
through research and engagement of citizen input and underrepresented institution, including 
historically Black Colleges and Universities; and, leveraging public-private partnerships to 
support civic education.15F16 
 The Donald Trump administration acted on civic education in its final months in office.  
On November 2, 2020, a day before the presidential elections, the Trump administration made 
public its own conceptualization of civic education when it established, by executive order, the 
1776 Commission. For this administration, civic education was not seen as a vehicle that would 
promote equity and career readiness, nor one that would foster patriotism, service, and 
citizenship in light of foreign challenges. Rather, its interpretation of civic education could be 
 
14 Secretary Arne Duncan’s Remarks at “For Democracy’s Future” Forum at the White House, January 10, 2012, accessed at 
https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/secretary-arne-duncans-remarks-democracys-future-forum-white-house. 
15 Secretary Arne Duncan’s Remarks at “For Democracy’s Future” Forum at the White House, January 10, 2012, accessed at 
https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/secretary-arne-duncans-remarks-democracys-future-forum-white-house. 





viewed as an extension of Trump’s “Make American Great Again” ideology and a reaction to 
what it termed as a “cancel culture” movement emanating from the left. The Commission was 
created in response to the 1619 Project, launched in August of 2019 by the New York Times 
with the goal to “reframe the country’s history by placing the consequences of slavery and the 
contributions of black Americans at the very center of our national narrative.”17 The project, 
which coincided with the rise of the Black Live Movement era in the United States, views 1619--
the year when the first enslaved Africans arrived in Virginia-- as the founding date of the United 
States. The creators of the 1619 project developed a vast array of curricula resources, activities, 
and guides for educators to use in their classrooms.   The Trump administration characterized it 
as “a series of polemics” that resulted in “many students [being] taught in school to hate their 
own country, and to believe that the men and women who built it were not heroes, but rather 
villains.”17F18  
According to the executive order, this “radicalized view of American history … lacks 
perspective, obscures virtues, twists motives, ignores or distorts facts, and magnifies flaws, 
resulting in the truth being concealed and history disfigured. Failing to identify, challenge, and 
correct this distorted perspective could fray and ultimately erase the bonds that knit our country 
and culture together.”19 Education Secretary Betsy Devos noted that the work of the Commission 
will “help focus the national conversation on the great American story and the importance of 
ensuring the rising generation understands the values of our founding, the contents of our 
Constitution and the critical need to be engaged citizens.”19F20  
 
17 See https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html. 
18 Executive Order on Establishing the President’s Advisory 1776 Commission, November 2, 2020, available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-establishing-presidents-advisory-1776-commission/. 
19 Executive Order on Establishing the President’s Advisory 1776 Commission, November 2, 2020, available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-establishing-presidents-advisory-1776-commission/. 





The Commission was tasked with producing a report “regarding the core principles of the 
American founding and how these principles may be understood to further enjoyment of ‘the 
blessings of liberty ’and to promote our striving to form a more perfect Union,” as well as 
undertake several other initiatives that aim to encourage and promote “patriotic education.”21 
The timing of its establishment was viewed by some as opportunistic and as “campaign fodder 
for Trump’s base” with little real implications for schools as the federal government, under 
ESSA, cannot dictate content or curriculum (Ravitch, 2020). The Commission released its report 
on January 18, 2021 a few days before the inauguration of Joe Biden. 21F22 It was condemned by the 
American Historical Association and 46 other organizations. 22F23 Joe Biden dissolved the 1776 
Commission by executive order on his first day in office (Hess, 2021). 
 
Federal Legislation and Appropriations on Civic Education 
Congressional legislative activity on civic education in the post-NCLB era suggests 
relatively limited federal action on civic education. From 1981-2020, a total of 76 bills and 
resolutions were introduced in the U.S. Congress making some reference to civic education 
(Figure 2). Of these, only 8 became law and of those 8 only the following 3 did so after 2000: the 
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, the American History and Civics Education Act of 2004, and 




21 Executive Order on Establishing the President’s Advisory 1776 Commission, November 2, 2020, available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-establishing-presidents-advisory-1776-commission/. 
22 The 1776 Report, available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Presidents-Advisory-
1776-Commission-Final-Report.pdf. 





 Figure 2. Congressional Activity on Civic Education, 1981-2021 
 
Source: Congress.gov.  
Note:  Search limited to bills and resolutions in education policy containing a reference to “civics.”  
  
NCLB explicitly addressed civic education in subpart 3 setting as goals to:‘‘ (1) to 
improve the quality of civics and government education by educating students about the history 
and principles of the Constitution of the United States, including the Bill of Rights; (2) to foster 
civic competence and responsibility; and (3) to improve the quality of civic education and 
economic education through cooperative civic education and economic education exchange 
programs with emerging democracies.”24 NCLB sought to meet these goals through a 
noncompetitive grant to the Center for Civic Education to focus on civic education activities, a 
noncompetitive grant to the National Council on Economic Education to deliver economic 
education activities, and grants or contracts to other organizations to carry out international civic 
education activities.25  
 
24 The No Child Left Behind Act (2001), available at https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ110/PLAW-107publ110.pdf. 





Although not characterized as “civic education,” NCLB also established the Teaching 
American History program which was a direct federal-to-local discretionary grant program 
aiming to “increase students ’knowledge of history by providing funds to school districts to 
design, implement and demonstrate effective, research-based professional development 
programs. The program [was] predicated on the idea that students who know and appreciate 
American history will be well-prepared to understand and exercise their civic rights and 
responsibilities.”25F26  The Teaching American History program was the product of advocacy 
efforts launched by Senator Robert Byrd from West Virginia to encourage schools around the 
country to focus on history education. 26F27  
Finally, NCLB addressed civic education by establishing the Close Up Fellowship. This 
program offered financial aid to economically disadvantaged, middle, and secondary school 
students coming from families that migrated to the United States within five years. The financial 
assistance enabled these students to spend one week in Washington DC attending seminars on 
government and current affairs and meeting with leaders from various branches of government. 
The program also provided funding to support professional development for teachers of the 
participating students.28  
 The 2004 American History and Civics Education Act build on the Teaching American 
History Program and authorized the Secretary of Education to award up to 12 competitive grants 
to organizations experienced in the teaching of history to establish two programs—the 
Presidential Academies for Teaching of American History and Civics and the Congressional 
 
26 No Child Left Behind: A Desktop Reference (2002), prepared by the Secretary of Education, available at 
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/nclbreference/reference.pdf. 
27 Senator Byrd’s Efforts to Renew History Education, July 17, 2020, accessed at https://www.byrdcenter.org/blog/senator-byrds-
efforts-to-renew-history-education. 





Academies for Students of American History and Civics. The 2004 Act also offered financial 
support for professional development of history and civics teachers and the National History Day 
program.29  
The 2015 Every Student Succeeds Act authorized the Secretary of Education to carry out 
a program to improve: ‘‘(1) the quality of American history, civics, and government education 
by educating students about the history and principles of the Constitution of the United States, 
including the Bill of Rights; and (2) the quality of the teaching of American history, civics, and 
government in elementary schools and secondary schools, including the teaching of traditional 
American history.”30 ESSA preserved the competitive grants for Presidential and Congressional 
Academies established by the 2004 American History and Civics Education Act and the 
eligibility criteria for applicants (demonstrated expertise in historical methodology or teaching of 
history). It offered a more robust description of what the Academies should look like in terms of 
programming, as well as a stipend for participating teachers and students.  
ESSA also specified, in a departure from the 2004 Act but more in line with the Obama 
administration’s interest in promoting public-private ventures discussed earlier, that 
organizations awarded the grants shall match 100 percent of the amount granted (a condition that 
could be waived at the discretion of the Secretary if it was determined that doing so would result 
in hardship for the organization and impact the activities intended to be carried out). In another 
nod to the one of the nine principles identified in the 2012 Call to Action, ESSA authorized the 
Secretary to grant competitive grants to organizations to promote, develop, implement, evaluate, 
and disseminate “evidence-based strategies to encourage innovative American history, civics and 
 
29 American History and Civics Education Act (2004), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-
bill/5360.  




government, and geography instruction.” ESSA also specified that financial support would be 
provided to local education agencies that “offer well-rounded educational experiences to 
students” that may include, among others, American history, economics, geography, social 
studies, or government education. 30F31 
Civic education advocates hailed ESSA as an opportunity for several reasons. First, 
because it explicitly identified civics, government, history, geography, and economics as 
components of a “well-rounded education”. Second, because it required that all states should 
develop their state plans with input from community stakeholders (thus opening the door to civic 
education advocates). Third, because it required that states include in their plans indicators of 
school quality and student success outside of the tested subjects it was seen as an opportunity to 
include civic preparation of students as an indicator (Brenna, 2017). For critics of NCLB, ESSA 
marked a shift away from the emphasis on accountability, testing, and standards that in their 
estimation crippled the capacity of schools to meet their civic mission and to develop well-
rounded and adequately prepared citizens (Ravitch, 2010). By 2017, of all the state 
accountability plans submitted to the USDOE, 10 states32 made some form of reference to civics 
and/or social studies (Levine & Kwashima-Ginsberg, 2017). An additional four states have done 
the same since 2017, including Georgia, Minnesota, New York, and Pennsylvania. Of the 14 
states that referenced civic education in their ESSA plans 8 have adopted only the C3 
Framework, while 9 supported Joe Biden in the 2020 presidential election.  
But other accounts appear to suggest that ESSA, much like NCLB, did little to entice 
states to act on civics/social studies, as references to civics remain “limited primarily to special 
 
31 Every Student Succeeds Act (2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ95/PLAW-114publ95.pdf. 
32 The following states included had referenced civic education in their ESSA plans by 2017: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, 




programs for preparing teachers under Title II” (Hansen et al, 2018). While ESSA does require 
that local school districts use a percentage of federal money on coursework supporting a “well-
rounded education,” it does not require them to use it on civics. Additionally, the competitive 
grant funds authorized by ESSA for civics are meant to financially support collaborations 
between school districts and non-profit organizations to bring to schools limited programming 
related to civics, not to encourage schools to support curricula-wide focus on civics 
(Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2017). In this respect, ESSA maintains the status of civics as 
“second-tier” academic subject (Hansen et al, 2018). 
Any enthusiasm by civic education advocates regarding ESSA was short-lived, as ESSA 
did not appropriate funds to support its titles, for which full appropriation would have required 
by one estimate $1.6 billion (Warren and Harris, 2017). In 2017, the ESSA programs 
“appropriated at a combined $10 million, or less than 1 percent of the authorized amount” 
(Warren and Harris, 2017).  
Even more telling in terms of civic education not being a high priority for the federal 
government may be the reduction of federal appropriations devoted to civic education. 
According to Inspired to Serve, a report released in March 2020 by the National Commission on 
Military, National, and Public Services (established by Congress in 2017 to review all forms of 
service in the United States), federal funding reserved for civic education programs peaked at 
approximately $150 million in 2010, with the largest portion (about $100 million) devoted to the 
Teaching American History Grant program (TAH). In 2011, Congress eliminated funding to 
TAH33 and to We the People, which from the time of its inception in 2002 received $75 million 
in federal funding (Geary, 2018).  
 





Starting in the early 2000s, with the NCLB’s emphasis on testing, accountability, 
mathematics, literacy, and then science, Congress started shifting more funding to STEM 
education (Adams, 2019). By 2019, the federal government spent about $3.2 billion on STEM 
education, versus $5 million on civic education.34 According to Ted McConnell, the executive 
director of the Campaign for the Civic Mission of schools, that translates to “$54 per school 
child in this country [for STEM] as opposed to the very paltry amount of about five cents per 
student spent on civics” (Adams, 2019).  Inspired to Serve argued that these funding reductions 
“send an important signal to policymakers and education leaders throughout the Nation. In an 
environment characterized by competing curricular demands, an acute teacher shortage, and 
financial challenges in many jurisdictions, limited Federal investment in civic education makes it 
increasingly difficult for teachers and schools to treat this essential topic as a priority.”34F35 
Civic education reformers point to the reduction of funding as evidence of a waning 
federal commitment to civic education (Adams, 2019). For civic education reformers, the 
NCLB’s focus on language arts, math, and later science constituted an “omission” and a “sign 
that other priorities have displaced civic education on the public agenda” (Jamieson, 2013). Even 
some members of the Bush administration acknowledged the impact of NCLB on civic 
education, albeit considering it an “unintended consequence”: “Unfortunately—as many 
educators, policymakers and others have rightly complained—focusing on reading and math 
alone can lead schools to abandon other subject areas, including civic education” (Birkland, 
2011). Thus, to understand the relationship between federal policies and the recent civic 
education policy reform one must look less at what these federal policies did for civic education 
and much more at what reformers perceived that they did to civic education. A discussion on 
 
34 Inspire to Serve, available at https://www.inspire2serve.gov/reports.  




how NCLB incentivized a nonprofit “call to action” on civic education follows in the next 
section of this chapter.  
 
The Role of Nonprofits in Civic Education Policy Reform 
The limited federal involvement in civic education in the post-NCLB era came at a time 
of direct federal involvement in other content areas. In this regard, the indirect effects of NCLB 
on civic education, opened the door for civic education reformers to launch in the early 2000s a 
“call to action” aiming to counter what they perceived as the marginalization of social studies 
and its civics subset. The call to action was deeply rooted, as discussed below, in a long standing, 
well-established narrative, advanced by proponents of participatory citizenship, that the central 
mission of education is to cultivate citizens. Paradoxically, perhaps, the call to action was not 
deterred by the lack of scholarly consensus on the extent to which civic education does in fact 
generate better civic outcomes. The rhetoric espoused by all nonprofit organizations that issued 
the call to action was one grounded in a firm belief that schools have a civic mission. 
Interestingly, not all agreed, however, on exactly what schools should do to fulfill this mission.  
 
The NCLB-Inspired “Call to Action”  
 In late 2002, the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning (CIRCLE) and 
the Carnegie Foundation, in consultation with the Corporation for National and Community 
Service, convened a series of meetings of scholars and practitioners to identify the “components 
of effective and feasible civic education programs.”35F36 The findings of these discussions were 
summarized in a report that Carnegie and CIRCLE published in 2003 entitled The Civic Mission 
 
36 Carnegie Corporation of New York, CIRCLE. The Civic Mission of Schools (Carnegie Corporation of New York and CIRCLE, 




of Schools. The report, which arguably constitutes the civic education-version of A Nation at 
Risk, noted that civic education is “crucial for the future health of our democracy,” has been a 
long-standing goal of education, and “was the primary impetus for originally establishing public 
schools.”36F37  
According to the report, civic education helps “young people acquire and learn to use the 
skills, knowledge, and attitudes that will prepare them to be competent and responsible citizens 
throughout their lives.”38 It defined competent and responsible citizens as those who are 
informed and thoughtful, participate in their communities, act politically, and have moral and 
civic virtues. The report argued that schools are uniquely positioned to aid civic education 
because they have “the capacity and mandate to reach virtually every young person in the 
country,” are “best equipped to address the cognitive aspects of good citizenship,” and are 
“communities in which young people learn to interact, argue, and work together with others, an 
important condition for future citizenship.”38F39  
 The report identified several factors that made 2003 an opportune time to call for a 
renewed interest in civic education, including: low levels of youth engagement in politics; 
declining school-based civic education; teacher apprehension to engage with controversial 
topics; budget cuts impacting extra-curricular activities; and the impact of high-stakes testing. 
On the last factor, the report explicitly took on NCLB and stated that: “In the current educational 
environment of high-stakes testing, the focus tends to be on math and reading while civics and 
government get little attention. As a result, a message is being sent that civic knowledge, skills, 
 
37 Carnegie Corporation of New York, CIRCLE. The Civic Mission of Schools (Carnegie Corporation of New York and CIRCLE, 
2003), accessed at https://www.carnegie.org/publications/the-civic-mission-of-schools/.  
38 Carnegie Corporation of New York, CIRCLE. The Civic Mission of Schools (Carnegie Corporation of New York and CIRCLE, 
2003), accessed at https://www.carnegie.org/publications/the-civic-mission-of-schools/.  
39 Carnegie Corporation of New York, CIRCLE. The Civic Mission of Schools (Carnegie Corporation of New York and CIRCLE, 




and attitudes are not valued. We believe that education for citizenship is on a par with reading, 
math, and science and, in fact, could and should be included in standard setting when developing 
education policy.”40  
The report made seven recommendations. First, it called on schools to work with state 
departments of education and local school districts to establish curricula based on “six promising 
approaches to civic education.”41 Second, it called on school administrators to encourage 
educators to engage with controversial issues. Third, it called on the federal government to 
increase funding for civic education. Fourth, it advocated for the creation of standards for civic 
education based on the six promising approaches. Fifth, it called on schools of education to 
strengthen the civic dimension of teaching and training. Sixth, it called on researchers to further 
pursue best practice research of civic education. Finally, it called on “funders” to support efforts 
to build national and state coalitions to advocate for civic education in schools.  
 The publication of this report was followed by the establishment of the Campaign for the 
Civic Mission of Schools, a coalition comprised initially of 40 organizations (by 2013 that 
number increased to more than 60) interested in “improving the quality and quantity of civic 
learning in American school” and aiming to reestablish “civic learning as one of the three 
principal purposes of American education” in addition to college and career preparation 
(Jamieson, 2013). The Campaign played a critical role in leading subsequent efforts to advance 
civic education reform.  
 
40 Carnegie Corporation of New York, CIRCLE. The Civic Mission of Schools (Carnegie Corporation of New York and CIRCLE, 
2003), accessed at https://www.carnegie.org/publications/the-civic-mission-of-schools/. 
41 The six practices include: 1) Provide instruction in government, history, law, and democracy; 2) Incorporate discussion of 
current local, national, and international issues and events into the classroom, particularly those that young people view as 
important to their lives; 3) Design and implement programs that provide students with the opportunity to apply what they learn 
through performing community service that is linked to the formal curriculum and classroom instruction; 4) Offer extracurricular 
activities that provide opportunities for young people to get involved in their schools or communities; 5) Encourage student 




 A few months later, in August of 2003, the conservative Fordham Foundation released its 
own report interpreting differently the impact of NCLB on civic education. Entitled Where did 
Social Studies Go Wrong, the report, much like The Civic Mission of School, noted that: the 
“omission of social studies and, more importantly, of history, geography, and civics from NCLB 
is beginning to have deleterious effects. It’s causing some states and schools to downplay these 
subjects in favor of others for which they’ll be publicly accountable and compare with each 
other. As the old educator truism puts it, what gets tested is what gets taught” (Leming, et al, 
2003). 
The report, however, was less concerned with faulting NCLB (it characterized its creators 
as “patriots”), and more interested in responding to the “social studies establishment” (the 
coalition formed by organizations led by CIRCLE and Carnegie) which it viewed as “lunatics” 
taking “over the asylum.” For the authors of the Fordham report, members of the “social studies 
establishment” possessed “no respect for Western civilization … were inclined to view 
America’s evolution as a problem for humanity … interpreted civics as consisting largely of 
political activism and service learning rather than understanding how laws are made and why it 
is important to live in a society governed by laws.”  The report argued that schools “have an 
important role to play” in preparing “knowledgeable and patriotic citizens” and that a “decent 
social studies curriculum” is one that espouses the tenet that “democracy’s survival depends 
upon our transmitting to each new generation the political vision of liberty and equality before 
the law that unites us as Americans--and a deep loyalty to the political institutions our Founders 
put together to fulfill that vision” (Leming, et al, 2003).  
 In 2003, another nonprofit organization, the AFT-affiliated Albert Shanker Institute 




Civic Core (Gagnon, 2003). The Shanker Institute report examined the capacity of existing state 
social studies standards to improve student “political education.” It found that although much 
“good” work had been done, the standards varied widely and “consisted simply of a laundry list 
of people, events, and dates to be memorized and therefore failed to develop civic competence 
and critical thinking” (Jamieson, 2013). According to the report, the laundry list approach 
stemmed from writers being unwilling to “battle over what to put in and leave out” and meant 
that the standards were “rarely coverable, much less teachable in ways the standards documents 
themselves declare as ideal: that is, in both breadth and depth, with much writing, inquiry and 
“active learning,” group projects, simulations, debates, seminars, and exhibits.” Furthermore, 
according to the report, the approach left schools “at the mercy of shifting views” and “imposed 
impossible demands” on educators tasked with “tailoring instruction and assessments to the 
standards” thus undercutting “equal opportunity [among students] to learn” (Gagnon, 2003).   
 The Shanker Institute report called for the creation of a “common civic core” focused on 
“a study of American society and politics, and other people’s ideas and lives, past and present, 
from kindergarten through high school that must be required for all students and be uniform in its 
main focus, though not in detail or methods.” In response to the unfolding ideological debate 
between the Fordham report and the Civic Mission on Schools, the Shanker report noted that “the 
usual objection ‘whose culture is it? Who is to say ’should not apply to civic education” because 
“citizens of whatever class, race, age, gender, religion or cultural taste need a common body of 
knowledge that gives them the power to talk to each other as equals on their society’s priorities, 
each others’ experiences in it, and the political choices it confronts. Together, they need to grasp 




So unfolded the “social studies wars” in the early 2000s (Evans, 2004) as civic education 
reformers knew that some type of standardization of social studies education, and its civic 
education subset, was on the horizon as the call to action to preserve the status of the discipline 
in the wake of the NCLB’s increasing emphasis on literacy, mathematics, and science was 
gaining momentum. Yet, the “call to action” launched by civic education reformers on all sides 
appears somewhat paradoxical, as there was in the early 2000s (and still is) little consensus in the 
scholarly literature that in fact civic education correlates with civic outcomes. A discussion of 
that literature follows.  
 
Calls for Reform, But Based on What Evidence? The Literature on Civic Education  
The relationship between education and various civic capacities has been well explored in 
political and other social science literature from various angles.  America’s public schools were 
long ago ascribed the responsibility to prepare informed and engaged citizens (Dewey, 1916; 
Jefferson, 1810; Hochschild & Scovronick, 2000; Hahn & Torney-Purta, 1999; Mann, 1848;). 
Discussions on the sustainability of democracy and the challenges that it faces have highlighted 
the prominent role that education plays (Almond & Verba, 1963; Converse, 1972; Dahl, 1998).  
Scholars have also noted that public education remains uniquely qualified to strengthen human 
capital and civic engagement (Putnam, 2000), and the capacity of civic education to address the 
civic empowerment gap (Levine, 2017; Levinson, 2012). Numerous studies sought to assess the 
relationship between civic education and several participatory and deliberative democratic 
outcomes, including support for civil liberties, civic and political knowledge, and civic and 




Nie et al, 1996; Niemi & Junn, 1998). Others looked at the impact of civics-infused experiential 
experiences on the same factors (Pasek, et al 2008; Morgan & Streb, 2001; Niemi, et al 2000).  
Yet, the actual link between civic education and these outcomes remains “in a proverbial 
black box” (Campbell, 2006, p. 26). As Campbell argued, “we know that people attend school, 
and then they experience a boost in their level of engagement. What precisely happens to them in 
school (if anything) to lead to an increase in engagement is not well understood” (2006, p. 26). 
Although the relationship between educational attainment and civic engagement (primarily 
voting) had been fairly well captured as one that is positive (Almond and Verba, 1963, Dee, 
2004, Henderson, 2018, Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos, 2004), the same cannot be said about 
the relationship between civic education and civic engagement. Indeed, Langton and Jennings ’
1968 study found that formal civic curricula had no effect on political attitudes and behavior: 
“there is a lack of evidence that the civics curriculum has a significant effect on the political 
orientations of the great majority of American high school students” (p. 62). The Langton and 
Jennings study had a monumental effect on the field of political science, becoming in essence 
“conventional wisdom” for almost three decades.  
This started to change in the late 1990s with the publication of three key studies (Galston, 
2001). In 1996, Delli Carpini and Keeter found that political knowledge was positively 
associated with political participation. The same year Nie and co-authors (1996) sought to 
understand why and how formal education is the “universal solvent.” They found that formal 
education is related to two dimensions of citizenship: political engagement and political 
enlightenment.  In a 1998 analysis that challenged Langton and Jennings, Niemi and Junn found 
that civics course work was related to political knowledge. Inspired by these findings, Galston 




learning goals had the potential to stimulate an increase of political knowledge (Galston, 2001). 
He asserted that, “The more knowledge citizens have of civic affairs, the less likely they are to 
experience a generalized mistrust of, or alienation from, public life” (Galston, 2001, p. 234). 
Galston warned that going forward “researchers cannot afford to overlook the impact of formal 
civic education and related school-based experiences on the civic outlook of young adults” 
(Galston, 2001, p. 232). 
It would be inaccurate, however, to claim that all scholarly literature exploring the 
relationship between civic education and engagement generated evidence of positive effects. On 
the contrary, the findings have been mixed, depending on the methodology employed and on the 
outcome variable of interest. Manning & Edwards (2014) concluded that “civic education 
programmes should not be viewed as a vehicle for increasing voter registration/enrolment or 
voter turnout” as it “is highly likely that factors beyond political knowledge and awareness affect 
people’s decisions about voting” (p. 42).  Similarly, in their 2008 study, Kam and Palmer 
generated findings undermining a causal link between education and political participation.  
Another challenge to the relationship between civic education and civic engagement 
came from Green, et al. in a 2011 study found that a civics education curriculum had no effect on 
general knowledge about politics nor support for civil liberties and while it had an effect on 
knowledge of civil liberties it dissipated one year after the treatment. Campbell and Niemi 
(2016) sought to ascertain whether state-level civics exams have a positive impact on civic 
knowledge. They concluded that there is little evidence that such an exam does lead to greater 
political knowledge. More recently Holbein and Hillygus (2020) argue that their own study 




have an impact on voter participation” (p. 129) and that “civics has been ineffective at promoting 
active citizenship for decades” (p. 119).  
Even studies seeking to capture the impact of civics-infused educational experiences have 
been unable to concretely capture what type of experiences actually have an impact on civic 
outcomes. In a 2008 study Pasek, Feldman, and Jamieson sought to ascertain the long-term 
impact of the Student Voices program on political involvement. They found that students 
exposed to the program demonstrated long-term increased in internal efficacy, political 
attentiveness and knowledge. Less promising, however, were the results of another looking at 
whether service-learning projects had an impact on civic engagement (Morgan & Streb 2001). It 
found that service-learning had a positive impact only when students felt that they had a “voice” 
(i.e. real responsibilities, challenging tasks, made decisions) in the project.  
The conclusion that service-learning matters only under specific conditions was further 
validated by another study. Using the 1996 National Household Education Survey, Niemi, 
Hepburn, and Chapman (2000) assessed whether participation in service-learning and 
community service had an effect on political knowledge, attention to news, participation skills, 
efficacy, and tolerance. They found that only “substantial” service “stimulates greater political 
knowledge, more discussion with parents, and the feeling that one can understand politics and 
express one’s concerns publicly” and that “tolerance of diversity, however, is unrelated to levels 
of participation” (p. 46).  
Interestingly, the inconclusive evidence about the relationship between civic education 
and civic outcomes did not serve as a deterrent for civic education reformers that mobilized in 
the early 2000s. The call to action, as noted earlier, was firmly rooted in the narrative that 




narrative that guided the reform efforts is discussed in the section that follows, along with its 
critics.  
 
The Civic Education Narrative and its Critics  
Scholarly proponents of participatory democratic citizenship argue that democracy and 
education have always been explicitly linked in America and it was never otherwise. Dahl (1998) 
solidified the relationship between education and democracy noting that “opportunities to gain an 
enlightened understanding of public matters are not just part of the definition of democracy. 
They are a requirement for democracy. … This is precisely why advocates of democracy have 
always placed a high value on education” (p. 79). Others followed and argued that schools were 
uniquely positioned to prepare students for citizenship (Barber, 1998; Galston, 2001; Gutmann, 
1999; Levinson, 2012; Macedo, 2000; Schudson, 1998; Williams, 2011). 
 Some scholars link the relationship between education and democracy to the very 
founding of American public schools, noting that Horace Mann argued that “a republican form 
of government, without intelligence in the people, must be, on a vast scale, what a mad-house, 
without superintendents or keepers, would be on a small one” (Kahlenberg and Janey, 2016, p 3). 
Such scholars evoke the deliberative democratic model and point to John Dewey, who noted that 
“a society which makes provision for participation in its good of all members on equal terms and 
which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms 
of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which 
gives individuals interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure 
social changes without introducing disorder” (Dewey, 1916, p. 100). Proponents of the 




the civic mission of schools who in 1907 argued that “The function of the public school is to 
produce a good type of citizenship. There is no other sanction for the existence of the public 
school” (1907, p. iii). More recently, Gutmann (1999) explicitly made the case that education has 
democratic goals, while Macedo (2000) noted that one of the core purposes of public schooling 
is the promotion of civic ideas.  
The deliberative democratic model assumes that citizens must be able to engage with 
ideas and to interpret events critically (Callan, 1997; Cohen, 2003). According to Stacie Molnar-
Main (2017) the rationale for deliberation in civic education is not “to produce complete 
agreement among participants. The broad goals, among other curricular goals, are to promote 
improved understanding of the issue, awareness of the consequences of various responses, and 
recognition of commonly held values that can inform future action” (p. 13).  
Proponents of deliberative and participatory citizenship have sounded alarm bells when, 
in their view, policies and politics threaten the core civic mission of schools. Writing in early 
1990s in light of the legislative response to A Nation at Risk, Wood warned that “the legislative 
excellence movement is primarily concerned with the American economy, not with the lives of 
children. … Today we seem to hear little about the democratic purpose of education. Perhaps we 
should remind ourselves that this was the reason for establishing public education.… This task of 
public education, the education of democratic citizens, is most at risk in our schools” (Wood, 
1993, p. xviii, xxiii).  
Writing a few years later, Cuban and Shipps (2000) further emphasized the tension 
between policies and mission: “public schools are still expected to yield both civically-minded 
independent thinkers who care for their communities and marketable entry level workers. … 




4).   Echoing these sentiments, Ravitch and Viteritti (2001) warned that “unless schools provide 
our children with a vision of human possibility that enlightens and empowers them with 
knowledge and taste, they will simply play their role in someone else’s marketing schemes. 
Unless they understand deeply the sources of our democracy, they will take it for granted and fail 
to exercise their rights and responsibilities. …The best protection for a democratic society is 
well-educated citizens” (p. 28).  
The deliberative democratic model has been critiqued by some for encouraging resistance 
to authority and tradition (Bennett, 1993; Hunter, 2000; Kilpatrick, 1993). This school of thought 
believes that education has a civic mission tied to promoting patriotic civic virtues and ideas. The 
model has been associated with a more conservative segments of American society and its 
ideology if often informed by religion and politics. This model has become more visible in times 
of national crises. For example, World War I, the onset of the Cold War, and the September 11th 
attacks sparked calls for patriotism and American values to be emphasized in schools (Murphy, 
2003; Westheimer, 2007).  
Additionally, the deliberative and participatory models have been critiqued by others for 
emphasizing a singular, civically-oriented goal for education. The narrative of the democratic 
purpose of schooling was challenged decades ago by Bowles and Gintis (1976) who argued that 
public education has not aimed to prepare students for authentic democratic participation, but 
rather for acceptance of an unequal social order. Another critique of the democratic purposes of 
public education came in 1985 by Carnoy and Levin. Much like Bowles and Gintis, they argued 
that public education evolves in response to the needs to a capitalist system and has been used as 
its tool. According to Carnoy and Levin, public education is “the arena of conflict over the 




meet their needs and business attempts to reproduce hegemony” (p. 50). Labaree (1988) also 
cautioned that the mission of schools had more to do with preserving a certain type of economic 
order and that education has been a “source of private benefit rather than as a source of public 
good,” as well as a “mechanism for allocating social status” (Labaree, 2018).  
In identifying other purposes of education, Hochschild and Scovronick (2000) argued that 
education is tasked with achieving three, not one, goal: sustaining the American dream of 
individual attainment, promoting democracy, and demonstrating respect for the identities of 
distinct groups. The latter point aligns with additional, more recent studies highlighting that 
those who view education through the participatory model fail to recognize that education has to 
uphold a commitment to norms of equality and tolerance. Wodtke (2012) analyzed the effects of 
education on attitudes about racial stereotypes, discrimination, and affirmative action policies. 
He found that more educated whites and more educated minorities do not show a “heightened 
commitment to policies designed specifically to overcome these pernicious forms of racial 
discrimination” (p. 103). He argued that that “a primary ideological function of the formal 
education system is to marginalize ideas and values that are particularly challenging to existing 
power structures, perhaps even among those that occupy disadvantaged social positions” (p. 
103). 
Critical perspectives have also noted that advocating for a civic mission of school makes 
these very institutions vulnerable to serving as vehicles of competing definitions of democracy. 
Apple cautioned that “while we need to be optimistic about the possibility of [schools] creating 
lasting transformations, we should not be romantic,” as “there is an ongoing contest over 
different versions of democracy” and that “this has important implications for those of us who 




visions of what education is for” (Apple, 2018, p. 7). Highlighting this further, Murphy (2007) 
argued that “as we repeatedly learned throughout U.S. history, once public schools adopt any 
particular conception of moral or civic education beyond the moral education inherent to 
academic study, not only is the moral integrity of schooling likely to be compromised as the 
curriculum and pedagogy are manipulated in an attempt to indoctrinate students, but this loss of 
integrity also will fray the civic trust necessary for vibrant common schools” (Murphy, 2007).  
 
From “Call to Action” to National Policy Initiatives 
The critiques of the narrative that schools have first and foremost a civic mission are 
several, as described above. None of these, however, deterred civic education reformers in the 
early 2000s from launching their call to action. Their motivation to save civic education in the 
wake of NCLB was in deep alignment with the participatory and deliberative narrative and its 
beliefs. Undeterred by critical voices and by the lack of conclusive evidence, civic education 
reformers continued in the late 2000s their call to reform civic education. To enhance their policy 
platforms, they mobilized as evidence survey results generated by their own advocacy wings. 
The strategy of using research-based evidence to advance policy reform was one employed by 
education policy reformers in other areas as well, particularly Common Core Standards 
(McDonnell and Weatherford, 2020).  
In the case of civic education policy reform, examples of research based-evidence used 
include the results of a 2006 survey by the Center for Education Policy, a think tank focused on 
public education policies, on the effects on NCLB on elementary school instruction. According 
to the survey, instructional time for subjects not tested by NCLB had declined by one-third since 




Council for Social Studies, Susan Griffin, noted in 2009: “When that instruction time gets 
reduced ... [students] aren’t learning basic U.S. history, which informs civics, or they may not 
have a good picture of how our government compares with another” (Zehr, 2009). Peter Levine, 
the director of CIRCLE, another advocacy organization committed to civic education, noted that 
same year that the problem was not only less instructional time, but also the absence of engaging, 
interactive classroom discussions of current events (Zehr, 2009).  
While the federal-centric NCLB sparked the motivation for a call to action, it was the 
state-centric Common Core that provided reformers with the window of opportunity to go a step 
further. In the early 2010s, as states started to adopt Common Core Standards, civic education 
reformers saw an opportunity to advance concrete policy agendas. The coalition led by the 
Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools sought to secure the civic mission of schools by 
jumping on the standards bandwagon and establishing social studies standards. In this sense it 
traces its roots to the deliberative and participatory democratic citizenship models outlined 
above.  Concurrently, however, another nonprofit organization sought to solidify the same civic 
mission of schools through advancing a different platform: legislative-mandated state civics 
tests. This movement aligned more with the patriotic model discussed above. The two camps 
sought change at a national scale and the resulting national initiatives including the C3 
Framework and the Civic Education Initiative. A discussion of the impact of the Common Core 
on the nonprofit strategies follows, as does a detailed description of the two initiatives.  
 
The Common Core Window of Opportunity  
Civic education reformers took steps toward achieving more concrete policy change 




the adoption of the Common Core standards for literacy, math, and science by the National 
Governors Association and the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO). The Common 
Core standards were voluntarily adopted by most states throughout the country but “accelerated” 
by the fact that the Obama administration made standards (although not necessarily Common 
Core Standards) “a criterion for entry into the federal Race to the Top education grant 
competition” (Jamieson, 2013, p. 71). The Common Core standards movement left civic 
education reformers to “worry” that the standards “inadvertently made the delivery of high-
quality civic education more difficult” (Jamieson, 2013, p. 69). By 2010, the way reformers 
responded to the perceived marginalization of social studies as a result of NCLB and the 
Common Core was to seek “to develop [their] own set of standards” (Journell, 2015, p.631).  
The CCSSO initiated the conversation for the creation of some type of standards for the 
social studies, but left it up to the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools (CCM) and the 
National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) to lead the effort (Swan, 2013). In December of 
2009, Ted McConnell, the executive director of CCM approached the NCSS and offered support 
and resources to convene leaders of national organizations in civics, economic, geography, and 
history to collaborate on the establishment of Common Core Standards in social studies. 
Learning Point Associates, another educational nonprofit organization, was also involved in the 
initial attempts to create this collaboration.42 The NCSS, then president-elect, Steve Armstrong, 
warned in June of 2010 that “if done incorrectly or if a subject is left out [Common Core] has 
great potential to harm a subject.”43 He noted that “social studies standards must be developed by 
cooperation among stakeholder organizations in civics, economics, geography and history. There 
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will not be separate discipline standards. This single set of standards will drive assessment 
systems, as well as curriculum and instructional practices.”44 According to Armstrong, funding 
for the creation of these standards was not available from NGA or CCSSO and that, as a result, 
“NCSS took action with other discipline organizations to become involved in this effort.”45 
According to NCSS, the creation of the standards would be led by a “small decision-making 
group” and a “large advisory group that would include every signatory organization.”45F46  
 As the team convened to start work on these standards, which would eventually become 
the C3 Framework, a number of nonprofit organizations released reports advocating once again 
that action was needed to save civic education. Prominent among them was the 2011 Guardian 
of Democracy: The Civic Mission of Schools.47 In many ways a follow up to the 2003 report, 
Guardian demonstrates the growth of the civic education advocacy movement as several 
organizations, not just CIRCLE and Carnegie, signed off on this version, including all the 
organizational members of the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, the Leonore 
Annenberg Institute of Civics of the Annenberg Center for Public Policy at the University of 
Pennsylvania, the National Conference on Citizenship and the Public Education Division of the 
American Bar Association. The report summarized recommendations made at a conference of 
civic education leaders convened in March 2011 by the Annenberg Foundation Trust at 
Sunnylands in partnership with the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools and the National 
Conference on Citizenship. 
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47 Jonathan Gould, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Peter Levine, Ted McConnell, and David B. Smith, eds. Guardian of Democracy: 
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 The report explicitly noted that “schools are the guardians of democracy” and argued that 
“while there is no single solution that alone can revitalize our democracy, there is one common-
sense step our nation can take to strengthen it. Too often overlooked by politicians, educators, 
and civic engagement advocates, investing in civic learning strengthens American democracy.” 
According to the report, civic learning has the capacity to: address democratic shortfalls (such as 
increasing democratic accountability of elected officials, improving public discourse, and 
fulfilling the ideal of civic equality); promote civic knowledge, skills, and dispositions; promote 
civic equality; instill in youth “twenty-first century competencies” valued by employers; foster 
better school climate and reduce dropout rates.  
 Guardian placed the responsibility to build this type of civic learning on local educators 
and administrators, state and federal policymakers, institutions of higher education, scholars, 
philanthropic funders, parents, the media, and all citizens. Like its 2003 predecessor, Guardian 
identified NCLB as a force that negatively impacted civic learning, but noted that “the narrowing 
of the curriculum far predates No Child Left Behind.” Guardian appeared to be less interested in 
identifying the cause of the marginalization of civic education and more interested in 
highlighting the proposed solution. The report called on localities to“ change how civic learning 
is taught, from the dry facts of history and the structure of government to an emphasis on how 
citizens can and must participate in civic life” and to “treat civic learning as an interdisciplinary 
subject to be employed across the curriculum.” It further called on state policymakers to 
“develop common standards and assessments in social studies through a state-led effort and hold 
schools and districts accountable for student civic learning achievement by inclusion of civic 




Similar reports were published in subsequent years making the case that civic education 
could mitigate declining voting participation rates, low levels of political interest, and low 
performance of students on the National Assessment of Educational Progress. These included a 
2014 report by the Education Commission of the States and the National Center for Learning and 
Civic Engagement, a 2016 report by The Century Foundation, and a 2017 report by the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York and the Robert R. McCormick Foundation.  
In this regard, the “call to action” of the early 2000s had by 2011 transitioned to 
reformers seeking to place on policy agendas with a concrete policy proposal: standards. 
Reformers used survey results as evidence to justify their position: the creation of standards for 
history, civics, geography, and economics would solve challenges facing American democracy. 
This, in some respects, constitutes an evolution from the calls of the 2000s that were concerned 
more with action needed to prevent the marginalization of civics.  The momentum that the 
movement gained in 2010 was incentivized by the Common Core (and the opening provided to 
NCSS and CMS by CCSO to develop standards), but also by the strategy that the movement 
adopted to use data as evidence of a problem that its policy proposal could solve.  
The data used most prominently in the Guardian and the other reports released at that 
time had to do with recently released NAEP scores that indicated that two-thirds of all American 
students scored below proficiency.48  Additional NAEP results cited at this time include: less 
than half of eight graders that took the exam knew the purpose of the Bill of Rights and three 
quarters of high school seniors were unable to name a power granted to Congress by the 
Constitution.49 Proponents of civic education, who by this time included prominent figures like 
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former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (by 2011 a co-chair of the Campaign for 
the Civic Missions of School who contributed to the Guardian) pointed to NAEP scores to place 
greater urgency on the need for civic education reform. According to O’Connor, the “NAEP 
results confirm that we have a crisis on our hands when it comes to civics education.”50 Charles 
Quigley, executive director of the Center for Civic Education noted that “The results confirm an 
alarming and continuing trend that civics in America is in decline …  “During the past decade or 
so, educational policy and practice appear to have focused more and more upon developing the 
worker at the expense of developing the citizen.”50 F51  
Additionally, data cited to bring urgency to the reform came from surveys and research 
conducted by these same organizations. The Guardian featured prominently in its opening pages 
the results of a survey conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy Center and called 
them”reasons for concern” attributed to the decline of civic education, including: only one-third 
of Americans could name all three branches of government; one-third ’could not name any; and  
just over a third thought that it was the intention of the Founding Fathers to have each branch 
hold a lot of power, but the president has the final say.  
As the civic reform movement led by the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools 
gained momentum and started to create social studies standards, another nonprofit organization, 
the Joe Foss Institute was also preparing to enter the civic education reform landscape with an 
alternative solution: the Civic Education Initiative (CEI). The CEI aimed to restore the civic 
mission of schools not through standards. Rather, the preferred strategy was a legislatively-
mandated state civics test. The CEI constituted the 2010s manifestation of the patriotic model of 
civic education touted a decade earlier by the Fordham Institute. It finds its roots in a 2010 board 
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of directors meetings where Norman McClelland, a board member, questioned whether the 
Institute was in fact adequately meeting its objective “to promote civic education and prepare 
students to be informed and engaged citizens.”51F52  
At that meeting, the board concluded that the absence of testing on civics along with the 
new focus on STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) were the primary 
reasons for the declining focus on civic education throughout the nation. The CEI was the 
Institute’s strategic response. It was established to do the following: “First, to bring attention to 
this “quiet crisis” to ensure students graduate with the tools they need to become informed and 
engaged citizens; second, to get civics education back in classrooms across this country.” 
According to its creators, the Civics Education Initiative would be only “the first step in 
expanding civic awareness and learning for our students – we don’t want them to stop with just 
this one program, but for the Civics Education Initiative to serve as a foundation for a re-
blossoming of civic learning and engagement.”52F53 
The Institute defined civic education as the teaching of “how our government works and 
who we are as a nation, preparing them to exercise their vote, solve problems in their 
communities, and engage in active citizenship” (Wong, 2015). It sought to launch a national 
campaign to encourage legislators in all 50 states to pass by September 2017, the 230th 
anniversary of the Constitution, legislation to make the passage of the U.S. Citizenship and 
Naturalization a requirement for high school graduation (Schencker, 2014). Like the C3 camp, 
the CEI also mobilized as evidence facts coming from surveys demonstrating that civics was in 
crisis, most notably the results of a 2010 Pew Research survey that showed that young adults 
lacked basic knowledge about government. But, unlike the C3, the CEI sought to bring about 
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civic education reform not by attaching itself to the Common Core emphasis on the creation of 
state standards. Rather, it sought to bring about change, ironically, in an NCLB-inspired way, as 
it advocated for an assessment to be delivered across all states as a result of legislative mandates.  
The C3 aligns with the model of participatory democratic citizenship, discussed earlier. 
In contrast, the CEI aligns more with the ideology of the moral and patriotic model.  These 
ideologically conflicting civic education platforms—the C3 and the CEI—mobilized to capture 
state legislative and bureaucratic agendas on a national scale. Certainly, the C3 and the CEI are 
not the only forms of civic education policy reform enacted at the state level in recent years. 
Approximately 50 pieces of legislation have been adopted by states on civic education since 
2018 (see Appendix A) and some states, most notably Illinois, Florida, and Massachusetts, have 
enacted civic education policies that go beyond the C3 and CEI. But the majority of states have 
acted in some manner consistent with the C3 and the CEI and, thus, they are considered by this 
study as the most dominant examples of recent civic education policy reforms. The next section 
of this chapter discusses both in greater detail.  
  
The National Initiatives: The C3 Framework and the Civic Education Initiative 
The two reform movements agreed that civic education policy reform was needed in the 
early 2010s. They both believed that civic education needed to be strengthened and they both 
believed that civic education could solve challenges facing American democracy. They both 
sought to bring about change at the national level, not through federal policies, but via capturing 
agendas at multiple states. But they disagreed on two fronts: what civic education actually looks 
like. The C3 opted for inquiry, standards, and the bureaucracy; the CEI for facts, testing, and 
legislatures.  




In 2013, the NCSS issued the College, Career, and Civic Life Framework for State Social 
Studies Standards (C3 Framework). The C3 Framework was the product of a three-year 
collaboration of organizations concerned with the perceived marginalization of social studies and 
civics in the era of NCLB (Griffin, 2013). The key partners included the NCSS and the 
Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools. The C3 Framework was funded by the Gates 
Foundation. In 2009, the Foundation granted to NCSS $351,704 with the purpose to “enhance 
national policies on civic learning, build a more robust national communications and advocacy 
program, and identify and support a laboratory of schools and districts.”54 A second round of 
funding—in the amount of $205,000—was granted in 2014 by the Gates Foundation to NCSS to 
“operationalize a plan designed to help social studies teachers to implement the Common Core 
State Standards.”55 According to the NCSS, with the second grant the organization would 
“operationalize collaborative professional learning opportunities based on the core principles of 
the NCSS College, Career and Civic Life (C3) Framework for Social Studies Standards to 
provide social studies teachers with the necessary supports to engage in instructional shifts that, 
beyond achieving student content mastery, will also achieve the goals of the Common Core State 
Standards for English Language Arts and Literacy in History/Social Studies, Science, and 
Technical Subjects.”55F56 
The C3 Framework capitalized on the Common Core’s focus on literacy but reframed it 
to include academic inquiry and civic action (Griffin, 2013).  The process was initiated by the 
Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) which organized various meetings with 
representatives from 23 states and 15 professional organizations that shared a concern that the 
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Common Core would “marginalize” social studies curricula (Swan, 2013). The CCSSO left the 
writing process to NCSS and CMS. The process involved the feedback of more than 3,000 
individuals including K-12 educators, university faculty, state education personnel, professional 
organization representatives, and cultural organizations (Swan, 2013).  
While the Frameworks were in the final writing stages, the CCSSO opted to disassociate 
itself with the endeavor and to not publish the document. According to the 2013 NCSS 
President-Elect, the decision was driven by “political reasons, as the CCSSO was at the time 
“taking some major political blowback against the common core.”57 As the CCSSO struggled to 
“get the common core through this political minefield” it did not want to “add additional issues 
that might hurt support” and decided that “the C3 document might be one of the diversions that 
would further dilute support for the common core.” The NCSS leadership sought to assure its 
membership that “the decision of CCSSO to drop their support of C3 has nothing to do with the 
document itself” and that the NCSS would be the sole entity responsible for publishing the C3 
Framework. NCSS leadership went as far as to say that “it is somewhat liberating to be away 
from the political minefield of CCSSO and the battles over the common core” and that this 
“move allows social studies to stand on its own merit, and not be tied to the common core as it 
been under CCSSO.”57F58  
The Framework was released in 2013 and aimed to appeal to states interested in 
restructuring social studies standards and curricula (Herczog, 2013). It had three main objectives: 
“enhance the rigor of the social studies disciplines; build the critical thinking, problem solving, 
and participatory skills necessary for students to become engaged citizens; align academic 
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programs in social studies to the Common Core State Standards” (Herczog, 2013). The writers of 
the C3 Framework argue that it links to the Common core by “elevating the purpose of literacy 
to be in the service of academic inquiry and civic action … as social studies content provides the 
context and inspiration for wanting to read, write, and communicate with others” (Swan, 2013).  
According to Framework’s Project Director and lead writer, Kathy Swan: “the writers, 
participants, and reviewers of the C3 Framework see this document as more than a standards 
document. Certainly, standards are an important step in influencing social studies policy. But the 
social studies educators who have worked on the C3 Framework see it as a mission statement for 
a robust social studies experience” (Swan, 2013). Along these lines, the framework promotes 
“the idea that the tools, concepts, and habits of mind within civics, economics, geography, and 
history play a critical role in developing young people’s understanding of the world around them, 
and help to make them college, career, and civic ready. … The C3 Framework also creates a 
relationship within and among the disciplines by anchoring social studies in the process of 
inquiry (Swan, 2013).  
The C3 drew upon an array of established standards—state social studies standards and 
Common Core Standards—and produced a Framework that encourages the process of inquiry in 
the curricula of civics, economics, geography, and history. It was premised on the belief shared 
by its creators that “tools, concepts, and habits of mind within civics, economics, geography, and 
history play a critical role in developing young people’s understanding of the world around them, 
and help to make them college, career, and civic ready” (Swan, 2013). According to its main 
authors, the primary contribution of the C3 has been “the emphasis on civic action as a 
fundamental outcome of a meaningful social studies experience” and “the addition of civic 




(Swan, 2013). According to its creators, the C3 prepares students for civic life for several 
reasons: “First, it encourages the civic act of inquiry by asking students to develop evidence-
based arguments and to share their findings in a variety of modalities—including writing, oral 
and visual means—to diverse audiences. Threaded throughout the Framework is the notion that 
students will be working in collaborative environments, either individually with their teachers or 
with others, to develop questions, to adopt disciplinary perspectives, make claims, and formulate 
conclusions. And lastly, the C3 Framework makes taking informed action an essential skill that 
should be practiced by all social studies students in a vibrant democracy” (Swan, 2013).  
 In 2013, a few months before the NCSS adopted the new Framework, Peter Levine and 
Kei Kawashima-Ginsberg (Director and Deputy Director of CIRCLE), published an article in 
Social Education encouraging states to adopt the C3 in response to the findings of the 2013 
report, All Together Now” (Levine and Kawashima-Ginsberg, 2013).59 According to the authors, 
the report highlighted the need for states to adopt new standards that would be “more 
challenging, more coherent, and more concerned with politics that the typical state standards in 
place today.” They argued that “the upcoming College, Career, and Civic Life (C3) Framework 
for Social Studies State Standards is an important step in that direction; states should adopt the 
Framework.” The authors further argued that the Framework comes at a time when there is 
“urgent need” for “all students to learn to talk and work with people who are different from 
themselves. They must learn to address current matters of controversy and concern, not just 
historical or theoretical cases.” 
The campaign worked. To date, 44 states have revised their social studies standards along 
these lines (see Appendix B). The C3 Framework has been endorsed by the American Historical 
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Association (AHA) and the National Council for History Education (NCHE). By one account, 
the endorsement and participation of these organizations, who contributed members to serve as 
advisors to the creation of the C3 took place because “the NCSS document needed some street 
cred, some History PhD clout” (Horton, 2014). Others critique the C3s limited focus on history 
and preference for inquiry and constructive approaches, arguing that teaching “historical thinking 
within limited contexts” fails to provide students with the historical context and knowledge 
required to understand and assess the “big picture” (Horton, 2014). For these critics, the C3 
Framework “emphasizes a return to the inquiry based ‘post holing ’that the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation support in the Common Core Standards and the Stanford Education Group” 
(Horton, 2014). 
The C3’s emphasis on skills rather than specific content has been critiqued for being a 
strategic attempt by its creators to “fend off fights about both the politics of content and the 
potential for federal overreach into states ’rights” (Au, 2013). The C3 has also been critiqued for 
its emphasis on: 1) liberal individualism at the “exclusion of non-Western conceptions of 
community, social, and cultural collectives”; 2) “discourse of citizenship at a time of rising white 
nationalism and xenophobia in the United States”; 3) its “presumption that the United States 
really does operate on democratic values, when that presumption often depends on which 
community or economic class one hails from” (Au, 2013). A final concern with the C3 deals 
with the possibility that the standards would pave the way for additional standardized testing: “If 
the C3 standards gain the traction that the framers are aiming for, the real question to grapple 
with will be: when the tests come, and they are coming, what will they do to the social studies?” 




For some the decision to leave social studies “last” was problematic and reflective of an 
unwillingness on the part of the NGA and the CCSSO to deal with the task of bringing standards 
to this discipline. Speaking in 2013, after the C3 Framework was made adopted, Leo Casey, the 
Executive Director of the Albert Shanker Institute, noted that the production of standards 
“requires a certain amount of political courage and unfortunately this courage has been lacking. 
Out of fear of the second coming of Lynne Cheney, the NGA and CCSSO left civics to the very 
last of the standards, rolled it into the C3 Framework together with college and career 
preparation, and not fully incorporated them into the main body of the common core. This sends 
the wrong message about the importance of civics and about the value of fighting for civics.”60 
For others, the decision to call the C3 a “framework” was damaging, as was the lack of content 
within it. According to Chester Finn, President of the Thomas Fordham Institute, “So C3 comes 
out and avoids calling itself standards. It claims it’s a framework. I believe it will be interpreted 
as standards. It attempts to attach itself to the common core and in doing it might damage the 
common core. When C3 achieves a certain level of visibility and prominence in American 
society it’s going to be denounced by a vote in the U.S. Senate like the 1990s standards. It’s a 
travesty. It is completely content free.  You will find skills, statements, and the C3 people will 
tell you that states are supposed to come up with content on their own. Well they’ve done a bang 
up job of that over the years … We are sitting in Washington DC. Wouldn’t it be nice to know 
for a kid what is the federal government, who runs it, how it’s organized, what is the Supreme 
Court, what is its role?”60F61 
The Civic Education Initiative. 
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Starting in 2013, the Civics Education Initiative (CEI), spearheaded by the Joe Foss 
Institute, actively advocated across the country by launching sustained campaigns to entice state 
legislatures to introduce and adopt legislation requiring students to pass a civics test to graduate 
from high school. The Institute was founded in 2001 by Joe Foss, a WWII veteran, former 
Republic governor of South Dakota, and former president of the National Rifle Association, and 
his wife Donna Foss. For a decade the institute sent veterans to schools to discuss their 
participation in various conflicts and to promote patriotism. Concerned that this approach was 
not far-reaching, the Institute sought to influence changes through the CEI and encourage state 
legislatures to make the passing of the U.S. Citizenship and Naturalization test a requirement for 
high school graduation.  
When the CEI started it had three explicit goals: “First, to bring attention to this ‘quiet 
crisis’ to ensure students graduate with the tools they need to become informed and engaged 
citizens; second, to get civics education back in classrooms across this country; lastly, that the 
Civics Education Initiative should be only the first step in expanding civic awareness and 
learning for our students … to serve as a foundation for a re-blossoming of civic learning and 
engagement” (McClure, 2017).  
The CEI argued that the decline of political knowledge among America’s youth can be 
explicitly linked to education policies: “The country’s education system began to focus on 
[STEM]. Parallel to that, standardized testing became the way to measure success and 
performance. Then, simultaneously school and teacher funding began to be tied to the results of 
these tests. … Teaching what is tested became the norm and civics was de-emphasized in the 
curriculum” (McClure, 2017). The CEI constitutes the Institute’s response to the “realization” 




outlined in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and more importantly, the history behind how our 
country came to be—the philosophy behind America’s values” (McClure, 2017). According to 
members of this initiative, the CEI offers a solution to this problem because by “putting civics on 
a statewide assessment, we are showing our students that knowing how government functions is 
as important as math, science, or English. So many people aren’t aware let alone engage in the 
issues because they don’t understand the basic civics our generation needs to understand the 
structure of our government.”61F62  
To achieve the goal, it established the Civics Proficiency Institute, a 501(c)(4) that 
between 2013 and 2015 raised close to $800,000 in support of the CEI from donors including, 
Normal McClelland, the chairman of a dairy company, Jim Chamberlain, the founder of a 
contracting firm, and Ken Kendrick, the managing general partners of the Arizona 
Diamondbacks (Vara, 2019). The funding allowed the Institute to hire lobbyists that targeted 
politicians in various states to support the CEI.  Arizona was the first state to pass the Initiative 
in 2015. The legislative efforts failed in some states by some accounts because of concerns that it 
would introduce more testing in the post NCLB-era, but also due to uncertainty about the 
adequacy of the test to generate civic learning (Hess, et. al., 2015). To date, 25 states adopted 
legislation in line with the CEI (see Appendix B).  
Unlike the C3 Framework, the Civic Education Initiative takes a facts-based approach to 
civic education. States targeted by the Joe Foss Institute are encouraged to adopt legislation 
requiring high school students to pass a test comprising 100 questions taken from the United 
States Citizenships Civics Test (Joe Foss Institute website). The CEI encourages states to make 
the passing of the test a requirement for high school graduation but does allow for variation at 
 




the school level in how the test is administered. According to the Joe Foss Institute website, the 
main goal of the CEI remains to “ensure all students are taught basic civics about how our 
government works, and who we are as a nation…things every student should know to be ready 
for active, engaged citizenship.”  
 According to Frank Riggs, the president and CEO of the Joe Foss Institute, the Institute 
first targeted conservative states where it had “traction” (Vara, 2019). Liberal states have also 
been targeted, as the Institute aims through the CEI to “spur a revival in preparing children for 
citizenship; Riggs calls it the third C, along with college and career” (Vara, 2019). Voices critical 
of the CEI, stemming mostly from the left, note that it places at a disadvantage students who are 
recent immigrants and it ““gives over-tested students yet one more exam to take” (Vara, 2019). 
Others are skeptical that the CEI approach will “inspire civic-mindedness” and that other 
approaches—like discussion of current events and volunteering—produce better results (Vara, 
2019). Some critics, like Joseph Kahne, have called the CEI an “empty symbolic effort” and 
“something state legislators can pass and feel good about” (Vara, 2019). Louise Dube, the 
executive director of iCivics, criticized the CEI in 2015 for using a “one-dimensional tool as a 
proxy for an idea of nationhood” rather than an approach that should be a “continuum” 
emphasizing “quality and not just facts” (Wong, 2015). Responding to such critiques, Lucian 
Spataro, a former president of the Jose Foss Institute, noted that the CEI serves only as “first step 
toward getting kids ’civic literacy to an acceptable level” and defended the testing approach by 
saying that it incentivizes teachers to give attention to the subject because “if it’s tested, it’s 
taught” (Wong, 2015). The CEI’s emphasis on testing was further critiqued by educators who 
expressed concern “it might actually reduce the amount of time devoted to civics instruction” 




questions that are public knowledge, then it is plausible that some schools might limit their civics 
instruction to requiring students to memorize test answers” (Journell, 2015). 
 
The Timing of Civic Education Reform: Same Story, Different Decade? 
The recent civic education policy reform comes at a time of heightened concern about the 
state and future of American democracy. In 2018, political scientists Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) 
warned that the “guardrails of American democracy are weakening” (p. 9). The culprit, they 
argue, is “extreme partisan polarization—one that extends beyond policy preference into an 
existential conflict over race and culture” (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 9). In this context, group 
identities align with partisanship in a manner where politics will become “more divisive and 
explosive” (Sides et al, 2018, p. 11).  Others find low levels of political participation and 
knowledge particularly alarming.  Brighouse (2018) argued that “something has gone terribly 
wrong … In November 2016, a large portion of the American electorate was sufficiently 
disengaged not to vote against [Trump] and another substantial portion sufficiently alienated, ill-
willed, ignorant, deluded, or reckless to indeed vote for him.”  
Other scholars have noted that the lack of emphasis on civic education in the aftermath of 
No Child Left Behind is to blame for the following: that only 26 percent of Americans in 2016 
were able to name the three branches of government, that public trust in government is at 18 
percent, and that 23 percent of eighth graders performed at or above the proficient level on the 
National Assessment of Education Progress (Shapiro & Brown, 2018). They argue that schools 
“need to put democracy back in education” (Shapiro & Brown, 2018). And, finally, even those 
concerned about the impact of growing inequality on American democracy consider civic 




would benefit not only individual students but also society as a whole, advancing both political 
equality and distributive justice” (Allen, 2018). 
Members of the judicial branch are also contributing to this conversation and highlighting 
the connection between the state of American democracy and education. In his 2019 year-end 
report, Chief Justice John Roberts stated that “we have to take democracy for granted, and civic 
education has fallen by the wayside.”63 A federal judge in Rhode Island (responding to a case 
filed by plaintiffs arguing that their constitutional rights have been violated because the state 
does not provide them with adequate civic education) offered a similar cautionary note: “This is 
what it all comes down to: we may choose to survive as a country by respecting our Constitution, 
the laws and norms of political and civic behavior, and by educating our children on civics, the 
rule of law, and what it really means to be an American, and what America means. Or, we may 
ignore these things at our and their peril.”63 F64 
For other proponents of civic education, “the Trump phenomenon should be a Sputnik 
moment for civics education. Just as Soviet technological advances triggered investment in 
science education in the 1950s, the 2016 election should spur renewed emphasis on the need for 
schools to instill in children an appreciation for civic values and not just a skill set for private 
employment” (Kahlenberg and Janey, 2016). As argued earlier in this chapter, however, the 
recent civic education policy reform predates the “Trump phenomenon.” The “Sputnik Moment” 
for civics education may have come in the early 2000s and the NCLB-induced call for action. 
But even that timing may not be accurate because the policy “solutions” that came from that 
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2000s “call to action” that manifested in the C3 Framework and CEI are certainly not new, nor 
are their divergent conceptions of civic education.  
The 1990s public, prominent debates concerning the attempts to pass national social 
studies standards remind us that when it comes to civic education the tension between 
conservatives and progressives has been around for a long time. Furthermore, the problems that 
the civic education initiatives—the C3 and the CEI—aim to solve are also not new. American 
democracy, that is, had been “in danger” before and this threat was once again, as noted earlier, 
attributed to a neglect of civic education.   
What, then, is different about the most recent civic education policy reform?  Unlike the 
prominent public debates on the 1990s social studies standards, the recent civic education reform 
is unfolding in the absence of any federal mandate requiring states to act. In fact, the recent civic 
education reform comes at a time of retraction of federal involvement in education. ESSA, which 
Congress passed in 2015 with overwhelming bipartisan support, has been viewed as the 
beginning of the end of the wave of centralization dominating education policymaking in recent 
decades. ESSA, it has been said, signals a “U-turn” away from the era of No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) and a turn toward greater state autonomy (Education Week, 2015).  The verdict is still 
out on whether ESSA constitutes a hard U-turn, but the sentiment among some education 
scholars appears to be that the tide has shift away from centralization of control (Mitchell, 2017; 
Malkus, 2018).  
Furthermore, unlike the social studies standards of the 1990s and the debates about the 
Common Core of the early 2000s, the recent civic education reform has not (at least not yet) 
been contested at the national level. As perplexing as the absence of a national debate may be, 




between the two models that form the roots of the C3 and the CEI movements, 21 states across 
the United States have declared that they will travel down both pathways at the same time.  In all 
21 states, legislation has been adopted to require students to take the CEI-inspired civics exam 
and state departments of education have revised social studies curricula to align with the C3 
Framework.  
Westheimer and Kahne (2004) cautioned that “there is a politics in educating for 
democracy—a politics that deserves careful attention. … Indeed, thoughtful analysis requires 
that those who design curriculum and those who study its impact be cognizant of and responsive 
to these important distinctions and their political implications. The choices we make have 
consequences for the kind of society we ultimately help to create” (p. 263). Their writing serves 
as a solid “reality check” regarding the civic education narrative and a reminder that education 
policy, much like all policy, is affected by competing interests, competing political actors and 
resources, and competing ideologies. To think otherwise misses a key point: education, including 
civic education, is policy, and policy is affected by politics. The current civic education reform is 
not any different.  
In choosing to adopt conflicting mandates, states may have tasked local school districts 
with doing the impossible: implementing policies based on two conflicting kinds of politics. As 
compelling as the question of why these states adopted seemingly conflicting mandates may be, 
this study focuses on understanding how, if at all, did these conflicting mandates unfold during 
implementation? Did localities implement the state mandates? Did they do so as it was conceived 
at the state legislative and/or bureaucratic levels?  Did they place more emphasis on one over the 




By focusing on implementation, this study gets closer to answering the larger so what 
question. That is, so what if the national initiatives captured state policy agendas? Did these 
initiatives actually impact America’s classrooms? These questions could be answered by 
analyzing what, if anything, happened when these conflicting state mandates (inspired by 
national initiatives) actually hit the local level. A study of the implementation sheds light on the 
degree to which the national debates and state mandates are superficial and rhetorical. If states 
have not exhibited a real commitment behind their adopted state civic education policies, then 
the mandates are superficial and local districts are really not being asked to march to two 
different tunes, or to a single tune in states that adopted only one type of reform. But if the 
opposite holds, and the policy design at the state level was sought to aid and incentivize district 
implementation, then implementation will be telling about whether districts operate in a US 
education system that offers them room to ignore or superficially respond to state mandates and 

























CHAPTER III  
 
 LITERATURE REVIEW: IMPLEMENTATION & POLICY FEEDBACK 
 
 This study analyzes how districts responded to civic education policy reform enacted at 
the state level. It seeks to understand what, if anything, happened when state mandates hit the 
local school district level. As described in the previous chapter, the recent civic education reform 
may have been born out of a movement of actors reacting to the indirect effects of federal centric 
initiatives. This movement, however, gained momentum as a result of state-centric initiatives and 
its efforts to capture policy agendas was very much concentrated at the state level. Capturing 
state agendas, as will be seen in the case studies chapters that follow, required the inputs of a 
multiplicity of actors, including elected officials, nonprofit organizations, educators, and 
professional organizations. In this regard, the civic education reform exemplifies the shift of 
education politics from single-purpose governance structure, to as Henig (2013) notes, a 
“multilevel, general-purpose government and politics” (p. 3).  General-purpose governance rests 
upon the inputs and competition of multiple actors and is “steered by partisan, ideological, and 
interest group politics, in a clash that metaphorically looks more like war than a New England 
town meeting” (Henig, 2013, p.18). Arguably, the “civic education wars” of the early 2000s, and 
the subsequent policy reform that they generated, follow this pattern. Yet even in this context of 
“messy” politics, localities remain vibrant, integral actors. As Reed notes, “school districts 
operate public schools” and for any type of education reform to be “legitimated” at the district 
level “the reform efforts of the state and federal governments must land in particular localities, 




 Did civic education policy reforms, as conceived at the state level, land in such localities?  
This study aims to understand how the recent civic education policy reform unfolded at the 
district level, to ascertain the extent to which the systematic nature of reform at the state level 
produced similar patterns at the local level. The study aims to understand how districts 
responded to these ideologically conflicting state mandates generated by the new “messy” 
education politics. Understanding if and how state mandates were implemented allows for some 
interpretation of whether the reform, as generated by localities, produced at the local level a 
particular type of “politics in educating for citizenship” (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). In other 
words, understanding whether and how districts did in fact adopt C3 or CEI may allow for some 
interpretation of how and why students across America’s public schools are being educated 
differently for citizenship.  
The study is motivated by the assumption that to understand the how and whether 
requires a study of what happened post-enactment.  The post-enactment analysis undertaken in 
this study includes two elements. First, an assessment of the implementation phase, that is what 
happened with the interpretation and administration of the policy as it was handed from the state 
to the local level and from elected leadership to bureaucratic structures. In assessing this phase, 
the study draws upon the literature of policy feedback and analyzes how elements of policy 
design introduced at enactment as well as competing priorities constrained or aided the will and 
capacity of local implementers (teachers and local administrators). Second, the post-enactment 
analysis also includes an assessment of the sustainability of these policies, making use of policy 
feedback to ascertain that degree to which the politics of implementation generated feedback 




This study explores the implementation phase of civic education reform through the lens 
suggested in 2006 by Honig: looking not only at “what’s implementable and works, but what’s 
implementable and works for whom, when, where, and why?” (Honig, 2006, p. 2).  It extends 
this rationale further when studying sustainability by looking at what happened when the policy 
did or did not work for someone, somewhere. To capture these objectives, the analysis draws 
upon the literature on policy implementation and mobilizes as an analytic tool the theoretical 
framework of policy feedback effects. This framework allows for an analysis of the political 
forces—ideas, interests, and institutions—that interact to generate district response and 
subsequent policy making. Few implementation studies have mobilized this theoretical 
framework, although scholars have noted that policy feedback is uniquely positioned to bring the 
discussion of politics back to implementation studies (McDonnell, 2009; Moynihan and Soss, 
2014). Because the primary focus of this study will be an analysis of the local politics of civic 
education reform, it seems fitting to ground the analysis in this theoretical framework. This 
chapter first provides a review of the scholarly literature on implementation. Given this study’s 
focus on education, the chapter then looks at how education studies intersect with the 
implementation literature and its directions. Finally, the chapter introduces the literature on 
policy feedback, arguing that this study answers a call for wider application of this framework to 
studies of education policies.  
 
On Implementation: A Review of the Literature 
 Implementation studies are principally concerned with the post-enactment phases of the 
policy making process. Scholars define implementation as “what happens after a bill becomes a 




program by a legislative body (or, in some cases, a chief executive or the courts) and its intended 
and unintended impacts” (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981, p. xi). Implementation studies remain 
keenly concerned with “the agencies and officials involved, the procedures they follow, the 
techniques they employ, and the political support and opposition that they encounter” (Anderson, 
2011, p. 209). Recognizing the complexity of the implementation process, O’Toole (1995) saw 
implementation “as the connection between the expression of governmental intention and actual 
results” (p. 42). A plethora of implementation studies—in the fields of political science, policy 
studies, studies of administration, and specific policy subsets, including education policy—
assess, based on varied ideological perspectives, what makes policies implementable, what does 
not, and systematically theorize about the perceived successes and failures. 
 The study of implementation began with the seminal work of Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1973), in which they analyzed the failure of a policy generated by the Economic Development 
Administration to stimulate the intended job growth for the unemployed in Oakland, California. 
Their study viewed implementation as a complex interaction between institutions and actors and 
highlighted the centrality of politics in the implementation process. They defined implementation 
as “the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results” 
and highlight that the “longer the chain of causality, the more numerous the reciprocal 
relationships among the links and the more complex implementation becomes” (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973, p. xxiii-xxiv).  
Some scholars (e.g. Goggin, et al 1990) have noted that the implementation literature has 
been produced in three waves. First generation studies, like Pressman’s and Wildavsky’s and 
Martha Derthick’s (1972) were largely case-specific and showed that the outcome of policies 




commitment of local institutions and actors (McLaughlin, 1987). These studies “threw a 
spotlight on implementation as a key reason for policy failure” and “offered some prescriptive 
advice on how to increase the odds of policy success,” but more importantly, for the evolution of 
the study of implementation, these first wave studies “hinted that a systematic understanding of 
cause and effect in implementation might be possible” (Smith and Larimer, 2009, p. 161).  
Second generation implementation scholars took the hint and attempted to create a 
framework to understand cause and effect for implementation. One of the first such attempts 
came in 1977 by Bardach who argued that implementation is a series of “games” played by 
various administrative agencies seeking to resist top-down reforms and that, as such, 
implementation constitutes the “continuation of politics by other means” (p. 85). For Bardach 
implementation constituted an “extension of politics” with the dependent variable being “the 
behavior of implementers” (Smith and Larimer, 2004, p. 164). Other scholars took a different 
approach and looked beyond the behavior of implementers. Elmore argued that implementation 
fails when it lacks proper planning, control, and specification (Elmore, 1978). Mazmanian and 
Sabatier (1983) went further and categorized the independent variables driving implementation 
into three broad categories: the tractability of the problem, the ability of statute to structure 
implementation, and non-statutory variables that affect implementation, such as the socio-
economic and political variables. 
 Implementation studies that followed took either a top-down or bottom-up approach. 
Top-down approaches focus primarily on the actions of “top-level officials, the factors affecting 
their behavior, whether policy goals are attained, and whether policy was reformulated on the 
basis of experience” (Anderson, 2011, p. 211). Top-down approaches interpret policy as input 




level officials give so much discretion to local agents making it impossible to control them for so 
much is left to their discretion. Top-down approaches have been critiqued for placing too much 
emphasis on top-level officials and neglecting to acknowledge the role of lower-level officials 
(Anderson, 2011). The response to this limitation came from bottom-up approaches that focus 
primarily on the impact of the implementers on the process and more specifically on what Lipsky 
termed “street-level bureaucrats” (Birkland, 2005; Lipsky, 1980). Lipsky argued that the key 
actors in implementation were actually the implementers and that these individuals were not 
simply implementing, but in essence policymaking (Lipsky, 1980). As Smith and Larimer (2004) 
noted, “for the bottom-uppers, it is down at the street level where implementation really 
happens” (p. 167).   
Some attempts have been made to reconcile the two perspectives (Elmore, 1985; 
Matland, 1995; Sabatier, 1988), but the debate was not fully resolved. Nor has the complexity of 
theory-building for implementation, as second generation scholars managed to make a vital 
point: studying implementation is complex.  Writing in the 1990s, Goggin and colleagues 
predicted that a third wave of implementation studies was in the making with the goal “simply to 
be more scientific than the previous two (generations) in its approach to the study of 
implementation” (Goggin et al, 1990, p. 18). But this wave did not entirely materialize. In fact, 
by the mid-1990s, Goggin and others were lamenting the demise of implementation studies 
(Lester and Goggin, 1998; de Leon, 1999). Scholars recognized that the complexity of “the 
implementation process emerged as a major stumbling block to any parsimonious and 
generalizable framework” (Smith and Lamirer, 2004, p. 170). The variables were simply too 
many and “to encompass all the apparently essential elements of implementation, theoretical 




Lamirer, 2004, p.170). As a result, implementation studies returned to the focus of first and 
second generation scholars, and also focused more narrowly to the fields of public policy and 
administration (Smith and Lamirer, 2004). In a detailed history of the field, Saetren (2005) noted 
that implementation studies gained traction in the policy fields and, particularly, in education. 
 
Implementation and Education Studies: A Review of the Literature 
Education policy implementation scholars broadly agree that implementation research 
remains complex (Fixsen, et al, 2005; Honig, 2006; Odden & Marsh, 1988) mostly because of 
the vast array of contextual factors that aid or impinge it. The complexity has resulted in the 
absence of a coherent methodological and theoretical framework for this subfield (Fixsen et al., 
2005; Hill & Hupe, 2002; Honig, 2006). The most comprehensive attempts to explore the 
research on education policy implementation include Odden’s (1991) Education Policy 
Implementation and Honig’s (2006) New Direction in Education Policy Implementation.  They 
both describe how education policy implementation research unfolded during the three waves of 
the implementation literature discussed above. According to Odden (1991), first wave education 
implementation studies surfaced in the 1960s and demonstrated that the “local governments were 
simply at odds with those of higher levels of governments” (p. 1), something that resulted from a 
lack of will (implementers did not want to implement them) and capacity (implementers did not 
know how to implement them) at the local level. Early studies focused on Great Society Period 
policies, including the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act and researchers of these 
policies generally agreed that implementation failed because of the absence of will and capacity 
of the implementers, as implementers in these studies (influenced by political scientists as noted 




According to Odden and Honig, in the 1970s studies shifted their attention to what gets 
implemented over time and to macro and micro level influences. During the second wave, 
studies noted that state or federal initiatives stood a better chance at implementation if they 
allowed for “mutual adaptation” allowing localities to tailor programs to their specific needs and 
context. Stage two studies concluded that over time programs do get implemented, but they are 
altered to adapt to local conditions (Odden, 1991). During the 1980s, the focus of 
implementation studies moved away from the “mismatch” between implementers and 
policymakers (Honig, 2016).  
This focus became more pronounced in the early 1990s as implementation studies entered 
a third stage dealing with a set of more complex policies that brought new challenges to 
implementation, including teacher professionalism proposals, curriculum changes, and school 
restructuring. Odden (1991) noted that these reforms transformed implementation in three ways: 
1) the challenges were more complex than a matter of will and capacity; 2) state and federal 
programs had the capacity to affect localities faster and more directly; 3) the policy focus shifted 
on improving entire school systems a task much more challenging for purposes of 
implementation. The third stage of implementation studies was more concerned with not simply 
if the programs were being implemented, but primarily with how effective they were with 
solving the problem they intended to solve. According to Honig (2006), this changed the scope 
of the field: “whereas past research revealed that policy, people and places affected 
implementation, contemporary research aims to uncover their various dimensions and how and 
why interactions among these dimensions shape implementation in particular ways” (p. 14).  
The literature on education policy implementation identifies factors unique to the field of 




schools (Fusarelli & Cooper, 2009). Partly because of this characteristic most of the research on 
education policy implementation focuses on “what does not work, rather than what does” 
(Fixsen, et al, 2005). Other studies find that teachers serve as barriers to implementation 
operating as street-level bureaucrats and impacting implementation through teacher unions and 
through their role in shaping curricula (Kerchner & Koppich, 1993; Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988; 
Bascia & Osmond, 2012).  Studies that emphasize the role of teachers argue that regardless of 
the level at which a policy is initiated, school reforms are enacted by teachers and administrators 
at the school level and that it is at this level that reform policy inevitably succeeds or fails to 
achieve its goals (Cooper, Fusarelli & Randall, 2003; Pristine and McGreal, 1997, Porter, 
Rusarelli & Fusarelli, 2015). Even top-down studies of education policy implementation 
acknowledge the multi-directional aspect of reforms (Louis and Corwin, 1984; Walker, 2004).  
Whereas the realization that implementation was so complex hindered the third wave of 
implementation studies in the field of political science, it did not do the same for education 
policy implementation scholars. Honig noted (2006) that contemporary education policy 
implementation research views implementation as a “highly contingent and situated process” and 
that variation should not be avoided, but rather “understood and harnessed to enhance the 
capacity of program participants to produce desired goals” (p. 21) In this sense, variation is 
viewed as “a stimulus for innovation and improvement” and builds upon findings related to sense 
making (Spillane, 2002), interpretation, and learning as unavoidable dimensions of the 
implementation process. For third wave scholars, this variation and the complexity of 
implementation served as a unique opportunity for those interested in “improving the quality of 
education policy” to focus “not simply on what’s implementable and what works but rather 




(Honig, 2006, p. 9).  Honig argued that, “Implementation research should aim to reveal the 
policies, people, and places that shape how implementation unfolds and provide robust, 
grounded explanations for how interactions among them help to explain the implementation 
outcomes. The essential implementation question then becomes not simply what’s 
implementable and what works, but what is implementable and what works for whom, where, 
when and why?” (Honig, 2016, p. 2). 
Despite Honig’s call, implementation studies in education have been critiqued for 
providing “little insight into the way political support and opposition evolve over the phases of 
the policy process” because researchers examine implementation as a “largely administrative 
exercise” and look only at factors “that explain variation across jurisdictions” (McDonnell and 
Weatherford, 2016).  McDonnell and Weatherford argue that even studies that examine the 
response of local actors during implementation (e.g. Cohen & Moffitt, 2009; McLaughlin, 1987; 
Spillane et al, 2009) fail to account for politics, as they conceptualize implementation as “the 
response of professionals to externally imposed policy intervention, not as a political action” and 
rarely integrate the political strategies of these actors as “explanatory variables” (McDonnell and 
Weatherford, 2016). In other words, for critics, implementation studies erroneously neglect 
politics. As Patashnik (2008) noted, evoking Bardach, “the implementation literature focuses 
mainly on the internal life of bureaus and the conditions under which statutory mandates are (or 
are not) translated into administrative actions … The problem with this empirical focus is that a 
lot of [political] action occurs after the curtain falls on the high drama of legislative enactment.” 
McDonnell and Weatherford (2016) argue that the “politics of both enactment and 
implementation are salient influences on whether a policy produces its intended effects.” 




of politics and policy—a moment with significant consequences for the polity as a whole” (p. 
322).  
The theoretical framework of policy feedback effects offers a promising framework to 
address this gap as it treats politics as an explanatory variable with the capacity to explain the 
outcome of a given implementation process and to do so in a holistic way, as it accounts for 
vertical and horizontal interactions. Several scholars (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016; 
Moynihan and Soss, 2004) have argued that policy feedback offers the conceptual tools needed 
to unify models of policy from enactment to implementation. A review of the policy feedback 
literature follows. 
On Policy Feedback: A Review of the Literature  
Consistent with Lowi’s (1972) claim that “policies beget politics,” scholars have 
researched the policy-politics connection for quite a long time (Salisbury, 1968; Wilson, 1995). 
Political scientists have long argued that policies have political repercussions, focusing primarily 
on the angle that policies are susceptible to some type of public accountability (Dahl, 1971; 
Fiorina, 1981).  More recent scholarship on policy feedback revisits the policy-politics 
connection and suggests that policies are not simply “objects” of the policy process, but rather 
“political forces” with the capacity to do one or all of the following: “reconfigure the underlying 
terms of power, reposition actors in political relations, and reshape political actors ’identifies, 
understanding, interests, and preferences” (Moynihan and Soss, 2014. p. 321). More specifically, 
“policy feedback is an analytical framework for examining how a policy’s design shapes 
political responses to it and, in turn, influences its sustainability (McDonnell and Weatherford, 




 Feedback scholars are primarily interested in the following questions: “how do policies, 
once enacted, reshape politics, and how might such transformations in turn effect subsequent 
policymaking?” (Mettler and Sorelle, 2014, p.151). Policy feedback examines “how a policy’s 
design shapes political responses to it, and in turn, influences its sustainability” and argues that 
“new policies establish institutional rules and structures or augment existing ones, specifying the 
conditions under which benefits are allocated to some individuals and groups, and costs imposed 
on others. For interest groups and other political actors, these costs and benefits create incentives 
for mobilizing to protect their benefits or minimize their costs” (McDonnell and Weatherford, p. 
234). In this regard, feedback scholarship is concerned with understanding how policy enactment 
of policy A shapes policy enactment of policy B. The connection between the two policies lies in 
how policy design and the politics of implementation reshape the interests of actors.  Feedback 
scholars assume that policies generate feedback effects able “to shape the attitudes and behaviors 
of political elites and mass publics, as well as to affect the evolution of policymaking institutions 
and interest groups, and through any of these dynamics potentially to affect subsequent 
policymaking processes” (Mettler and Sorelle, 2014, p. 152). 
Since the early 1990s, two strands of policy feedback have been developed. The first 
takes a historical institutional approach and focuses on how policies affect state capacity and the 
identities, interests, ideas, and capacities of interest groups (Hacker, 2002; Pierson, 1993; 
Skocpol, 1992). The second strand focuses on mass political behavior and examines how policies 
affect political engagement (Mettler and Soss, 2004; Schneider and Ingram, 1997, Soss and 
Schram, 2007) primarily because policies “convey cues to the public about civic standing, group 
deservingness, and the nature of social problems” (Moynihan and Soss, 2014, p. 321). As Soss 




They can influence beliefs about what is possible, desirable, and normal. They can alter 
conceptions of citizenship and status. They can channel or constrain agency, define incentives, 
and redistribute resources. They can convey cues that define, arouse, or pacify constituencies” 
(p. 113).  
Both policy feedback strands assume that policies once enacted, “create political 
institutions, interests, and public perceptions that can mobilize elites and, at times, the mass 
public to take actions that shape future policies” (McDonnell, 2009). Scholars of policy feedback 
posit that after policy enactment much rests “on how policymakers and others advance the ideas 
that are central to a given policy approach, how institutional arrangements reinforce policy 
cohesion, and whether the approach engenders support or opposition among concerned interests” 
(May and Jochim, 2013, p. 427). According to the feedback perspective, policies generate 
outcomes—such as delivering benefits, imposing burdens, or regulating activity—that generate 
“short-term political feedback in terms of target group responses” and “longer-term political 
impacts with respect to the empowerment of groups as they gain new rights and obligations” 
(May and Jochim, 2013, p. 430).  
Embedded in this discussion of policy feedback effects appears to be a concept of power 
similar in some respects to Steven Lukes’ characterization of the pluralist or neopluralist view. 
Lukes suggests that neoliberalists define power as follows: “A exercises power over B when A 
affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (Lukes, 2005, p. 30). Lukes argued that pluralists 
(Dahl) and their critics (Bachrach and Baratz) fail to account for the fact that sometimes people 
willingly act in a manner that is contrary to their real interests. As he notes, “The trouble seems 
to be that both Bachrach and Baratz and the pluralists suppose that because power, as they 




necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious 
use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place” (Lukes, 2005,p. 27). For 
Lukes, the absence of observable conflict of preferences in decision-making arenas constitutes 
the result of the elite having successfully shaped the preferences of subordinates by establishing 
ideological constraints and/or the formation of beliefs and identities. Lukes argued that this false 
consciousness leads nonelites to believe that their preferences align with the ideology upheld or 
promoted by elites, even if in actuality it does not. According to Lukes, the lack of participation 
on nonelites in political decision-making processes and arenas must be viewed through the lens 
of exclusion, ideological control, and socialization.  
Pierson (1993) argued that policies shape the political behavior of government elites, 
organized interests, and mass publics through two pathways: interpretive effects, as policies 
serve as sources of information and meaning thus affecting political learning and attitudes; 
resource effects, by providing means and incentives for political activity (Mettler and Sorelle, 
2014).  Resource and interpretive effects “affect constituency support for the extension of 
reforms ’line of policy development” (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2013, p. 1083). These resource and 
interpretive effects start at enactment but gain momentum post-enactment because “how 
individuals ascribe meaning to a policy is mediated through the institutions implementing these 
policies” (McDonnell, 2009, p. 419). Interpretive and resource effects have “the potential to 
profoundly shape politics” as they, along with elements of the policy design (institutional 
structures and rules discussed above) determine if a policy will generate positive or negative 
feedback effects (May and Jochim, 2013, p. 431).  
Positive feedback “enhances policymaking and implementation by reducing conflicts 




negative feedback can make policymaking and implementation “more difficult by activating turf 
wars and putting competing political interests into conflict” (May and Jochim, 2013, p. 430).  
Some feedback scholars argue that negative feedback is “a product of initial policy design 
features, divisive enactment, and the failure of reformers to uproot the institutional base of 
opponents when a law is enacted” and that this negative feedback can be further “shaped by the 
strategic choices of actors during the post-enactment phase” (Patashink and Zelizer, 2013, p. 
1075).  
Feedback scholarship has struggled to identify the precise factors that will generate 
positive or negative feedback effects (Campbell, 2012).  Several comprehensive attempts have 
been made, notably in several studies by Patashnik and Zelizer (2008, 2009, 2013). They have 
argued that the capacity of public policies to create feedback effects that and to, thus, “remake 
politics is contingent, conditional, and contested” (Patashink and Zelizer, 2013, p. 1072). 
According to Patashnik and Zelizer, feedback effects that reinforce policy sustainability if it 
provides adequate resources to gain support of its policy targets and/or when it adequately 
conveys to its policy targets how they stand to benefit by it (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2009). 
Additionally, positive feedback that aids sustainability when “enactment phase decisions 
undercut or destroy the institutional bases of support of the reformers opponents” (Patashnik and 
Zelizer, 2013, p. 1076). Feedback scholars also emphasize that what happens after enactment 
may also impact sustainability. Positive feedback effects stand a better chance if a policy could 
rely upon institutional support and is able to “call upon state capacities” (Patashnik and Zelizer, 
2013, p. 1078).  In this regard, examining closely implementation is pivotal as it plays a critical 
role in generating feedback effects. Ultimately, these feedback effects “shape and constrain the 




Policy feedback scholars are interested in understanding “the limits of political reform in 
U.S. politics” (Patashink and Zelizer, 2013, p. 1073).  As Moynihan and Soss (2014) argue, 
feedback scholarship offers “a coherent prescription for political analysis: public policy must be 
analyzed as a political outcome and as a force that influences political actors, organizes political 
understandings, and structures political relations” (p. 322). They view the implementation 
literature as relevant to their quest in that it too “explores what happens after a bill becomes a 
law” and in that it also acknowledges that “laws only provide the legal frameworks for 
exercising public authority, and do not determine how programs work on the ground” (Patashnik 
and Zelizer, 2013, p. 1075). But they find implementation scholarship weak in explaining the 
limits of political reform because it focuses primarily on the bureaucratic factors and neglects to 
account for other factors (Patshnik and Zelizer, 2013). Feedback scholars do not deny that 
institutions, will, and capacity matter in the post-enactment outcomes of policies. Rather they 
argue that the end result is very much contingent upon the interaction between “internal 
attributes of policies” (including resource flow and institutional capacity) and “the strategic goals 
of officeholders and groups, and the forces arising from an uncertain and contentious political 
environment” (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2013, p. 1072).   
A decade ago, McDonnell noted the utility of the policy feedback framework to the study 
of education policy. McDonnell argued that the “model implicit in most research on the politics 
of education assumes that political factors shape policies” but finds the framework incomplete 
because “it provides only partial information about key aspects of the educational enterprise, 
including why major policy changes are so difficult, why some policies persist past their useful 
lives, and how different policies shape who participates and who decides how educational 




education could resolve this limitation by asking not only “what kinds of policies politics 
create,” but also at “what kinds of politics education policies creates” (McDonnell, 2009, p. 417). 
Similarly, Moynihan and Soss (2004) argue that studies of public administration, not only 
education, fail to capture that “implementation is often a pivotal moment in the interplay of 
politics and policy—a moment with significant consequences for the polity as a whole” (p. 322). 
McDonnell suggested the policy feedback framework could be instrumental in mitigating for 
these limitations “especially in understanding linkages among the institutional, elite, and mass 
political effects of policies” and added that the field of education naturally lends itself to such 
analysis “because it offers varied cases across a wide range of policy goals and political arenas” 
(McDonnell, 2009, p. 418).  
The policy feedback framework has also been seen as relevant to the study of 
implementation because it allows for an analysis of the political sustainability of policies 
(McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016; Moynihan and Soss, 2004). It could do so because the 
policy feedback framework explicitly looks at how a policy’s design shapes political responses 
during implementation and this, in turn, “influences its sustainability.” McDonnell and 
Weatherford (2016), argue that traditional implementation analysis offers insights only about 
characteristics internal to a policy and its implementation agencies, but little insight about the 
“political dynamics of implementation”—that is, about “how those factors are shaped by and 
interact with the political incentives that produce policy feedback” (p. 24). In this sense, policy 
feedback, “although not explicitly conceptualized as implementation research” does focus on 
“the political dimensions of the implementation process, and only indirectly on administrative 
aspects” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p. 235).  They argue that introducing policy 




what happens post-enactment is shaped not just by the formal attributes of the law but also by the 
interaction of policy-specific characteristics with interests and institutions in the broader political 
environment” (p. 239). And that by doing so, “the resulting political sustainability analysis will 
sharpen efforts to explain implementation outcomes” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p. 
240). 
 This study builds upon these recent calls and mobilizes the policy feedback framework to 
analyze the implementation and sustainability of the recent civic education policy reform. The 



















CHAPTER IV  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE POLITICS OF CIVIC EDUCATION 
POLICY REFORM 
 
This study seeks to analyze what happened when civic education policy reform enacted at 
the state level hit the level of the district. It hypothesizes that districts responded with variation 
and that some substantial part of that variation resulted from the politics of implementation.  
Because the goal of this study is to assess the degree to which the politics of implementation of 
civic education policy reform influenced the district outcomes and the policy’s sustainability, the 
use of a feedback effects perspective was most fitting. Figure 3 below offers a visual illustration 
of the conceptual framework that guided this study. A comprehensive discussion of the model 
follows.  
Figure 3. The Politics of Civic Education Reform: Implementation and Sustainability
 
Note: The framework draws extensively from McDonnell, L. (2009). Repositioning Politics in Education’s Circle of Knowledge. 
Educational Researcher 38(6): 417-427 and McDonnell, L. M. and Weatherford, M.S. (2016). Recognizing the Political in 
Implementation Research. Educational Researcher 45(4): 233-242. 
 
 
The theoretical framework depicted in Figure 3, starts with a premise, that district level 
implementation outcomes can be understood by analyzing how elements of the policy design and 




interpretive frameworks of district level implementers. It views administrative capacity as the 
ability of districts to implement a policy based on resources at their disposal. It considers 
interpretive frameworks the degree to which districts were willing to implement based on how 
they interpreted the policies. This premise is discussed in greater detail below.  
The Role of Policy Design  
A key task of studies that mobilize policy feedback to analyze implementation is to begin 
analysis by taking into account the enactment phase as it has a “direct effect on a policy’s 
design” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016).  Several elements of a policy’s design affect the 
politics generated during implementation, primarily because they determine how implementers 
will interpret the policy’s intent. This interpretation shapes the actions of implementers during 
implementation and, thus, implementation outcomes. As Figure 3 illustrates, the elements of the 
policy design analyzed in this study include: enactment coalitions and theory of action, origins, 
type of change, policy targets, policy instruments, and institutional structures and rules.  
The analysis begins by looking at enactment coalitions. Identifying these groups, their 
ideologies, and interests, and “assessing their incentives to remain” in the coalition post-
enactment matters for policy design and also for subsequent implementation (McDonnell and 
Weatherford, 2016, p. 240). In discussing enactment coalitions, this dissertation incorporates 
elements of the advocacy coalition framework, particularly ACFs discussion on the belief system 
of coalitions consisting of deep core values, policy core beliefs, and secondary aspects (Sabatier 
& Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Identifying these beliefs is critical because they shape the coalition’s 
behavior and primarily its theory of action, a concept introduced by Argyris and Schon (1996) 




defines “espoused theory” in line with Argyris & Schnon, as follows: “the theory of action as 
advanced to explain or justify a given pattern of activity” (p. 13). 
The second element of the policy design phase analyzed in this study is the origins of a 
given policy, that is “who advanced the policy; whether it originated in the legislative, judicial, 
or executive branch; and the governmental level(s) enacting and implementing it” (McDonnell, 
2009, p. 419).  Origins sets the tone of implementation as it identifies the general parameters for 
implementation and the scope of the intended reform. Also relevant for understanding the policy 
design remains the nature of the change that is whether the policy constitutes incremental or 
major change and doing so matters for implementation “because it signals whether existing 
institutions and political arrangements are likely to be disrupted” (McDonnell, 2009, p. 419).  
The theoretical framework also calls for an analysis of the policy targets, that is the 
groups that will be affected by the new policy, as this sets the tone for how the policy makers 
view the respective groups (for example, as advantaged, disadvantaged, deserving, politically 
weak or strong) (McDonnell, 2009; Schneider and Ingram, 1993). To assess the mechanisms that 
the proponents of civic education policy reform employed to ensure that school districts will 
implement the state level policy reforms the analysis looks at the policy instruments. Instruments 
matter because the tools government uses to pursue the intended outcome (inducements, grants-
in aid, legal entitlement, etc.) are bound, as Theodore Lowi notably documented in 1966 and, 
others followed, to “engender a different kind of politics” (McDonnell, 2009, p. 419).  
 
Implementation, Feedback Effects, and Sustainability 
The conceptual model depicted in Figure 3 proposes that the policy design triggers 




Pressman and Wildavsky highlighted the relationship between policy design and implementation 
noting that “the study of implementation requires understanding that apparently simple 
sequences of events depend on complex chains of reciprocal interaction. Hence each part of the 
chain must be built with the others in view. The separation of policy design from implementation 
is fatal” (p. xxv).  The model proposes that the policy design affects implementation in two 
ways: 1) through policy design characteristics that set the tone for implementation by priming 
how groups will interpret the policy during implementation (as discussed above); 2) through the 
institutional structures and rules it establishes to guide implementation. For example, policies 
may establish new rules and institutions or weaken or strengthen existing rules and institutions 
(McDonell, 2009, p. 419).  These institutional structures and rules potentially have two effects: 
1) they establish how the benefits of a policy are distributed—who wins, who loses, who pays; 
and 2) they determine who “can [and cannot] participate in decision making, the level at which 
decisions are made, and how grievances are handled (McDonnell, 2009, p. 419).  
The conceptual framework, informed by the literature of policy feedback, hypothesizes 
that policy design characteristics and institutional structures and rules have a direct bearing on 
how implementers interpret the policy during implementation. These policy design 
characteristics “influence how implementers and policy targets interpret the policy’s intent, its 
effects on them, and its likely costs and benefits” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p. 239).  
Interpretations rest largely on a policy’s “asymmetric flow of benefits and costs: promised 
benefits are often uncertain, diffuse, or far into the future, whereas the costs are immediate and 
concentrated on particular groups” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p. 237). How 
implementers interpret these costs and benefits of policies matters for implementation outcomes, 




high, and the benefits uncertain or distant (and vice versa). How implementers will interpret the 
policy also depends on the degree to which a policy, through its policy instruments and 
institutional structures and rules, comes with resources to help aid with implementation. More 
specifically, in “allocating resources or in regulating their use, policies create incentives for 
targets to organize to preserve and expand their benefits or to minimize their costs” (McDonnell, 
2009, p. 420).  Thus, what happens during implementation depends to a large degree on how 
these elements of policy design influences the interpretations and capacity of implementers.  
As illustrated in Figure 3, the conceptual framework  posits that one more factor plays a 
role in determining implementation outcomes: competing priorities generated by the external 
political environment. The model hypothesizes that the competing priorities generate additional 
“political pressures (or opposition)” during implementation (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, 
p. 240) and, therefore, influence the political dynamics of the implementation by impacting 
further the interpretive frameworks and capacity of implementers. The external political 
environment introduces political pressure that constrains the capacity and interpretive 
frameworks of implementers who may opt to prioritize the implementation of one policy over 
another, especially if they interpret the competing priority as one having less cost and more 
immediate benefits.  
The conceptual framework hypothesizes that administrative capacity and interpretive 
frameworks (influenced by policy design and competing priorities) shape implementation 
outcomes and the type of feedback effects generated post-enactment. These feedback effects 
matter for policy sustainability, because, as noted earlier in this study, negative feedback triggers 
interest groups to mobilize to challenge a policy and to create new ones. In this regard, looking at 




they help identify “who has an incentive to mobilize” for or against the policy (McDonnell, 
2009, p. 419), why they mobilized, and what they seek to do.   
Although not depicted in Figure 3, the theoretical framework that guides the analysis that 
follows assumes that implementation’s longer time frame matters in understanding outcomes and 
sustainability. Unlike enactment, which is “episodic,” implementation is “continuous” 
(McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p. 235). That is, enactment happens fairly quickly, whereas 
implementation usually takes much longer because “the time and effort required to move reform 
initiatives through a fragmented, multilevel system are complicated by the absence of coherent 
and coordinated institutional arrangements to guide and support educators” (McDonnell and 
Weatherford, 2016, p. 235). If the policy was created in a way that does not give localities 
“centrally available resources and guidance,” then the time required to implement a policy 
extends even further as “local districts and schools need to build infrastructure to support 
educators as they develop the new knowledge, capabilities, and beliefs necessary for translating 
policy into effective classroom practice” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p. 235).  
The theoretical framework accounts for implementations longer time frame because it has 
a bearing on how implementers interpret the policies, as “the process also requires that local 
implementers have time to make sense of, interpret, and adapt external policy directives” 
(McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p. 235). Additionally, it considers that the implementation’s 
longer time frame also has a bearing on sustainability as it increases the “potential that groups 
who were not present or were less influential during enactment will mobilize during 
implementation … because interests that did not prevail during enactment [may] mount a 
counterattack against the new policy … or because the policy being implemented becomes the 




Additionally, the framework takes into account that implementation, unlike enactment, 
requires the input of multiple implementing venues which has political implications because the 
new policies are “introduced into deeply entrenched … local political cultures” (McDonnell and 
Weatherford, 2016, p. 237).  Variation in decision venues suggests that the “politics of 
implementation is more localized, more varied, and less predictable than the politics of 
enactment” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p. 237). The multiplicity of venues, much like 
time, has a direct bearing on implementation outcomes and on sustainability. More specifically, 
local political settings possess different ideologies, interests, and institutional histories and this 
may lead to implementers having different interpretations of the “same statute, across geographic 
regions and states and even among local communities within the same state (McDonnell and 
Weatherford, 2016, p. 237). As such, multiple decision venues may lead to varied outcomes 
during implementation. Varied implementation outcomes are significant for sustainability 
because variation “may lead to a politics of implementation characterized by delay and resistance 
or even the mobilization of outright opposition, whereas in others, key participants may support 
the externally imposed policy, using it as leverage to advance their own local interests” 
(McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p. 237). 
Finally, the analytical framework considers multiple decision venues because they allow 
some groups to enter the political deliberation process and others not. As Henig (2013) notes, 
“venue shopping does not change the basic institutional parameters, but it allows some flexible 
and highly resourced groups to tactically shift their battles into more congenial institutional 
niches” (p. 29). Furthermore, as Lukes notes in his discussion of the second dimension of power, 
venues shape which actors and which policy positions are given a voice in the policy 




and their interests not represented in the process. Henig (2013) concurs noting in the venue-
shopping environment of the new political context of educational decision making “those with 
limited resources and limited mobility might be at a distinct disadvantage because of the expense 
of playing politics in this complicated landscape” (p. 172).  
This study hypothesizes the factors influencing the politics of implementation interact in 
a manner that generates a politics that determines implementation outcomes and whether the 
policy, as conceived at enactment, will remain sustainable. As McDonnell notes, “these factors, 
resulting from a given policy and the politics it creates, then shape and constrain the direction 
and scope of future policies” (McDonnell, 2009, p. 420). An outcome is deemed sustainable “as 
long as the basic objectives and means remain unaltered” and as long as there is no “strategic 
retreat on objectives” (May and Jochim, 2013, p. 433). When the interaction of these forces 
during implementation generates a politics that encourages interest groups to mobilize to seek to 
terminate it or scale back a policy, the feedback effects produced are said to be negative. In 
contrast, when these forces generate a mobilization of interests that seek to “reinforce or expand” 
the existing policies, the policy produces positive feedback effects (McDonnell, 2009, p. 420).  
To summarize, the theoretical framework that guides this study hypothesizes the 
following: specific elements of the policy design and competing priorities influence the 
administrative capacity and interpretive frameworks of district level implementers. The 
interaction of these factors has dual effects: 1) they shape implementation outcomes; 2) they 
generate feedback effects prompting the mobilization of interests that may challenge the 
sustainability of the existing policy and seek to create new policies, or to mobilize to create new 
policies that strengthen the existing one. Thus, both implementation outcomes and sustainability 




this regard, policy feedback offers a comprehensive lens through which to analyze 

































The primary goal of this study is to understand how district level politics affected the 
implementation and the political sustainability of the recent state initiated civic education policy 
reforms. To achieve this goal, the dissertation explored four research questions. 
Research Questions 
1) How did districts in states that adopt both the CEI and the C3 respond to seemingly 
conflicting mandates emanating at the state level on civic education policy reform? 
 
2) How, if at all, did the response of districts differ in states that did not face seemingly 
conflicted mandates and adopted only the C3?  
 
3) How, if at all, did administrative capacity and interpretive frameworks impede or aid 
the implementation of civic education reform at the district level? 
 
4) How, if at all, did the politics of implementation affect the policy’s sustainability? 
 
Case Selection 
To understand how districts responded to the recent civic education policy reform, this 
dissertation undertook a comparative case study of 8 districts across 2 selected states (4 in 
each state). According to Creswell (2013), comparative case studies enable investigators to 
acquire different perspectives on the key issue of interest and identifying the appropriate 
cases remains central to this method of research. As such, case selection was guided by a 
desire to maximize variation in the implementation of civic education policy reform and not 
by a desire to look at cases that allow for generalizability. The goal of this study was  




was the state and districts within them, making this an embedded case study. To identify the 
“most appropriate cases”, this study proceeded as follows:   
1) First, I examined the national development of the recent civic education reform to 
identify chronological boundaries for selecting the state that implemented the combined 
civic education reform (C3 and CEI). 
2) Second, I confirmed that states within the established chronological boundaries showed 
promise of a commitment to civic education reform that was not simply symbolic. 
3) Third, I selected a state that adopted only the C3 framework to compare the 
implementation process in this state to that of the state that adopted both the C3 and the 
CEI.  
4) Fourth, I identified districts to be studied in each state guided by an attempt to maximize 
variation in terms of several factors, including: size of student body, district location, 
district political ideology, characteristics of the student body (percentage non-white, 
percent English Language Learners (ELL), and percentage of  students economically 
disadvantaged), and per pupil district expenditures.  
 
Establishing Chronological Boundaries 
  This study sought to analyze the implementation of the recent wave of civic education 
reform in a state that adapted both the C3 Framework and the CEI. To identify the state, I first 
examined civic education reform in all 50 states looking at media reports, legislative activity, and 
revisions of standards on the respective state websites. This process entailed researching and 
collecting the most recent Social Studies Standards of all states available on the websites of their 




demonstrate an alignment with the C3 Framework. Once I validated that, I turned to the websites 
of the state legislatures to locate the bills introduced calling for adoption of the Civic Education 
Initiative (CEI) and verified that those bills have been enacted. This process enabled me to 
identify states that proceeded with dual policy enactment and adoption. The findings are 
summarized in Table 1 below.   
Table 1. Civic Education Reform in States that Adopted both CEI and C3, by year 
State Year C3 Adopted Year CEI Adopted 
Arizona 2018 2016 
Arkansas 2014 2017 
Indiana 2014 2019 
Kentucky 2018 2017 
Louisiana 2019 2015 
Michigan 2018 2016 
Minnesota 2020 2016 
Missouri 2016 2016 
Montana 2019 2017 
Nevada 2018 2017 
New Hampshire 2019 2017 
North Dakota 2019 2015 
Oklahoma 2019 2016 
South Carolina 2019 2015 
South Dakota 2017 2019 
Tennessee 2019 2015 
Utah 2016 2015 
Virginia 2015 2017 
Washington 2018 2018 




Wisconsin 2018 2015 
   
 
This study aimed to analyze implementation and, thus would benefit from looking at 
states that were early adopters of both initiatives. In selecting to focus on early adopters, I was 
aware that diffusion studies do note that early adopters of policy reform differ in some respects 
from those that follow. More specifically, this literature (Rogers, 2003) notes that early adopters 
may be more enthusiastic/supportive of the policy reform enacted than those that join at later 
stages. Thus, if early adoption means more enthusiasm, this would provide a conservative case 
for analyzing the impediments to implementation. Recognizing this, I believe that my choice to 
focus on early adopters stands as the most optimal way to service my research agenda for two 
reasons: 1) if these early adopters (and putatively more enthusiastic states) evidence greater 
obstacles and resistance, this might suggest that the obstacles and resistance will be even more 
evident in later adopting stages, if they tend to be those that are less enthusiastic; 2) I could 
assess implementation more efficiently in districts that have simply had time to adopt, react, 
reject, or debate the reform. Therefore, to adequately capture developments during the 
implementation stage my research was best served by looking at states that adopted both the C3 
and the CEI by 2017. Selecting this timeframe as a chronological boundary enabled me to have 
access to a longer period of time to study. By setting these parameters, my data suggested that 
Missouri and Utah were the most viable candidates.65 I opted to pursue Utah first.  
Confirming Commitment and Variation 
 
65 The study originally aimed to assess implementation in both Utah and Missouri and to start with Utah. However, the study 
deviates from the original design in not including Missouri. Numerous attempts to connect with state officials and district leaders 




  Once I identified Utah as the state that I would pursue for this study, I confirmed that it 
showed signs of a concrete commitment to civic education reform and that enactment and 
adoption of both the C3 and the CEI was not symbolic.  According to Walker (2004), the 
existence of symbolic structures (like legislation on the CEI or the new standards that include the 
C3) often “help to maintain the façade that the organization is still committed to its goals,” but 
do “not necessarily imply that the organization has established formal mechanisms for their 
actualization. For example, some state departments of education maintain programs on paper 
only, with no staff assigned to these programs” (p. 343).  Walker, evoking the 1984 study of 
Louis and Crowin of the interaction of state education departments with their respective 
environments, suggests that state education departments also use instrumental and strategic 
structures to support their espoused goals.  Instrumental structures “connect materials, resources, 
and services to the desired goals” and examples include the creation of high school graduation 
requirements and the development of state assessment programs (Walker, 2004, p. 343).  
Given that Utah adopted a civics exam and made it a graduation requirement, I had 
confirmation of the existence of such structures. To assess the extent to which the Utah 
department of education had in fact put in place strategic structures, I looked closely at several 
departmental documents and resources made available on their websites. Strategic structures, 
according to Walker, “represent the strategies that are used by the organization to provide and 
deliver resources to the organizations to which it is likened” (Walker, 2004, p. 343). Examples of 
strategic structures include state monitoring activities, as well as technical assistance and support 
to local districts. My research revealed signs of strategic structures in Utah. For example, the 
Utah State Board of Education (USEB) provided professional development opportunities for 




I also confirmed that Utah was not the only CEI & C3 state that proceeded in a non-
symbolic way. Other states that adopted both the CEI and the C3 also undertook steps indicating 
a commitment to civic education reform. For example, the Arkansas Department of Education 
provided its districts with a study guide for the civics exam.66 The Arizona Department of 
Education organized an annual civics learning conference for educators.67 The Oklahoma 
Department of Education made available on its website comprehensive information for district 
educators regarding various professional development opportunities, grants, educational 
resources, and student scholarships related to civic education.68 
Once I selected the state I would analyze that pursued both the CEI and the C3, I turned 
to identifying the state that adopted only the C3. As noted earlier, comparing Utah to a C3-only 
state would allow me to pursue the question: how, if at all, did the response of districts differ in 
states that did not face seemingly conflicted mandates and adopted only the C3? I started my 
analysis by looking first at two aspects: the date that C3 was adopted; and legislative activity 
related to the CEI. This process entailed researching and collecting the most recent Social 
Studies Standards of all states that adopted only the C3 available through their respective 
Departments of Education and studying the documents to ensure that the standards aligned with 
the C3 Framework. Once I validated that, I turned to the websites of the state legislatures in all 
states to locate the bills introduced calling for adoption of the Civic Education Initiative (CEI) 
and verified that CEI was not enacted. This process enabled me to compile the findings displayed 
in Table 2 below.  




67 See https://www.azed.gov/civicengagement/2019/01/11/6th-annual-civic-learning-conference/.  




State Date C3 Adopted Legislative Activity on CEI 
California 2017 None 
Colorado 2018 SB16-148 introduced in 2016; failed 
Connecticut 2015 HB 5464 introduced in 2015; failed 
Delaware 2016 None 
Georgia 2016 SB219 introduced in 2019; failed 
Hawaii 2018 CEI introduced multiple times since 2015; failed 
Illinois 2016 None 
Iowa 2017 SF209 introduced in 2019; failed 
Kansas 2013 CEI introduced in 2021(pending) 
Maine 2018 None 
Maryland 2015 HB0324 introduced in 2016; did not pass; reintroduced in 2021 (pending) 
Massachusetts 2018 H.434 introduced in 2019; failed 
Mississippi 2018 HB1135 introduced in 2019; pending 
Nebraska 2019 CEI introduced in 2017; failed 
New Jersey 2014 A308 introduced in 2018; failed 
New Mexico 2019 None 
New York 2014 None 
North Carolina 2021 None 
Ohio 2018 HB544 introduced 2016; failed 
Oregon 2018 Introduced multiple times since 2015 (failed); reintroduced in 2021 (pending) 





My findings indicated that the following states adopted the C3 framework prior to 2017 
(and therefore would offer the opportunity to adequately analyze implementation): Connecticut, 
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York. I ruled out 
considering states that had no legislative activity on the CEI guided by the hypothesis that a state 
that saw a bill introduced to establish CEI had some political actors who felt that the CEI should 
be considered and, as a result, some debate did unfold in that state to consider both mandates. 
That these efforts failed may indicate that the C3 “won,” that is, it was the preferred course of 
action in the state. That the C3 was the preferred strategy after some degree of contention 
indicates that pro-C3 (or anti-CEI) political actors were more powerful in these states. For states 
that did not consider the CEI, we can only hypothesize that pro-C3 sentiments may have 
dominated, but we have no means of being certain. Perhaps, in these states other factors may 
account for the non-CEI action, such alternative civic education platforms, or a lack of interest in 
testing as an educational strategy. Thus, looking only at states that considered the CEI but 
rejected it makes a more concrete case that those states did in fact “choose” C3. This process of 
elimination left me with three states that could serve as viable candidates for analysis: 
Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey.  
To identify the most appropriate state, I explored how the three candidates compare to 
Utah using several criteria. All three states were in different geographic regions from Utah 
making them all viable candidates for analysis.  To maximize my capacity to select one state I 
looked at variation in terms of governance and more specifically along three lines of 
centralization guided by the work of Manna (2013) who suggests that the degree of 
administrative, fiscal, and political centralization matters for the implementation process. To 




bureaucracies to carry out public policy—I compared the number of school districts in each of 
the states. To assess fiscal centralization—the allocation of responsibility across government 
levels for raising public revenues—I compared the sources of revenues for public education in 
each state. Finally, to capture political centralization—the degree to which power over 
appointments to key positions in state government is relatively centralized into the hands of 
fewer people—I compared how chiefs of state departments of education are appointed in Utah 
and Missouri.  
Manna (2013) tells us that fiscal centralization matters because “he who has the gold gets 
to make the rules,” as does political centralization because “variation in who is empowered to 
select government officials creates different principal-agent relationships as well as different 
networks, which can affect policy implementation and results” (p. 686). Centralized states 
typically exhibit the following characteristics: a smaller number of school districts 
(administrative centralization); a higher percentage of education revenue coming from nonlocal 
sources (fiscal centralization); and gubernatorial power to select state education department 
officials (political centralization).  
Analysis of the degree of administrative, fiscal, and political centralization of Utah and 
the three C3 only states produced the findings summarized in Table 3.  
Table 3. Degree of Centralization: Utah, Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey 























Fiscal Centralization Centralized 
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% of funds that 
comes from nonlocal 
revenues: 46.3** 
Political Centralization Decentralized 
 









Governor appoints state 
board education (SBE) 
members; SBE appoints 




Governor appoints state 
board education (SBE) 
members; SBE appoints 





state board (SBE) 
members; SBE 
appoints chief state 
school officer.*** 
*Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Selected Statistics From the Public Elementary and Secondary Education 
Universe: School Year 2015-16, accessed at https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2018052. 
**Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), “National 
Public Education Financial Survey,” 2014-15, accessed at https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/stfis.asp. 
*** Source: National Association of State Boards of Education, State Education Governance Matrix, accessed at 
http://www.nasbe.org/about-us/state-boards-of-education/. 
 
All three states are similar in terms of all three levels of centralization, suggesting again 
that all three are viable candidates for analysis. Furthermore, because all states are different from 
Utah, my comparative analysis would further be strengthened. I sought to maximize variation as 
much as possible guided by the hypothesis that my research would point to varied 
implementation outcomes within the states, but not between. I hypothesized further that the 
variation in implementation outcomes would come from local factors (the local politics) and that 
these may in fact be similar even in states who are different geographically and in terms of 
educational governance structures, like degree of centralization. To test this hypothesis, I 
maximized variation as much as possible. I opted to pursue Connecticut first as a result of factors 





Selecting District Characteristics 
 I selected four districts in each state to analyze for this study. Utah has a total of 41 
school districts and Connecticut a total of 205. According to Creswell (2013), site selection in a 
comparative case study must result from a “purposeful maximal sampling strategy” (p. 100) that 
will yield the variation required to inform the central research questions. Before making my 
selection, I gathered statistical information for all districts in each state of the following 
characteristics: district political ideology, size of student body, location, per pupil allocation, and 
characteristics of the student population (percentage non-white, percent ELL, and percentage of 
economically disadvantaged students). To gather information on all of these characteristics (with 
the exception of political ideology) I consulted databases available through the National Center 
for Education Statistics, the Utah State Board of Education, and the Connecticut State 
Department of Education.  I compiled this information for all school districts in each state, 
including only those categorized as “normal school districts”68F69 and removed those listed as some 
other type of district (i.e. agency, state, etc.). I did so to control for variation possible stemming 
from administrative/organizational factors. 
Once I gathered the above data, I set out to identify the political ideology of each school 
district. I chose to include political ideology as a factor because my main research questions seek 
to assess the degree to which district level politics affected the implementation phase of the 
recent state initiated civic education policy reform. This reform, as highly earlier, appears to be 
promoting ideologically conflicting mandates. Therefore, the ideological orientation of a given 
district (in terms of the political affiliation of the general public) may generate a certain type of 
 
69 NCES defines regular school districts as follows: “Locally governed agency responsible for providing free public elementary 
or secondary education; includes independent school districts and those that are a dependent segment of a local government such 




response, or policy feedback effect. For example, we could expect to find conservative districts 
more likely to make efforts to support the implementation of the CEI and to be less enthusiastic 
about the C3. We would expect that because school districts often respond to pressures from 
elected members populating local boards of education and/or the parent community. I 
hypothesized that a district that has a conservative board of education and an active conservative 
parent community may be more likely to align with the ideological perspective of the CEI and 
pressure its school districts administrators to take steps to ensure implementation of one 
mandate, possibly at the expense of another. To capture this, my goal was to analyze 
implementation in two conservative and in two liberal districts in each state.  
I proceeded as follows to identify political ideology for each school district in both states. 
Given that the two national initiatives had started to unfold in early 2010, I opted to use data 
from the 2008 presidential elections and not the 2012 elections—partisan presidential vote—to 
determine district ideology. The challenge in Utah was the data were available at the county level 
and not the school district level. I consulted the data and statistics division of the Utah State 
Board of Education and they provided me with a file specifying how school districts map to 
counties. I then found county level data on the 2008 presidential election results from the Utah 
Lt. Governor’s website.70 Thus, I was able to find the political ideologies of all 41 counties. The 
process was more straightforward in Connecticut as school districts correspond directly to towns. 
I found 2008 election data per town available on the website of the Connecticut Secretary of 
State. Data were given as total votes cast per candidate, in each town, which I then converted to 






Once I compiled data for all districts in each state, I was able to identify clearly liberal 
districts in Connecticut and clearly conservative districts in Utah. However, at that point it 
became clear that the ideological composition of the two states—Utah being very conservative 
and Connecticut very liberal—made it challenging to clearly identify liberal districts in Utah and 
conservative districts in Connecticut. I ranked districts as “relatively conservative” or “relatively 
liberal” compared to others in each state (in Utah that meant districts in which close to 50% (or 
more) of the population voted for Barack Obama in 2008; and in Connecticut that meant districts 
in which close to 50% (or more) voted for John McCain).  When I completed the ranking 
process, I identified 13 districts in Connecticut that were “relatively conservative” and 9 districts 
in Utah there were “relatively liberal.”  
Once I had a pool of relevant districts, I started the process by first randomly selecting 
districts and contacting district administrators to request interviews. The process gave me access 
to some districts, but not enough. To meet the sample size that I needed I used interviews with 
various individuals at the state and district levels to gain access to individuals in the districts that 
I was targeting based on political ideology. Once I had access to a district, a snowballing 
technique was used to gain access to educators. This strategy has been employed by other 
qualitative studies (Spillane, 2002; Firestone, 1989). In some cases, interviews led to 
recommendations of districts that were thought to exhibit some level of commitment to civic 
education. In pursuing such recommendations, I made sure to remain true to my selection criteria 
and sought interviews only in those recommended districts that met my specification in terms of 
political ideology and for maximizing variation across the various characteristics outlined above.  
The district characteristics for each state are summarized in Table 4 below (pseudonyms 




Table 4. District Characteristics 











Apple (UT) 80,953 Conservative 20 4 16 7,888 Suburb: large 
Cook (UT) 70,643 Conservative 18 3 18 8,287 Suburb: large 
Stone (UT) 61,851 Relatively-
liberal 





57 55 55 11,044 City: midsize 
Mall (CT) 3,136 Relatively 
Conservative 
20 1 10 17,789 Suburb: large 
Store (CT) 2,894 Liberal 40 9 58 16,557 Suburb: large 
Beach (CT) 2, 392 Relatively 
Conservative 
12 0 13 15,696 Suburb: large 
River (CT) 1,842 Liberal 12 0 19 16,617 Town 
 
Source:  
*Author’s calculations as described on pages 37 and 38.   
**Utah State Board of Education and Connecticut State Department of Education 
***National Center for Education Statistics 
Note: Economically disadvantaged defined as eligible for free or reduced lunch.  
 
Methods & Data Collection 
To examine the research questions, the study employed a qualitative research design. Such a 
design, as Maxwell (2013) argues, is most appropriate when attempting to answer questions 
related to process. Because I was particularly interested in understanding the political dynamics 
of the implementation process (including the interpretive frameworks of implementers) a 
qualitative research design was fitting. The study seeks to ascertain how localities responded to 




focus on the specifics in each locality which Maxwell (2013) notes could be captured mostly 
through a qualitative research design. This study undertakes a qualitative research design guided 
by case study research approach. According to Creswell (2007), case study research constitutes a 
qualitative research approach during which “the investigators explore a bounded system (a case) 
or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection 
involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, audiovisual material, 
and documents and reports), and reports a case description and case-based themes” (p. 73).    
The dissertation constitutes a qualitative case study defined by Creswell (2013), as “a 
qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or a multiple 
bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collections involving multiple 
sources of information (e.g. observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and 
reports), and reports a case description and case-based themes” (quoted in Merriam and Tisdell, 
2016, p. 40). For Yin (2014), “case study is a design particularly suited to a situation in which it 
is impossible to separate the phenomenon’s variables from their context (Merriam and Tisdell, 
2016, p. 38).   
This dissertation did not make use of observations. Qualitative data collection for this 
study relied primarily on interviews. In this regard, the study is consistent with other studies in 
the field of education policy where, as Merriam and Tisdell (2016) note, “interviewing is the 
probably the most common form of data collection” (p. 106).Data collection also included 
documentary analysis involving  “mining data” (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016, p. 106) from 
documents and reports, including legislative documents, hearing and debate transcripts, minutes 




state level policies at the district level. Therefore, data collection included state-level and district-
level data (including district office and schools). 
Interview Data 
 State-level qualitative data included interviews with the representatives from the 
Departments of Education in both states, members of the Standards writing teams, and 
representatives from state-level educational organizations that played a key role in advancing 
respective state policies. District-level data included interviews with district social studies 
coordinators/specialists and district teachers. In both states interviews were also conducted with 
individuals representing interest groups that advocated for new civic education policies. Table 5 
summarizes the number and types of interviews conducted.  
Table 5. Summary of Interviewees 
Category Utah Connecticut 
State Department of Education officials 1 1 
Representatives of state level educational organizations  1 2 
District-Level Administrators 4 4 
Teachers 6 5 
Other (consultants, curriculum writers, advocacy group 
representatives) 
2 3 
Total 14 15 
 
 Most interviews were conducted between January 2020 and June 2020 (very few in the 
Fall of 2020 and two in early 2021) over the phone or via Zoom. The interviews were recorded 
with the participants’ permission and ranged from 45 to 90 minutes, with the vast majority 
lasting one hour. As a result of state-level developments viewed as policy responses to the civic 
reforms implemented in the states that prompted the need for additional clarification, three 




Interview protocols were used and in 3 cases shared with the interviewees (at their request) prior 
to the interview. Consistent with other qualitative studies (Spillane, 2002), interview protocols 
were used to ensure that comparable data was collected from interviewees, particularly with 
district-level social studies coordinators and teachers. For district-level administrators, the 
protocols included questions related to: district response to and position on the state CEI and/or 
Standards mandate; district capacity and resources to implement policies; district-initiated 
policies to facilitate implementation; and perceptions of the policy reforms. For teachers, the 
interview protocols included questions on: their definitions of civic education, perceptions of the 
efficacy of standards and (in Utah CEI) to enhance civic education and to increase student civic 
outcomes, communications and support received from the district during implementation, and 
factors that impeded or aided implementation.  
The questions were open ended to minimize potential investigator-introduced bias during 
the interview. Interview protocols for district administrators and teachers appear in the 
Appendix. All interviews were semi-structured and while the standard protocol was used, during 
the interview some questions were adapted or new questions were formulated depending on the 
interviewees responses and direction that the content of the interview was taking.  This strategy 
allowed me to “respond to the situation at hand, to the emerging worldview of the respondent, 
and to new ideas on the topic” (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016, p. 111). Prior to the interviews, all 
interviewees completed a consent form (that communicated that their anonymity would be 








 The study, primarily in analyzing implementation in Utah, makes extensive use of 
legislative documents and legislative hearings available on the website of the Utah legislature. 
That included hearings on the SB60, HB152, and HB334 at the Senate and House Education 
Committees, and subsequent Senate and House debates. Transcriptions of the hearing were not 
available on the websites. That required me to listen to the hearings of interest and generate my 
own transcriptions for future analysis and use. To ensure proper, non-biased use of the hearings, 
I transcribed hearings in their entirety and did not select only parts that seemed interesting to me 
at that moment. Hearings ranged from 30 minutes to 2 hours.  
 The study also made use of minutes available on the respective State Department of 
Education websites of meetings relevant to policy reforms related to the adoption of Standards in 
both states. Locating the minutes with relevant references required restricting the timeline to the 
months and year of interest. Because minutes were not always highly informational and provided 
a summary of the actions taken at the meetings, rather than more concrete details about the 
positions of each participant, additional research was required. In such cases, coverage of 
developments by the media aided with the analysis. I identified relevant media coverage both 
through targeted web searches and use of LexisNexis. I focused primarily on local news outlets 
in both states, as I felt that they would be more likely to report on the state-specific dynamics of 
proposed enactments and activities at the Departments of Education, as well as local reactions to 
these initiatives. These sources were instrumental in illuminating key actors in both states and 
helped me understand the local context.  In the case of Connecticut, the study makes extensive 
use of a quarterly newsletter published by the Connecticut Council for the Social Studies 




 The websites of the Departments of Education provided in both states the new Standards, 
but also access to state-level documents used to aid with implementation. I also research 
extensively the website of the districts of interest to find documents related to civic education 
policy reform at the district level. These documents helped me to “uncover meaning, develop 
understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem” (Merriam and Tisdell, 
2016, p. 192).  
 
Data Analysis 
I transcribed all interviews verbatim to ensure that I generate what Maxwell calls “rich 
data” and not just “notes on what [I] felt was significant” (Maxwell, 2013). Transcribing 
constituted another means “of generating insights and hunches about what is doing on in [my] 
data” (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016, p. 200).  I coded interviews after completing all transcriptions 
for each state, first Utah and then Connecticut, making use of the computer assisted qualitative 
data analysis software NVivo.  
Although most case study analyses follow purely an inductive investigate strategy 
(Merriam and Tisdell, 2016), I undertook a more hybrid approach in regards to coding similar to 
that undertaken in other studies (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Swain, 2018) and is line with 
Maxwell (2013) and Merriam (2009) in putting at the forefront of the study the theoretical 
framework. Guided by the theoretical framework, I created coding categories for policy design 
elements (including origins, incremental/major change, enactment coalitions, theory of action, 
policy instrument, and policy target), institutional structures and rules, interpretive and 
administrative effects, time, decision venues, external environment, and mobilization of interests.  




created additional categories, such as school culture, teacher philosophies, why civic education 
matters, etc.  
After completing the initial round of coding, I wrote memos that allowed me to gain 
distance from the data and to approach the data in an analytical, and not descriptive manner. 
Such memos, according to Bohm (2004) “become starting points for the formulation of the final 
manuscript” (p. 271). The memos certainly provided me with an opportunity to analyze and to 
synthesize the data using the theoretical puzzle and to understand how all the pieces of the big 
puzzle fit together. The memos helped me question original assumptions, identify missing pieces 
of data that I went back to locate, and recode the data as needed. Such an approach 
complemented this study well for the following reasons: 1) a deductive approach enabled me to 
stay close to the theoretical framework guiding this study; 2) an inductive approach ensured that 
I capture themes or patterns not accounted for in the original theoretical framework and to 
develop it further.  I continued the process of memo writing, data analysis, additional 
researching, and memo rewriting until I hit the point of “saturation” that is when I was confident 
that “no new information, insights, or understandings are forthcoming” (Merriam & Tisdell, 
2016, p. 210).  
Through the memo writing process, I engaged in data collection and analysis 
simultaneously, consistent with qualitative research practice (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). The 
process enabled me to identify patterns in my data, but also to identify new questions. The new 
questions sometimes led me to go back to interviewees and request clarification, or an additional 
interview. I used data to help me “learn as much as possible about the contextual variables that 
might have a bearing” on my cases (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 234). Furthermore, in line with 




to address my research questions (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). My research questions were clearly 
defined, and I used the collected data as evidence to answer specific research questions guided 
by my theoretical framework. For example, when trying to ascertain if and how competing 
priorities from the external environment affected implementation, I mined the data collected 
from interviews for evidence. In doing so, I made sure to look for patterns and/or more than one 
interview reference to an area that would constitute a “competing priority” to ensure that the 
conclusion I reached regarding what constituted a competing priority was well grounded in the 
data collected. In the chapters that follow, the data collected through interviews and documents is 
used in two ways. First, I use the data collected to describe the specific context of the civic 
education reform in my two case studies. Second, I used the data as evidence to support the 
conclusions that I make about the factors that impacted implementation of the civic education 
reforms in each state and as metrics to assess factors that led to variation in this implementation. 
In this regard, the data appear in subsequent chapters as evidence in the analytical sections of the 
study, including the tables that summarize the implementation outcomes.   
When undertaking data analysis, I first treated each case study individually and 
independently. That is, during the interview, data collection, and data analysis stages I did not 
compare the two cases. I first created what Yin (2014) calls a “systematic archive of all the data” 
for my first case and used it to write the case study. When finished I did the same for my second 
case. I started to think of the two in comparative terms and to write the cross-case analysis after 
completing the second case in hopes that I could “build abstractions across cases” (Merriam and 
Tisdell, 2016, p. 234).  
I am confident that the study addresses concerns related to validity and reliability 




Tisdell, 2016, p. 244) and because I went back to some interviewees to share findings and solicit 
additional feedback on conclusions thus engaging in respondent validation which Maxwell 
considers “the single most important way of ruling out the possibility of misinterpreting the 
meaning of what participants say” and “an important way of identifying your own biases and 
misunderstanding of what you observed” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 126). 
 
Study Design Limitations 
 Much like other qualitative case studies, the proposed study design requires a reduction in 
the number of cases studied. By making this choice, I was aware that the findings of this study 
will not be entirely generalizable. Generalizability, as Maxwell notes, “refers to extending 
research results, conclusions, or other accounts that are based on a study of particular 
individuals, settings, times, or institutions to other individuals, settings times, or institutions than 
those directly studied” (Maxwell, 2013,  p.137). I was well aware of the limitations related to the 
generalizability of qualitative research and knew that I would not be able to draw conclusions 
about the recent civic education reform in its entirety. However, the study does offer a detailed, 
concrete analysis of 8 school districts across 2 states all of which were carefully selected using 
specific criteria. This provides the study with some degree of generalizability, for example 
related to questions of what factors “matter” for implementation, what role district characteristics 
play, what characteristics aid or impede implementation.  
Furthermore, as Merriam notes, “although generalizability in the statistical sense cannot 
occur in qualitative research, that’s not to say that nothing can be learned from a qualitative 
study” (Merriam, 2009, p. 254). In qualitative research studies generalizability is based on “the 




but that may produce different outcomes in different circumstances (Maxwell, 2013, p. 138). My 
hope remains that the findings of this study from the school districts in Utah and Connecticut, 
which are grounded in a comprehensive, in-depth research design, will shed light on how 
districts responded to the recent civic education reform and on the role that politics played in this 
process.  From that point forward, the reader will be able to make the inference of whether the 

















CHAPTER VI  
 
 THE POLITICS OF CIVIC EDUCATION POLICY REFORM IN UTAH 
 
Almost 20 years ago, the Utah legislature solidified its commitment to civic education by 
making it part of state code. Through HB22, Civic and Character Education in Schools, the 
legislature defined civic education as “the cultivation of informed, responsible participation in 
political life by competent citizens committed to the fundamental values and principles of 
representative democracy in Utah and the United States.”71 HB22 identified schools, along with 
families, as vehicles responsible for delivering this type of education and noted that “Civic and 
Character Education are fundamental elements of the constitutional responsibility of public 
education and shall be a continuing emphasis and focus in public schools.”71F72  
Utah’s schools have, arguably, fulfilled this mission in the sense that most do deliver 
some form of civic education. In Utah, civic education is the product of outputs by the state 
legislature and bureaucratic initiatives spearheaded by the Utah State Board of Education 
(USBE). Most prominent among these, and the subjects of discussion of this chapter, are the 
USBE’s 2016 Utah Core Standards for Social Studies adopted and the 2015 Civic Education 
Initiative enacted by the legislature. The first called on Utah’s public schools to align social 
studies and civics instruction in grades 7-12 to the C3-inspired Standards and the second made 
the passing of the United States citizenship test a requirement of high school graduation.  
However, what this civic education actually looks like varies by district, by schools, and 
even by classroom. In practice, that means what type of civic education a student receives 
 
71 HB22 Civics and Character Education in School (2004), available at https://le.utah.gov/~2004/bills/hbillhtm/hb0022s01.htm. 




depends not only on the district in which they reside, the school they attend, but also the teachers 
that they have along the way. Twenty years after HB22, there is little consistency in how schools 
are “cultivating” students for citizenship.  
This chapter analyzes civic education policy reform that unfolded in Utah as a result of 
legislative activity on the Civic Education Initiative (SB60) and the adoption of the Utah Core 
Social Studies Standards (Standards). Using the analytical framework introduced earlier, this 
chapter first examines the implementation of both policies in four school districts. It looks at how 
elements of the policy design determined at enactment interacted with competing priorities of the 
external political environment to generate during implementation political dynamics that 
impacted the interpretive frameworks and the administrative capacity of implementers, thus 
affecting district implementation outcomes. The second part of the chapter examines policy 
sustainability. It describes how implementation politics and outcomes generated feedback effects 
that prompted interest groups to mobilize to challenge the sustainability of both policies. The 
chapter ends with conclusions from the analysis of these dual mandates.  
 
Utah’s Civic Education Initiative: The Politics of Implementation 
 
 In September of 2014, Utah lawmakers Senator Howard Stephenson and Representative 
Steve Eliason announced their intention to introduce legislation in the 2015 session making the 
passing of a civics test a requirement for high school graduation. During their joint 
announcement, Stephenson referenced the low levels of political knowledge and promoted the 
test as a solution: “When citizens don’t understand how government works, they aren’t likely to 
vote or take part in policy discussions … This Civics Education Initiative is important to help 
keep what the Founding Fathers set up” (Johnson, 2014). Eliason also highlighted that link 




engineering, and math a lot of other important topics, unfortunately, civics education has kind of 
fallen through the cracks. … We need to incentivize and put a requirement there that would 
require students to have a very basic knowledge (Schencker, 2014). The same day policymakers 
in six other states—Arizona, Missouri, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and South 
Dakota—made similar announcements (Schencker, 2014).  
The two legislators were joined by Jonathan Johnson, Overstock.com CEO and co-chair 
of the Utah Civics Education Initiative, the Utah arm of the Joe Foss Institute’s Civic Education 
Initiative. Johnson, who a year later launched an unsuccessful campaign for Governor in Utah, 
described the rationale as follows:  
What we are really trying to accomplish is to create a citizenry in Utah that 
understands how the system works. ... Our voter turnout over the past decades has 
gone down, and down, and down. The area where people vote the least are newly 
minted voters. … By helping them understand how civics work we would 
increase that number. … If we don’t make it a requirement, kids won’t do it.  … 
The Pew research report said only 1/3 of Americans can identify the branches of 
government … it feels like a jaywalking segment on the [Jay Leno] Tonight 
Show. We are trying to solve that problem by … requiring students to study and 
become educated in how the system works (Johnson, 2014).  
 
In November, Johnson took his message to the Conference of Mayors of Salt 
Lake County (Johnson, L., 2015), where he gained written support of all 16 mayors 
(Hearing, House Education Standing Committee, 2015). When the 2015 legislative 
session began, Stephenson submitted the bill to the Senate launching the enactment phase 
of the American Civics Education Initiative, Senate Bill 60 (SB60). The introduced bill 
called for the following: “requires a high school student to pass a basic civics test as a 
condition for receiving a high school diploma; requires a student enrolled in an adult 
education program to pass a basic civics test; specifies the number of correct answers an 




to make rules.” The bill defined a basic civics test as “a test that includes all 100 
questions on the civics test form used by the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services” and specified that to pass an individual “must answer a minimum of 60 out of 
the 100 questions.”72F73  
In January, a week before the bill was formally introduced in the legislature, a 
UtahPolicy policy poll found that 84 percent of Utahans supported the proposed bill and 
did so on a bipartisan basis:  87 percent of Republicans, 84 percent of Democrats, and 86 
percent of independents supported the idea (Johnson, J., 2015).  SB60 successfully made 
it through Utah’s swift 45-day legislative session. But, as will be discussed below, the 
politics of enactment and of implementation were much more contentious than the poll 
indicates, suggesting, perhaps, that the poll communicates less so public support for the 
bill, and more so the result of people lacking information and not thinking about the 
complexity of implementation.  
 
 
The Policy Design Phase of SB60 
 
The theoretical framework that guides this study proposes that an analysis of the 
implementation of SB60 starts with assessing characteristics of the policy design. As noted 
earlier, these characteristics matter as they set the tone for implementation, primarily how 
implementers will interpret the policy. The specific characteristics of the policy design phase that 
impact implementation include: enactment coalition and its theory of action, origins, nature of 
change, policy targets, policy instruments and institutional structures and rules.  The discussion 
of the impact of these characteristics on implementation starts with the argument that SB60 was 
 




the product of an elite enactment coalition motivated by a theory of action assuming that to 
increase political knowledge and participation at a time when both were at low levels and at a 
time when schools were neglecting civic education, the Utah legislature must enact a policy 
making the passing of the citizenship test a requirement for graduation. The theory of action 
dictated that elements of the policy design would set the tone for a contested implementation for 
several reasons. First, the policy design was one that aimed to produce a legislated top-down, 
mandate. Second, the policy design aimed to bring about major change to Utah’s educational 
system by mandating a high-stakes exam. Third, the coalition focused on the long-term civic 
benefits that the policy would generate for students, but did not account for the reaction of other 
policy targets, specifically the implementers (district leaders and teachers). Finally, the policy 
design generated almost no policy instruments to incentivize compliance. These policy design 
characteristics and the subsequent institutional structures and rules established predisposed a 
large sector of implementers to view the policy as a misplaced, misguided, top-down mandate 
with potentially high costs and few benefits. In this regard, as will be discussed in detail below, 
the policy design primed implementers to view the policy negatively and set the tone for a 
challenging and contentious implementation phase.  
Enactment coalition beliefs and theory of action. 
SB60 was introduced to the Senate Education Standing Committee on January 27th, 2015. 
At that hearing, members of the enactment coalition were present to introduce and support the 
bill. The enactment coalition, which upheld a conservative political ideology, included 
Republican legislators, the leadership of Utah’s Civics Education Initiative, and members of the 
Promote Liberty Political Action Committee (a libertarian PAC chaired by Johnson).  Looking at 




this analysis to identify the coalition’s deep core values, policy core beliefs, and secondary 
aspects (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), which, as noted earlier, shape the coalition’s behavior 
and, most importantly, its theory of action. The enactment coalition’s deep core values, which 
according to ACF are the broadest and most highly resistant to change, was that civic education 
could increase political knowledge and political and civic participation. The coalition’s policy 
core beliefs, which comprise strategies and policy positions employed by coalitions to bring 
about policy change in line with their deep beliefs, was that schools were not providing students 
with an adequate civic education as students did not know key facts related to American history 
and government. The secondary aspect of the coalition’s belief system was that to resolve this 
oversight the Utah legislature must require that all students pass the citizenship test to graduate 
from high school.  
These beliefs guided the coalitions ’theory of action, which, as noted earlier, assumes that 
“if you intend to produce consequence C in situation S, then do A” (Argyris & Schon, 1996, p. 
13). The enactment coalition’s theory was that to increase political knowledge and participation 
at a time when both were at low levels and at a time when schools were neglecting civic 
education, the Utah legislature must enact a policy making the passing of the citizenship test a 
requirement for graduation. At the January 27th hearing,74 members of the coalition laid out their 
theory of action. “This bill is meant to solve a problem we have with civic understanding,” noted 
Johnson in his remarks to the Committee. “We find that most citizens cannot name the three 
branches of government, the chief justice of the supreme court…. We are in crisis I believe,” 
said Stephenson.  “For us, voting, regardless of party affiliation, is a requirement. … In order for 
any of us to be part of our community, our nation, we must know the basics,” said Lorena Riffo 
 





Jenson, co-chair of Promote Liberty Political Action Committee when speaking to the 
Committee for the bill. Johnson expanded this point further, noting that, “by memorizing these 
facts we are providing our students with the building blocks they need to do further thinking and 
analysis of our government.”  
At the same hearing, members of the enactment coalition used two strategies to advocate 
for SB60: 1) an implicit argument that in helping preserve American democratic institutions the 
bill had a universal, patriotic, and not partisan appeal; 2) references to data supporting their 
arguments. Stephenson mobilized the patriotic appeal: “Some of our former patriots said that ‘if 
we refuse to understand our system, we are bound to lose it. ’Another one said that ‘each 
generation has to win our liberty anew. ’And I believe that that liberty doesn’t necessarily mean 
that we have to win it through war and that we certainly have to win it through knowledge. And, 
so, we are definitely in crisis.” The data mobilized by the coalition came from reports published 
in those years by the Annenberg Public Policy Center and the Pew Research Center. “We have 
seen a lot of data and concern about the inability of Americans to really understand the system of 
government under which we operate,” said Stephenson and went on to cite specific numbers 
from these reports.  
To further legitimize SB60, coalition members highlighted that their efforts aligned with 
a national movement in this direction. “This effort is being spearheaded around the nation. 
Arizona passed it just about a week ago and hopefully Utah will pass this legislation as well,” 
said Stephenson. That the enactment coalition did not include educators and that SB60 was 
connected to a national initiative was the element of this characteristic of the policy design that 
set the tone for a contentious implementation. According to a representative from the state’s 




to the legislature acting on a policy that came from an “outside organization” (Author’s 
interview).  
Origins. 
The national movement impacted the coalition’s decision to identify the legislature as the 
optimal venue to advance the policy. The strategy in Utah was consistent with that of the 
national movement. The coalition’s decision to bring policy change through the legislature set 
the tone for a contentious implementation phase, because most policy implementers perceived it 
as a top-down mandate. Educational mandates stemming from the legislature, according to a 
representative of the UEA are not seen favorably by most teachers, as they believe that 
legislators lack the expertise to make decisions that impact curriculum (Author’s interview). In 
fact, this matter surfaced during the policy design phase. While the bill was being debated on the 
Senate Floor, Democratic Senator Jim Dabakis, an opponent of the bill who ultimately voted 
against, noted:  
It’s the proper role of the legislature to bring to the attention of the experts in our 
department a problem and ask them to solve it, not to come up with another test 
which isn’t going to get us where we want to go. (Senate Floor Debate, February 
9, 2015). 
 
Comments made at a Senate Education Standing Committee meeting by Sydnee Dickson, 
Deputy Superintendent of the Utah State Board of Education (USBE), suggest that some within 
the USBE did not consider the civics test appropriate educational practice, nor the type of civic 
education that would increase civic knowledge and engagement:  
“Thinking of civic engagement and what that means and how we gain that 
understanding, does it come from a set of very basic questions, is that the answer 
to the problem?  … The second thing to think about is what are we emphasizing 
here? Is it rote memorization or deep understanding? … How much do we learn 
when we memorize for a moment in time, rather than engage in deep 
understanding of these founding principles? Third, [think about] the amount of 




parents and students about high stakes testing” (Hearing, Senate Education 
Standing Committee, 2015). 
 
Nature of change. 
Just like the origins set the tone for a contentious implementation, so did the type of 
change that SB60 would bring to Utah’s schools. The policy change was meant to not be 
incremental, but major. Given Utah’s 45-day legislative session, the bill would become law 
quickly and its implementation was to take place by the end of the school year. The change was 
also major as it would impact each one of Utah’s 41 school districts and its thousands of schools 
and teachers. Furthermore, the policy change was major because it made the test “high stakes” 
by making it a requirement for graduation. The enactment coalition appears to have been 
motivated to make this change major for two reasons: 1) the coalition appeared to have an 
interest in being one of the first states to join the national movement; 2) the coalition felt that the 
policy targets, the students of Utah, very much stood to benefit from this reform and needed to 
benefit now, not later. The “high stakes” nature of the exam constitutes the element of this policy 
design characteristic that generated the most backlash from some teachers during 
implementation. According to a representative from the UEA, teachers of students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, refugees, and special needs knew that they had to do more than their 
peers to prepare students to pass this exam (Author’s interview). Of note also is that parents in 
Utah have the option to request that their children opt-out of other state exams, but not the 
citizenship test.  
Policy targets. 
Another policy design characteristic that set the tone for a contentious implementation 




generate for students, but did not address how the policy would affect other policy targets (the 
USBE, the district administrators, and teachers). This left the door open for implementers to 
voice their concerns, which they did during the policy design phase indicating that the 
subsequent implementation phase would also not be smooth. Once the implementers entered the 
debate, primarily by putting pressure on legislators, the enactment coalition began making 
concessions to ensure that the bill passed. At the Senate Education Committee Hearing, the 
enactment coalition amended the bill to enable local education agencies (LEAs) to administer the 
test at any point of their choosing during a student’s academic path and no longer required that 
the test be administered in high school. It was at this same hearing that members of the 
Democratic party, which traditionally represents the viewpoints of teacher unions, spoke against 
the bill. Senator Dabakis noted: “I’m passionate about your cause but what can you tell me to 
convince me that this high burden and one more mandate to our students and teachers would be 
worth it?” (Hearing, Senate Education Standing Committee, 2015).  
By the time SB60 hit the Senate floor for debate, the implementers (primarily teachers 
through UEA representatives) had taken several steps to incentivize Republican and Democratic 
Senators to request further changes to the bill. The enactment coalition appeared willing to do 
whatever was necessary to make the bill more palatable, even if, ironically, the changes went 
against the parameters of the national movement. For example, when a motion was made to 
increase the threshold of the passing rate from 60% to 80%, Stephenson noted “I leave the 
passing rate to the discretion of the Senate” (Senate Floor Debate, February 9, 2015). Repubican 
Senator Todd Wieler shared that he was contacted by teachers “who asked to shorten it to 50 




“asking 100 questions is part of the 50-state movement. It could be modified.” The enrolled bill 
was modified to 50 questions.  
Another opponent, Democratic Senator Gene Davis, shared that teachers were 
concerned about students being required to take another test, as well as about the time 
that the test would take away from instruction and constraints it would place on already 
limited computer labs. “We should not do some national agenda that does not do what it’s 
intended to do. Reality is children take history. Why can’t this be part of the testing that 
children take in our classes?” Davis asked (Senate Floor Debate, February 9, 2015). 
Democratic Senator Luz Escamilla questioned whether the testing requirement would 
impact graduation rates, particularly for Latino and Native American male students. “I 
appreciate that we are talking about this issue…but this is not the way to go,” she said.  
When Stephenson came to the Senate floor two days later, the bill had been 
further modified to allow the USBE to create an alternate assessment for some students 
(ex. students with special needs). “I don’t want to claw a high school diploma away from 
a student who has otherwise earned it,” said Stephenson. The change added a fiscal note 
of $34,500 to the bill as the USBE indicated that creation of an alternate assessment 
would come at a cost. SB60 passed the Senate with a vote of 20-8-1 and headed to the 
House Education Committee where a similar conversation unfolded as legislators 
continued to voice the concerns of policy targets.  Johnson addressed directly the 
critiques launched by the opposition:  
I’d like to address some of the criticisms that I’ve heard of this bill and provide 
responses. One that I’ve heard is that this test is too easy. To that I’d say yes, but 
it’s not meant to be a ceiling of what schools should be teaching, it’s meant to be 
a floor. Second, I’ve heard that civics and American history courses already 
require competency in these skills in order to receive credit for these courses. To 




information is simply not getting absorbed. Some say that this will just create rote 
memorization and that memorization is not learning. My response would be in 
this case memorization is learning. … Some say that the test is too hard and that 
the high stakes of a graduation requirement is too much. To that I would say the 
bill provides that the students can take the test as many times as is necessary and 
that the local districts can make exceptions to graduation. Some say that this will 
be put an additional burden of testing on teachers with administration, monitoring, 
recording test scores and ensuring a diploma check. Teaching kids is the name of 
the game. … Some say that it’s too costly and that there are a lot of materials that 
need to be prepared. I would note that the test is already prepared. It’s available 
online as are free study materials for the test in multiple languages. Lastly, I 
recently heard that this is a vendor bill. I think that criticism is unfair. The Joe 
Foss Institute, which is an institute run by a great American patriot and where 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor is on the governing board, is a nonprofit group that 
is providing a free testing portal to administer the test online. A free portal, not a 
paid portal, not a vendor portal. … It’s not required that local school districts use 
it.” (Hearing, House Education Committee, February 23, 2015) 
 
At the same hearing, some conservative legislators made the point that not all 
future implementers opposed the bill. The House Sponsor, Rep. Eliason said: “I too have 
been contacted by a number of teachers on this issue, some for, some against. However, 
I’d say most have been in favor of it. They said, ‘I have nothing to fear, I teach all of 
this” (Hearing, House Education Committee, February 23, 2015). Republican 
Representative Kim Coleman added: “How can students go through 12 years of public 
education in Utah and could not pass this test? That is a shame and a travesty. … We are 
not just talking about students needing to understand trivia, but to have a fundamental 
understanding of basic civil rights…this test goes there” (Hearing, House Education 
Committee, February 23, 2015).  
The comments suggest that the implementers were split on their support of the 
civics test. At the hearing, Brad C. Smith, the Superintendent of Public Instruction was 




taken a position on the issue because, as indicated by Dickson’s comments at an earlier 
hearing, USBE officials were not united in their views on SB60. Smith said:  
The state office has not taken a position on this. I rise in support of this bill. … . 
It’s important that we establish a basic level of fluency with regards to our 
political system. That is exactly what this test does. … I would observe that in 
Utah we have compulsory attendance for public education. In my estimate the 
sole justification for compulsory attendance in public education is to create 
citizens fit to govern themselves. It’s appropriate that we take small steps in that 
regard” (Hearing, House Education Committee, February 23, 2015). 
 
SB60 moved on to the House Floor for debate on March 12th. No debate took 
place. Democratic Representative Joel Briscoe shared that his own informal survey of 
teachers in his district produced varied results suggesting that some teachers supported it 
while others were concerned that “SB60 is a way for the legislature to micromanage my 
classroom” (House Debate, March 12, 2015). But the pendulum had shifted in favor of 
SB60 with Senator Stratton remarking that “The greatest threat to our freedom is 
ignorance and I stand in support” and Senator Johnson saying “Give me a break. … 
Every high school student ought to exit high school with this rudimentary knowledge” 
(House Debate, March 12, 2015). SB60 passed the House with a vote of 46-26-3. It was 
signed by Governor Gary Herbert on March 30, 2015 74F75.  
Policy Instruments. 
Policy instruments can be understood as the “myriad techniques at the disposal of governments 
to implement their public policy objectives” (Howlett, 1991, p. 2) and these instruments, much 
like the above policy design characteristics, have the capacity to set the tone of implementation. 
SB60, however, offered few instruments to incentive implementation. The required high-stakes 
test was certainly an incentive for districts to focus on civic education, but the mandate did not 
 




come with any sanctions. That is, the legislation did not explicitly say what would happen to a 
district that did not implement this, nor did it specify any reporting requirements from districts to 
the USBE on progress made on testing. Districts were not required to collect or report data to the 
USBE on how many students passed the test nor the scores that the students received on this test.  
It simply stated that the USBE should make the rules that: “require an LEA to administer 
a basic civics test to a high school student; require an adult education program provider to 
administer a basic civics test to an individual who intends to receive an adult education 
secondary diploma; and, to allow an individual to take a basic civics test as many time as needed 
in order to pass the test” (SB60, 2015). The coalition assumed that because the policy was a 
legislative mandate school districts would simply implement it. The coalition appeared to be 
more interested, as  noted earlier, in simply passing this legislation, not in specifying its 
administration, perhaps in an effort to minimize opposition. As Johnson noted during the hearing 
to the House Education Committee:  
Some say that the language of the test is unclear if not messy on who would 
provide the test, at what cost with administration. The language is unclear for a 
reason. We would like to allow the local school districts to allow how best to 
administer the test. … It gives wide discretion to the local districts to choose how 
it’s done (Hearing, House Education Committee, February 23, 2015). 
 
The fluidity of the design and the absence of policy instruments to incentivize compliance (aside 
from the exam itself) suggest that the coalition may have been particularly interested in 
minimizing local opposition. By not establishing policy instruments, this policy design 
characteristics much like the others set the tone for an uncertain implementation phase.  
Institutional structures and rules. 
 
The theoretical framework that guides this study hypothesizes that a policy’s institutional 




structures and rules influence how policy targets “interpret the policy’s intent, its effects on 
them, and its likely costs and benefits” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p.239). If benefits 
are “uncertain, diffuse, or far into the future” and costs “immediate and concentrated on 
particular groups,” policy targets may be less likely to interpret the policy in a positive light 
(McDonnell and Weatherford, 2009, p. 420). Second, because institutional structures and rules 
allocate resources or regulate their use they create “incentives for targets to organize to preserve 
and expand their benefits or to minimize their costs (McDonnell, 2009, p. 420).  
When SB60 was enacted, a new set of rules was created at the state level regarding civic 
education in schools. The policy was clear: civic education in Utah now required that students 
take the citizenship test in order to graduate from high school. Because they were legislated, the 
rules were mandated. This automatically predisposed some implementers to perceive it in a 
negative light. For educators that disagreed with the premise of the civics exam, the new rules 
were not to be viewed favorably. For educators that agreed with the new rules, the fluidity of the 
institutional structure aiming to assist them with implementation made the costs “immediate” and 
the benefits diffuse and distant, thus making it less likely that implementers would perceive the 
policy in a positive light.  
The new policy did not establish any new institutional structures. The policy used an 
existing structure, the USBE, to identify the rules that would guide districts with implementation. 
By empowering the USBE with this role, the policy design further challenged the 
implementation. During the policy design phase, it became clear that the USBE leadership was 
not united on its position on SB60 and some officials within the USBE questioned the premise of 
this policy. Part of this resistance stemmed from the fact that while SB60 was being rolled out in 




Standards for Social Studies. According to a USBE official involved in that process, the USBE 
had a specific outlook on how that test should be used, but also felt that it could not dictate that 
to teachers:  
Well the ideal way for that test to be administered, in my view, would be to use it 
as an assessment in the 8th grade class not at the high school level. ... It aligns well 
with the content that we teach in 8th grade … But I could say that all that I want 
that doesn’t mean that teachers are implementing the assessment at the 8th grade 
level. A lot of them are, but that is again their choice. … [The test is] just not at 
the level that we need. Not at the cognitive level that we need. ...While it’s top 
down in some ways in terms of here is the mandate, it’s also kind of a web in 
terms of here are the ways that things can be implemented. 
 
 
This lack of buy-in at the USBE level, partially explains why the institutional structure 
tasked with implementation did not do much to assist districts.  In this regard, the rules published 
in July 2015 by Utah State Board of Education (Board Rule R-277-700-8) specifying details for 
LEAs to administer the civics test are telling76. To guide LEAs with implementation the USBE 
created a dedicated platform on its website highlighting that LEAs have full discretion on how to 
create the test, so long as it includes 50 questions from the USCIS exam and that they could do 
so in a manner that is “as efficient as possible.”77 The platform also included frequently asked 
questions, a sample assessment, and, interestingly, a resource that “shows how teachers can raise 
the cognitive rigor of the assessment in their classroom” implicitly suggesting that the exam only 
did not achieve that result. 77F78 The rules were more specific only in guiding LEAs with how to 
handle alternate assessment for students with disabilities, IEPs, and those moving into a district 
close to graduation. It specified that for the alternate assessment (to be delivered as an oral 
exam), the district must select 10 questions from the US Citizenship and Immigration Service 
 
76 Utah Administrative Code, R-277-700-8, accessed at https://rules.utah.gov/publicat/code/r277/r277-700.htm#T8. 
77 Utah Administrative Code, R-277-700-8, accessed at https://rules.utah.gov/publicat/code/r277/r277-700.htm#T8. 




exam and require the test-taker to answer 6 correctly. Finally, the website platform also 
highlighted that LEAs should report to their district superintendent when a student passed the 
civics test or an alternative assessment and to the State Superintendent only when asked to do so. 
In this regard, the USBE solidified further that the implementation of the CEI was left to the 
districts in every respect.  
By not establishing new institutional structures, SB60 left implementation up to the 
USBE. But because the USBE was not supportive of SB60 it opted to invest minimal resources 
and energy on its implementation and passed the rules of implementation one step down: to the 
districts.  In essence, that meant that existing local institutions were now the level of decision 
making. Therefore, the existing local institutions were tasked with handling implementation as 
they saw fit and with little resources to support them or to guide them. In this sense, the 
characteristics of the institutional structures and rules, combined with the other policy design 
characteristics discussed earlier, produced the following result:  local implementers, most of 
whom were already predisposed to not view SB60 favorably because of the other characteristics 
of the policy design, were now empowered to partake in policy reform.  
The institutional structures and rules strengthened the capacity of those implementers 
who did not agree with SB60 to not take steps to promote it within their districts, or within their 
classrooms. During the implementation phase, as will be discussed next, in three of the four 
districts studied, the fluidity of the institutional structures and rules contributed to the majority of 
district implementers (district leaders and teachers) perceiving the policy, “as hoop for teachers 
and students” to jump through (Author interviews).  In practice, that meant that the policy design 





The Implementation Phase of SB60 
 
With SB60 enacted, school districts throughout Utah were tasked with finding a way to 
implement the state-led policy reform. This dissertation looks at the implementation of SB60 in 
four school districts in Utah: Apple, Cook, Stone, and Mineral. The districts vary by size of 
student body, location, student characteristics, political ideology, and economic resources, as 
noted earlier.  Table 6 below presents the implementation outcomes in all four districts, as well 
as the key variables of interest: administrative capacity (that is the degree to which a district had 
the ability to implement SB60 based on resources) and interpretive frameworks (the degree to 
which district administrators and teachers were willing to implement the Standards based on how 
they interpreted the policies--their level of buy-in).  
Table 6. SB60 Implementation Outcomes in Select Districts  









Cook S.S. specialist present: Yes 
 
Degree of  district resources 
devoted to implementation: High 
High High Degree of district efforts to aid 
implementation: high 
 
12th grade testing; testing implementation 
determined at the district level 
Mineral S.S. specialist present: Yes 
 
Degree of district  resources 
devoted to implementation: 
Moderate 
Low Low Degree of district efforts to aid 
implementation: low 
 
8th grade testing; testing implementation 
procedures determined at the teacher level 
Stone S.S. specialist present:  Yes 
 
Degree of  district resources 
devoted to implementation:  Low 
Low Low Degree of district efforts to aid 
implementation: low 
 
8th grade testing; testing implementation 




Apple S.S. specialist present: No 
 
Degree of district resources 
devoted to implementation: Low 
Low Low Degree of district efforts to aid 
implementation: low 
 
8th grade testing; testing implementation 
procedures determined at the teacher level 
 
 
Note: Implementation outcomes, administrative capacity, and buy-in are rated  using a three level scale: low, 
moderate, high.  
 
 As shown in Table 6, implementation outcomes are presented using two different metrics. 
The first metric is the degree to which the district appeared to make a comprehensive effort to 
aid policy implementation. An attempt is considered comprehensive (rated “high”) if the district 
demonstrated a commitment to implementation through the following: collaboration of district 
social studies leaders with district- and school-level colleagues to plan for implementation; 
creation of a district-specific version of the test; establishment of district-level resources to aid 
teachers with implementation; and, training sessions for teachers.  Attempts are rated moderate if 
they exhibit most of the above characteristics and low if they exhibited only some. 
 The second metric used to present implementation outcomes is a descriptive lens that 
illuminates the procedures through which implementation takes place in a given district. In terms 
of procedures, in Mineral, Stone, and Apple districts, the civics exam is administered in the 8th 
grade and the details about its administration (when, where, how, by whom) is determined at the 
level of the teacher. In all three of these districts, it falls onto the high schools to administer the 
tests to students that did not take it in the 8th grade (for example, because they moved to the 
district after, or missed the day of the test in 8th grade, etc). In Cook, the test is administered in 
the 12th grade and the details of how it should be administered were determined at the district 




The analysis hypothesized that implementation outcomes can be understood as the 
product of the administrative capacity and interpretive frameworks of implementers with both 
indirectly affected by policy design characteristics and forces arising from the external political 
environment, mainly competing priorities. As illustrated in Table 6, district administrative 
capacity was assessed using two different metrics: the presence of a designated social studies 
specialist and the degree to which a district devoted resources to implement SB60 (rated again on 
a scale of high, moderate, and low). The interpretive frameworks are assessed at the level of the 
district (social studies specialists and/or district administrators) and at the teacher level. It also is 
measured using a scale of high, moderate, and low (a high ranking given if the interpretive 
frameworks demonstrated high buy-in based on qualitative data and decreasing to moderate and 
low).  
The analysis finds that three out of the four districts demonstrated a low degree of 
commitment to implementation of SB60 (Mineral, Stone, and Apple) and only Cook made a 
comprehensive attempt to roll out implementation.  Even though the three districts had different 
administrative capacity, their implementation outcomes were the same. This suggests that the 
interpretive frameworks of the implementers were the primary factors determining 
implementation outcomes.  Due to policy design characteristics discussed above, these three 
districts went into implementation with district leadership and most teachers critical of SB60. 
The negative interpretations were further enhanced by competing priorities at the district and 
teacher level, as will be discussed below. More specifically, district leaders were more interested 
during implementation in focusing on other forms of civic education, including the Standards 




because competing priorities related to district specific characteristics made the costs of SB60 
implementation immediate, visible, and high. A detailed discussion of these factors follows.  
 
District level Administrative Capacity and Interpretive Frameworks 
SB60 came with a small fiscal note to support the needs of the USBE to create 
alternate assessments. The policy design (through its policy instruments and institutional 
structures and rules) did not provide any further resources to the USBE or to the districts 
to assist with implementation. Rather the policy dictated that it was up to the district to 
determine what district-level resources, if any, it would mobilize during implementation. 
The four districts analyzed had different capacity in this regard.  
Cook had a designated 7-12 social studies specialist79 who collaborated with the 
district’s assistant superintendent, director of curriculum, and assistant director of the 
assessment department to roll out implementation. The specialist led meetings with a 
team of teachers to create the test, worked closely with the assessment department to 
make it available online, organized teacher training, created guidelines for teachers, and 
attended school level meetings to support implementation. In this sense, Cook had solid 
capacity for implementation and the cost was this individual’s time. As the specialist 
noted when asked about the costs associated with implementation: “There was a lot of 
manpower in creating it and implementing it, but zero costs that were direct costs. All the 
costs were indirect. All the costs were people’s time.” The presence of a designated 7-12 
social studies specialist appears to have made a difference in the district’s capacity and is 
notable because even though Cook, Apple, and Stone are similar in size and resources, 
 
79 Social studies specialists throughout Utah carry different titles. Some are called specialists, others supervisors, and others 




Cook has a separate individual overseeing social studies for grades K-6, suggesting that 
Cook may be more committed to social studies than the other districts.  
 Stone had a K-12 social studies specialist to oversee the process. During 
implementation, this individual worked only with the district’s assessment department. 
The process was not seen as a district-supported initiative and the Stone specialist did not 
engage or support teachers during implementation. Rather, the Stone specialist created 
the test, uploaded it on the testing platform with the assistance of the assessment 
department, and created a FAQ resource for teachers and posted it on its website. This 
district had different capacity from Cook: the social studies specialist was responsible for 
the entire K-12 curriculum and not only 7-12 as in Cook. This explains (but only partially 
as will be described below) why the specialist saw the implementation as an additional 
burden for the social studies specialist. According to the Stone specialist, “it [the 
implementation of the test] became an additional responsibility of the specialist in our 
district.”  
 Mineral also had a K-12 social studies specialist, but the district dedicated more 
resources to implementation partly because this individual operated within a larger 
department focused on teaching and learning and had access to more support mechanisms 
to roll out implementation, compared to Stone. “I had a lot of support between my 
department and the assessment department,” said the Mineral specialist that helped with 
creating the test and making it available online, creating FAQ resources for teachers,  and 
dealing with “logistical things glitches” that surfaced during the first year. The district 
also devoted some additional resources on tutorials for middle and high school teachers 




 Apple, unlike all the others, did not have a designated social studies specialist, but 
a teacher on special assignment (TSA) for social studies, an outcome perhaps attributed 
to the fact that this district is the least well resourced, as measured by revenue per 
student. The limited capacity of the district due to the absence of a designated individual 
may partially explain why this district simply created a test to upload to a district-wide 
testing portal. The TSA shared the link with school administrators and then left all other 
matters (communicating and training teachers, answering teacher questions, dealing with 
logistical or technical issues) to the school. The district website does not contain any 
information on the test, not even the simple FAQ document that Stone created.  
 Administrative capacity explains partly why Cook rolled out the most 
comprehensive attempt to implement SB60, but the interpretive frameworks at the district 
level appear to have more explanatory power. The fact that the outcome was rated low in 
Mineral even though it exhibited a moderate level of administrative capacity further 
enhances this argument. The scope of the implementation outcome had much to do with 
the degree to which district level administrators actually bought-into the SB60 to begin 
with. In interviews, all three social studies specialists and the TSA prefaced all comments 
to the civics test by noting in some way or another that implementation of the civics test 
happened only because it was “legislated.” Yet, not all shared the same level of 
enthusiasm about having to implement it primarily because they did not have the same 
sense of “buy-in” about the policy’s capacity to meet the intended goal. That is, they did 
not all feel that a test was good civic education, nor that the test would meet its stated 




Interestingly, the district that did, Cook, rolled out the most comprehensive 
district-led implementation. Looking at district characteristics to explain this outcome 
does not offer any insight, as Cook, like Apple, is conservative with similar student 
populations and resources. What may explain the variation are three other factors: 1) the 
ideology of the particular specialist who was the only district leader that expressed 
support for SB60; 2) that Cook is the district that has the highest levels of student 
proficiency; and 3) that Cook offered the test in the 12th grade where most teachers were 
already using it as an enrichment activity.  
The Cook specialist explicitly noted support of the test: “I thought [the test] was 
not a bad idea and I don’t remember getting any negative information from the teachers. 
Philosophically there was zero opposition” (Author interview).  In Cook, implementation 
involved the specialist, the assistant superintendent, the director of curriculum, and 
assistant director of the assessment department, because as the specialist explained, the 
test was a requirement for graduation. Being that Cook is the highest performing district 
of the four studied, the involvement of the district level administrators in the process, 
suggests that they wanted to ensure that the test did not jeopardize graduation rates or 
student performance.  
The team met regularly, according to the social studies specialist, to identify the 
most optimal way to roll out the civics test and decided that students would take in 12th 
grade as part of their US Government and Civics required class. The rationale for that 
decision was the following, according to the specialist: “We decided that normally we 
don’t accept anything from 8th grade for graduation. Graduation requirements don’t start 




wanted them to think a little differently and a bit more seriously about it” (author 
interview). Also, students moving into the district that took the test in the 8th grade 
somewhere else, are required to take it again in the 12th grade, further suggestive of the 
fact that this district had a high level of buy-in for the civics exam, 
The social studies specialist was tasked with creating the test. The specialist solicited the 
advice of three of the “best” government teachers in the districts to identify the questions from 
the citizenship test that best aligned with the district’s curriculum of the US Government and 
Civics Course and also were the least disruptive for the teachers.  According to the specialist, 
“we went through and hand-picked the questions that matched our curriculum. … If [we had not] 
done that our government teachers would have said ‘OK. I would have to teach a little about U.S. 
history here and step out of my actual curriculum because that is on this test. ’Now they are a bit 
more precise and [teachers] could say [to their students] ‘this is on the test so you could file it in 
your memory and keep it there’” (Author interview). 
According to the social studies specialist, once the test was created, the district had a dry 
run, a “test of the test” to assess the “computer program and how students would do without 
teaching it.” About 70 percent of students passed at the state’s required level of 70 percent.   
The Cook district social studies specialist held a training for social studies teachers throughout 
the district to familiarize them with the test and the rules. The specialist also noted that the 
district curriculum department, which holds monthly meetings for the district high schools, 
included the civics test on the agenda every month at the early implementation period to ensure 
collaboration and consistency among high schools.  The district administers the civics test online 
through a centralized district testing system. The civics test reopens each night to give teachers 




student score to the school counselors who then enters the information in the student graduation 
progress report. Assessing the overall implementation, the district specialist noted that: “In that 
first couple of years, it occupied a lot of people’s time but now it became part of our MO and we 
just do it. … The challenges were more technological. Otherwise, we were on board.”  
The other three districts did not exhibit the same level of buy-in and in all three 
the district specialists questioned the capacity of the test to meet its stated objectives. In 
this respect, all three districts appeared to align with the positions voiced by the 
opposition during enactment, including the UEA and the USBE. According to the TSA in 
Apple district,  
Civic education should be more than that. Kids should have more skin in the 
game with civics education than just taking this test. … I don’t think that the 
civics test makes students civically engaged. It doesn’t promote that. They need to 
be doing more than just answer 30 out of 50 questions correctly.  
 
Looking at Apple’s implementation efforts through the lens of the TSA’s comments clarifies 
further why those efforts were so limited. The district created its own version of the test and 
placed it on a district online portal. Schools use this portal to administer the test in the 8th grade.  
During the early years of implementation, high schools in the district posted a link on their 
websites and explicitly told students “go here to take the test.”  The links are still visible at the 
high school level for students who entered the district after the 8th grade. According to the TSA, 
if a student does not take the exam in 8th grade or on their own, high school counselors flag the 
need for them to fulfill the requirement and direct students to school computer labs to take the 
exam using this portal. According to the TSA, “Our district has been pretty low key on this. They 
don’t even collect data.” 
 In Stone district, the specialist also noted that the district did not see the test as 




As teachers we know that this is not what civics is. … The most frustrating part 
about that whole platform was that students had to pass this test instead of being 
able to dedicate time and resources in class to doing more of a project where 
students would still learn all that information but still allow them to engage in 
their communities and the actual process of being civically engaged (Author 
interview). 
 
Stone district, as noted earlier, also devoted few resources to rolling out the test.  The test 
was created by the district social studies specialist and staff from the assessment 
department. According to the specialist, the goal was to “set up this test to make it easy 
for the students to pass.” The test was created using the district testing platform and if 
students do not answer questions correctly a prompt appears on their screen and “after 
reading that prompt, [the students] should be able to go back and answer that question 
correctly.” In Stone district the test, noted the specialist, “really became something more 
like here is just a hoop that we have to jump through in order to get our kids to qualify for 
graduation.”  
Low levels of district buy-in are also present in Mineral district, where the social 
studies specialist shared that:  
[The test] does not necessarily fulfill what I think the intent is, which is to create a 
sense of citizenry and civic mindedness in our students. It didn’t accomplish that. 
… It does not inspire students to be civic-minded and it doesn’t inspire students to 
learn the ideals of citizenry. ... the intention of what our legislators wanted.  
 
 
In Mineral District, the implementation of the CEI was coordinated by the district social 
studies specialist, with input from the Teaching and Learning Department under which that 
specialist falls, and the assessment department. These entities determined that similarly to Stone 
and Apple districts the test would be administered to all 8th grade students because “it aligns 




specialist “we initially got together, we went through the test, clarified language to minimize 
misinterpretation and ambiguities that could happen, and selected questions.” The district 
informed schools that the test would be taken in the 8th grade, but allowed “the school to 
determine how to best do that for their site.” The assessment department uploaded the test on the 
district testing portal and the district provided schools and teachers with links to administration 
tutorials and protocols, while the district offered supplemental training to teachers.  Asked if the 
test changed instruction in the district, the social studies specialist answered, “I would say no. 
Not at all. The feedback that I got is that it was a hoop to jump through … It wasn’t taken 
necessarily seriously. The students knew that they could take as often as they needed. The 
teachers were frustrated because it was time out of instruction.” 
The district-level administrative capacity and interpretive frameworks mattered for 
implementation outcomes. But the outcomes were also affected by the buy-in of teachers, as in 
three out of the four districts studied the procedural aspects of the implementation were left up to 
the teachers.  Interestingly, district level buy-in, aligned in all four districts with that exhibited at 
the level of the teachers, as will be discussed below.  
 
Teacher-level Interpretive Frameworks 
 
 Interview data reveals that interpretations of teachers in the Apple, Stone, and 
Mineral district mirror those of the district.  The Cook specialist noted that most teachers 
in the district were receptive, partly because they were already using the test in their 
classrooms. According to the specialist, most teachers said: “we are already doing that as 
a fun experience during the first week to let students know this is what people have to do 
in order to become citizens.” The specialist added that the “vast majority of [teachers] 




introduction, it’s fun, it’s low stakes just to see what the students could do. And then they 
do it again later in the course” (Author interview). The coordinator acknowledged that 
some teachers were not as enthusiastic because “some teachers don’t like change or being 
told what to do,” but noted that the majority of teachers “by and large like it.”  
In the other three districts, most teachers did not interpret the test in a positive light. Their 
grievances with it stemmed from various sources. First, teachers did not like that the test was 
mandated by the legislature.  As one teacher in Stone district noted, and others concurred: 
 I get the legislature. They are trying to stress to all the teachers, in all the 
districts, that civic education is important. But … they need to leave to the state 
office of education or the district. They should come in the class and teach it 
themselves if they want to do it that bad (Author interview).  
 
Second, some teachers in the three districts saw the test as unnecessary given the state 
high school requirement of the U.S. Government & Civics class. According to one 
teacher in Stone district: “There is still a semester of civic education that is successful. 
It’s almost as if this was an unnecessary added piece … So educating our kids about the 
importance of civics is already in place and is successful” (Author interview). Third, 
some teachers believed that a good civic education has more to do with teacher expertise 
and philosophy and less so with required exams. As one teacher noted, “a good teacher 
can make kids connect to the curriculum with or without an exam. Successful 
understanding of civic knowledge rides on whether you have a good teacher.” 
 The majority of teachers interviewed in the three districts also expressed lack of 
support for the test because they felt that it could not meet its stated objective. As one 
Stone teacher noted, “as far as the test itself preparing students to be better citizens, I’m 




The test … does very little to encourage students to become active participants. 
Some of the test questions are rather obscure, meaningless facts that will not 
promote civic engagement whatsoever. The test does not meet its stated objective 
at all. …  
 
Another teacher in Mineral district, expressed similar skepticism about the capacity of the 
test to foster civic engagement and active citizenship: “The information they learned is good to 
know, but I don’t think that taking the test necessarily would make them be more civically 
engaged. But maybe that is just me. … Just the fact that you need to take this test to graduate. 
Yeah, but, anybody can memorize the answers to those question and they are not that difficult 
really.” 
Some teachers in Mineral and Stone districts indicated that they would prefer to see civic 
education move in the direction of more experiential, project-based, action civics. According to 
one Stone teacher,  
Students should be able to move beyond the idea of ‘I have to do it because it’s a 
test’, or because it’s part of the core curriculum, to ‘I want to do this because I see 
it making a difference. ’I think that is our ultimate goal. An action civics type 
program has the means of doing that. 
 
Another teacher embraces a similar type of civic education by integrating into the 
classroom curriculum from the National Geographic’s Geo Inquiry model, which, 
according to the teacher, unlike the civics test, “empowers students with civic 
engagement.” The juxtaposition between the test and the other civic education models 
was summarized by one teacher as follows: “Focusing on the founding fathers and the 
principles is pretty abstract, not so much picking up garbage in your neighborhood. That 
is a much more effective teaching opportunity to say here is an impact you could have on 




 The teacher’s reference to “barriers” speaks to challenges that teachers face as a result of 
competing priorities unique to each district. In Stone district, which has the lowest levels of 
students at proficiency level, and also a high percentage of ELL and economically disadvantaged 
students, one teacher noted that the emphasis on civic education competed with the emphasis on 
literacy. According to the teacher,  
I think that knowing dates and names is all well and good, but I think that I would 
feel successful if I knew my students were leaving my classroom being more 
literate and being able to critically think about information that they have been 
presented with whether it is related to social studies or not. 
 
 Even though the district made the test part of the 8th grade curriculum, students that were 
in high school during the first few years still had to take the exam to graduate. That proved to be 
challenging in Stone and Mineral districts. According to the district social studies specialist: 
“Where we found the struggle was with our students who were not reading at grade level, or ELL 
students, or our special education students, the students who are on one end of the spectrum 
really struggled.” The District utilized the alternate assessment rule provided by SB60 and 
USBE. 
Some teachers knew that some students would struggle if left to be tested unprepared 
and, according to the specialist, teachers created study materials to help the students: “It was 
frustrating for those students, we had pictures on the questions to memorize words and pass the 
test. When I would ask them the question, they would give me the answer, but they really had no 
idea what the word meant. They were just memorizing the facts. It was a check box and we 
would say ‘OK great now they know that information.’” 
To address the issue teachers used their prep time or department time to strategize. In 
Mineral district, which has a similar student body composition, a teacher reported that classroom 




The first quarter of our curriculum for U.S. government really hits the questions 
that are on the test. So, it was aligned. When I taught my government class and I 
had them take it after the first quarter, the library actually commented and said 
“Wow, your students got 90 plus percent on this.” And, I said yes, because all the 
questions come from the curriculum. It was good to coordinate it that way. For the 
ESL students I had to do more. Because if they grew up in another country, you 
don’t know a lot of things that you know by growing up here.  
 But high school teachers in these districts now administer the test only to the few 
students who did not take it in the 8th grade. That process still generates anxiety among some 
teachers, as one noted that it is “a scramble to get them to prepare for the test.”  But for others 
the process is seen as less onerous, as itis  not proctored, and students could take it as many times 
as they need to pass. According to a Mineral teacher, the process by which it is administered in 
high school speaks volumes about the inability of the test to meet its intended purpose:  
Our school librarian pulls a list now and then of kids that have not passed the test. 
She has a packet with test questions and answers that she has created and she 
gives the students a sheet that says something like ‘hello you need to pass the test, 
or you haven’t ’taken it. Study this packet and come to the library to take the 
test. ’After they study independently they go to the library and log into a 
computer with her help and they take the test. So, it’s really not a classroom 
experience. 
 
Interestingly, the test is not a vital part of the classroom experience at the 8th grade level 
either in some districts. In Stone, according to one teachers,  
We fit it in as part of our unit on the Constitution in American Government. 
Comes in the middle of the course. We give it like a final for the semester. It caps 
off our unit for the constitution nicely. Besides teaching the content that is in our 
standards, we don’t really teach much outside of that for the test itself. … Not 
explicitly any teaching for the civics test. 
 
In Stone district, some teachers feel less pressure to prepare students for the test during 
instructional time, as the testing feature created at the district level that offers students a helpful 





The hint is pretty much the answer to the question. So it’s awesome because it 
relieves me of trying to teach anything about this test on top of what I have to 
teach because this isn’t in the standards. So, that’s helpful. … [The test] felt much 
more like it was just a hoop to jump through. 
 
 Some teachers in Apple feel the same way. As one junior high school teacher noted: 
“Among social studies teachers [the test] hasn’t felt like a huge victory. The victory came in that 
‘oh they are acknowledging the importance of social studies and civic learning ’but other than 
that there isn’t much else... the feeling I get is that we have just another hoop.”   
Alleviating pressure from the teachers even further in Stone and Mineral is the fact that if 
students fail the test in the 8th grade, then it falls onto the high schools to ensure that the student 
meets the testing requirement before graduation. In Apple, students can take it as many times as 
they need. For one teacher that meant, “It’s often presented as a hoop that students have to jump 
through for graduation. … There might be some teachers who changed their teaching style. I 
didn’t.” (Author interview). But for other teachers, according to the district TSA and some 
teachers, the test is “frustrating” because they “are required to give it, but most of the questions 
are not part of the core. So they don’t necessarily want to teach to the test.”  
 These comments related to the tension between the test and Utah Core Standards of the 
Social Studies speak to how conflicting mandates generated competing priorities in Utah’s 
districts. The standards were introduced a year after the civics exam and even though 
implementation of the exam had by then been established to a degree in each district, the tension 
that these competing priorities generate for most teachers impacted further their already negative 
perceptions of SB60. That contributed, as will be described later in this chapter to the 
mobilization of interests that sought to repeal SB60. What follows first is a discussion of the 





The Utah Social Studies Standards: The Politics of Implementation  
 
 In December 2015, as the enactment coalition of SB60 was mobilizing in Utah to garner 
support for the American Civics Education Initiative, the Utah State Board of Education was at 
the final stages of completing new secondary social studies standards for Utah. While SB60 
focused on increasing civic engagement through political knowledge and testing, the USBE 
standards took a different direction. The Core Standards, adopted in December 2016, align, albeit 
with no explicit reference, with the C3 Framework. Being that the standards were informed by 
the C3, as much as SB60 was by the Civics Education Initiative, the two national agendas had 
managed to capture the attention of Utah’s legislature and Utah’s state educational administrative 
agency.  
 Although Utah’s legislature was transparent about its affiliation with the Joe Foss 
Institute, the USBE dismissed in December 2015 any connection to a national movement. “These 
are Utah Standards,” said Robert Austin, USBE social studies specialist, in an article published 
by the Salt Lake Tribune in December 2015. “We have Utah people making these standards and 
we want them to be the best standards possible” (Wood, 2015). A systematic comparison of the 
C3 and the Standards, however, leaves little doubt that the standards were heavily influenced by 
the C3. The Utah Standards may have been written by people of Utah, but those writers drew 
heavily on the C3 Framework. As an official from the USBE explained, “We don’t specifically 
say in articulated ways that we are referencing the C3 Framework ... But good ideas rise to the 
top” (Author interview).  
To analyze the implementation of the Utah Social Studies Standards without 
acknowledging that the process was in some way “in conversation” with the American Civics 




article by Kelly Cole, a social studies teacher and one of the writers of the standards, certainly 
suggests that the writers were keenly aware of the arguments put forward by the SB60 coalition: 
“It’s great to memorize facts for Jay Leno. But if [the students] don’t go out and vote or take an 
active part in society, then we’ve failed them” (Wood, 2015). Cole’s comments appear to be a 
direct response to those made by Johnson during the enactment of SB60. At that time, Johnson 
referred to participants on the jaywalking segment of Jay Leno’s Tonight Show who were unable 
to correctly answer civics-related questions as evidence justifying the need for making the 
citizenship test a requirement. Her statement gets to the core of the civic education debate that 
unfolded in Utah: what is the best way to prepare students for civic engagement? Inquiry, skills, 
and dispositions, or facts?  
The revision of the social studies started in March of 2014 and because the processes 
were unfolding concurrently the Utah standards will not be interpreted in this study as a reaction 
to the enactment of SB60, but rather as a competing policy. To understand how districts 
responded an analysis of the implementation of the standards is necessary, along the same lines 
as the one employed above of the SB60.  It looks at how elements of the policy design 
determined at enactment interacted with aspects of the external political environment to generate 
during implementation political dynamics that aided or constrained the administrative capacity 
and interpretive frameworks of implementers, thus affecting district outcomes. 
  
The Policy Design Phase of the Standards  
 
 The analysis of the politics of implementation of Standards starts, much like that of 
SB60, with an evaluation of the policy design, as it sets the tone for the subsequent 




coalition and theory of action, origins, type of change, policy targets, policy instruments and 
institutional structures and rules.  
As will be discussed below, the Utah Standards was the product of an elite coalition 
motivated by a theory of action that to increase civic engagement and political participation at a 
time when both were at low levels, the USBE must adopt new social studies standards that 
emphasize inquiry, deliberation, and civic action. The policy design, unlike that of SB60, did not 
set the tone for a contested implementation for several reasons. First, implementers interpreted 
the policy as less of a mandate, as it was not legislated and did not come with a high-stakes 
exam. Thus, even though the policy was major in that it meant to affect all of Utah’s 41 school 
districts, it did not come with a legislated deadline like SB60 and implementers knew that they 
could take their time to determine if and how this would be incorporated into classrooms. Third, 
the enactment coalition, unlike in SB60, made some efforts to include the implementers during 
the policy design phase by including some teachers on the writing team, holding focus groups 
with teachers during the writing process, and keeping district social studies leaders informed of 
the process during monthly meetings. Finally, the policy design did generate some policy 
instruments to incentivize compliance. In this regard, the policy design was one that sought to 
minimize resistance to the policy and to incentivize compliance. The coalition aimed for the 
Standards to be interpreted as not threatening. However, by not creating new institutional 
structures, implementation of the Standards, much like SB60, rested primarily on implementers. 
That meant that how these implementers interpreted the new rules as a result of the policy design 
mattered for implementation. 




The decision to revise the Utah Social Studies Standards was made by the Utah State 
Board of Education, the state’s administrative educational agency. The standards were 
previously revised in 2010 and, as standards are updated on a cyclical basis, they were due for 
review and revision (Author Interview, USBE official). The coalition seeking the revision of the 
standards was led by the USBE and included teachers, district social studies leaders, and 
academics. The core belief of the coalition was similar to that of SB60s in that it too believed 
that civic education could strengthen knowledge and civic and participatory outcomes. The two 
coalitions differed, however, on the two other belief levels. The policy core beliefs of the 
Standards coalition was that schools should empower students for citizenship through their 
curricula. Finally, the secondary aspect of the coalition’s belief system was that to empower 
students the USBE needed to adopt new social studies standards that aligned with the C3 
Framework’s emphasis on inquiry, skills, and dispositions.  
The enactment coalition’s theory of action was that to increase civic engagement and 
political participation at a time when both were at low levels, the USBE must adopt new social 
studies standards that emphasize inquiry, deliberation, and civic action. According to a USBE 
official familiar with the goals of the enactment coalition:  
We want students to be able to engage in deliberative, collaborative, and civil dialogue. 
We want students who are able to identify state, national or local problems but also to 
engage with solutions to those problems and share those ideas with appropriate 
stakeholders. We want students to be able to apply their knowledge of governmental 
structure and historical concepts and geographic relationships and economic principles 
because we see that civic engagement is very much tied to even geographic issues and 
economic issues. We want them to be able to develop values and demonstrate values that 
sustain the republic.  
 
The coalition also felt that social studies was the discipline uniquely positioned to 
achieve these goals. According to Jeff Nokes, a professor at Brigham Young University and one 




republic … and they’re probably not going to develop those skills in English or math to the same 
degree that they’ll develop those skills in social studies.”80 
The enactment coalition was able to persuade the Standards Review Committee for 
Social Studies of the Utah State Board of Education that this was the course of action that should 
be taken. According to the report submitted in April 2015 to the USBE, prepared by USBE 
Director of Teaching and Learning, Diana Suddreth and USBE K-12 Social Studies Specialist, 
the Committee “recognized the need to update the current standards in order to reflect the skills, 
knowledge, and attributes Utah students should gain through study in Social Studies” and 
“affirmed the direction the writing team [was] taking in rewriting the standards.” 80F81  
The writing team consisted of USBE staff, teachers, and academics. Drafts of the 
standards were presented to the Committee at various stages and revisions were made as a result 
of public feedback, focus groups with teachers, and requests of Committee members. The 
Committee reviewed the revision at the December 2016 USBE meeting and noted that all the 
changes requested by the Board had been implemented and motioned for the USBE to approve 
the revised standards.82 The USBE unanimously adopted the Utah Core Standards for Social 
Studies in December 201683.  
Utah’s 2010 Core Standards for Social Studies referenced civics. In fact, as early as 2006, 
a policy brief on citizenship education published by the Education Commission of the States, 
characterized Utah as one of only eight states in the country that “has successfully formulated 
 
80 Wood, B. (2015). Revising History: Proposed Education Standards Favor Debate, Would Bring Utah Studies into the 21st 
Century. The Salt Lake Tribune. Accessed at https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=3207570&itype=CMSID. 
81 Utah State Board of Education, Notice of Meeting (April 9-10, 2015), accessed at 
https://www.schools.utah.gov/File/3cb5b094-7b83-4c3f-a4a1-d9d594e71c3e. 
82 Utah State Board of Education Meeting (December 2016). Minutes, available at https://www.schools.utah.gov/file/f7387829-
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guidelines for civic education that address knowledge, skills and dispositions.”84 The USBE’s 
interest on skills and dispositions, therefore, pre-dated the 2016 standards, but the new standards 
solidified its commitment and called up school districts to do the same.   
 A comparison of the language in the 2010 and 2016 standards describing the goals of the 
U.S. Government and Citizenship course helps illustrate the difference: 
2010 Utah Social Studies Standards: “The goal of this course is to foster 
informed, responsible participation in public life. Knowing how to be a good 
citizen is essential to the preservation and improvement of United States 
democracy. Upon completion of this course the student will understand the major 
ideas, protections, privileges, structures, and economic systems that affect the life 
of a citizen in the United States political system. This course is recommended for 
seniors due to their proximity to voting age.”85 
 
2016 Utah Social Studies Standards:“ The goal of this course....citizen in the 
United States. Additionally, students will practice the skills needed to conduct 
inquiries, weigh evidence, make informed decisions, and participate in political 
processes. This course should nurture desirable dispositions including a 
commitment to the American ideals of liberty, equality, opportunity, and justice 
for all. This course is recommended for seniors due to their proximity to voting 
age (emphasis added).”86 
 
 The standards were designed for secondary studies, which in Utah includes grades 7-12 
and focus on the four core disciplines that comprise social studies: history, geography, 
economics, and civics. Although the standards provide a chronological sequence, they are 
designed to encourage teachers to implement them thematically with an emphasis on inquiry: 
“students will engage in inquiry using the tools, conceptual understanding, and the language of 
historians, geographers, economists, and political scientists at a developmentally appropriate 
level. Students will craft arguments, apply reasoning, make comparisons, and interpret and 
 
84 Education Commission of the States (2006).  Policy Brief: Citizenship Education, accessed at 
https://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/71/30/7130.pdf. 
85 Education Commission of the States, (2016), Civic Education State Profile-Utah, accessed at 
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbstcprofancg?rep=CIP16ST&st=Utah. 





synthesize evidence as historians, geographers, economists and political scientists. They will 
corroborate their sources of evidence and place their interpretations within historical contexts” 
(Utah Standards for Social Studies, 2016).  
The standards make explicit reference to their capacity to enhance civic engagement: 
“Whenever possible, students will make connections between course content and current issues, 
helping to deepen their understanding of the context and complexity of civic life and preparing 
them for civic engagement.” The standards explicitly argue that they offer students the 
opportunity to:  
engage in deliberative, collaborative, and civil dialogue regarding historical and current 
issues; Identify local, state, national, or international problems; engage with solutions to 
these problems; and share their ideas with appropriate public and/or private stakeholders; 
Apply knowledge of governmental structure, historical concepts, geographic 
interrelationships, and economic principles to analyze and explain current events; 
Develop and demonstrate values that sustain America’s democratic republic, such as 
open-mindedness, engagement, honesty, problem-solving, responsibility, diligence, 
resilience, empathy, self-control, and cooperation.” Interestingly, when introducing a 
specific course the standards go on to once again explain how that specific course could 
enhance a students civic engagement (Utah Standards for Social Studies, 2016).  
 
The standards deliver a clear message: student civic preparation and engagement could be 
strengthened through their implementation.  
 
 Origins and type of change. 
The policy originated in Utah’s bureaucratic educational agency, the USBE. In this 
regard, unlike SB60, the policy would not be viewed as a top-down mandate from an entity 
exogenous to education. Rather, it would be viewed as a mandate coming from the state’s 
educational experts, which stood a better chance of being received well by implementers, 




Furthermore, the policy change would be major, not incremental. All of Utah’s 41 school 
districts and their respective secondary schools, teachers, and students would be impacted. The 
change was major because it would require teachers not to learn new content, but to change their 
practice, or according to the coalition members, to change “how the content is presented.”87 
According to USBE Social Studies Specialist, Robert Austin, the shift required students to learn 
how to establish their own conclusions on topics introduced to them and to use evidence to 
support those conclusions88. It also required teachers to shift to a mindset that required them to 
encourage students to think about how one “does” social studies: “A geographer doesn’t come 
home from work and say, ‘My hand is so tired, I colored 50 maps today. ’That’s the shift. How 
can we promote the doing of social studies?”88F89 That the policy was major in this regard meant 
that without adequate support mechanisms and buy-in from implementers, the implementation 
phase would be challenging, as the costs to the implementers would be immediate and high and 
the benefits not immediate (McDonnell, 2009).  
 
 Policy targets. 
The coalition viewed as the ultimate policy targets the students who stood to benefit from 
this revamped form of social studies and civics instruction. The coalition was aware, however, 
that the policy implementers (primarily the teachers) needed to be considered as intermediary 
targets because they may not all respond favorably and would challenge implementation. As 
Nokes noted, “We can write the standards but whether or not teachers follow the standards is a 
 
87 Wood, B. (2015). Revising History: Proposed Education Standards Favor Debate, Would Bring Utah Studies into the 21st 
Century. The Salt Lake Tribune. Accessed at https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=3207570&itype=CMSID. 
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different issue … We teach the way we were taught. It takes a while to break out of those 
traditions.”90 In a preemptive move aiming to curtail possible push back from teachers, the 
coalition sought to engage some in the writing process, but also to hold focus groups with 
teachers before the standards were adopted.91 Teachers provided what was characterized “as 
strong feedback” and changes were made to reflect their comments. 91F92  
 
Policy instruments. 
During the policy design phase, the enactment coalition made use of various policy 
instruments to galvanize support and compliance of the state led reform among districts. As 
noted earlier, policy instruments usually “engender” a type of “politics” ((McDonnell, 2009, p. 
419). These instruments came in three forms: a communication campaign by the USBE targeted 
to teachers, USBE-led professional development session for teachers, and USBE-led 
informational sessions for teachers. Collectively the instruments employed during the policy 
design phase of the Utah Standards sought to “engender” a positive type of politics by 
communicating to implementers the following points: 1) the standards aligned with the Core 
Curriculum, therefore would serve as a natural extension of what teachers were already asked to 
do; 2) the USBE would support teachers across all districts with implementation; 3) the shift in 
instructional methods required by the standards was necessary to adequately prepare students for 
citizenship.  
 
90 Wood, B. (2015). Revising History: Proposed Education Standards Favor Debate, Would Bring Utah Studies into the 21st 
Century. The Salt Lake Tribune. Accessed at https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=3207570&itype=CMSID. 
91 Wood, B. (2016). Utah School Board to Consider New Social Studies Standards This Week. Salt Lake City Tribune. Accessed 
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The first instrument used was a communication campaign by the USBE to highlight that 
standards connect to the Common Core’s focus on literacy. On the USBE website section that 
includes the standards, the administrative agency explicitly states: “The term “literacy” is too 
often considered solely an ELA term. In fact, literacy is a term that transcends disciplines. We 
must have historically literate students, with all the skills essential to understand and appreciate 
the rich tapestry of human history. We must have geographically literate students able to 
understand the world around them. Clearly economic literacy is essential for the well-being of 
our students and nation. Civic literacy is essential for the sustaining of our democratic 
republic.”92F93 Perhaps then it’s not accidental that they are called the Utah Core Standards for 
Social Studies and educators across Utah do refer to them as the Core. 
By late Spring 2017, a few months after adoption, the USBE social studies 
specialist organized Utah Secondary Social Studies Institutes in various school districts. 
The Institutes aimed to familiarize teachers with the new standards, help with lesson 
creation, and discuss the sharing of curriculum resources. To encourage participation the 
USBE offered each participating teacher a $200 stipend.94 The USBE communicated the 
institutes to social studies teachers across Utah on several platforms, including Utah’s 
Education and Telehealth Network, which in June of 2017 posted the following 
announcement from the USBE, highlighting that it aimed to support teachers:  
As we implement the new secondary social studies standards, we will rely on the 
leadership and expertise of excellent teachers. Please join other Utah teachers for 
two days of standards study, lesson creation, and the sharing of curriculum 
resources. … The new secondary social studies standards expect much from Utah 
students. Utah’s social studies classrooms are one of the places where students 
gain civic preparation, learn to think like historians, learn to analyze geographic 
 
93 See https://www.schools.utah.gov/curr/socialstudies?mid=1129&aid=3.  




and economic data, and discuss the issues of today that will affect their lives 
tomorrow.95 
 
 The same month, USBE social studies specialist Robert Austin, introduced the Standards 
to history teachers at a brown bag presentation organized by the Utah Division of State History. 
The presentation aimed to incentivize history teachers to embrace the standards emphasis on 
inquiry and skills. Austin noted that,  
 
History is a verb: it really is about the verbs and doing history. We have some real 
opportunities to celebrate the doing of history. … History is very often considered 
a passive subject where students are empty vessels and the information is poured 
in that they will regurgitate back. Kids get bored to death by that kind of 
instruction. They love history and social studies instruction in the elementary 
grades, but by and large many students by the high school level say they don’t 
like history. …So what can we do to fix that? We tried to drive standards to try to 
rethink history as an engaging thing.96  
 
Austin explained how features of the new standards aim to make history more engaging,  
and highlighted that they also promote civic engagement, which mattered because:  
Civic engagement is one of the fundamental purposes of education. It is vital that 
public school fulfill their civic mission, the preparation of young people for 
participation in American’s democratic republic. … Social studies classrooms are 
the ideal locations to foster civic virtue, consider current issues, learn how to act 
civilly toward others, build a civic identity, and promote an awareness of global 
issues. 
  
In October 2017, the Hope Street Program published an article by a history 
teacher in Salt Lake City sharing an enthusiastic take on the standards:  
The old way of teaching history, however, is beginning to change, and Utah is 
championing that change in their new social studies standards. … I read through 
them and was ecstatic to see a step back from facts and a focus on skills. … These 
new standards have shown me that in the state of Utah, we are committing to 
making our students better people. We are arming our students with an 
understanding of history so that they can then go out and create positive 
discourse, make meaningful changes, and engage in whatever diverse group they 
become a part of. We are teaching history with a purpose, and it is a purpose that 
 
95 See https://lists.uen.org/pipermail/socstudies/2017-June/000432.html.  




will directly affect the quality of our public discourse, our elected officials, and 
our lives.”97  
 
Yorgason’s enthusiasm, however, was not shared by all her colleagues throughout the state. 
Some simply dismissed them, others did not believe that they were any better than the old. And, 
even those that shared the initial enthusiasm, stumbled upon various challenges and obstacles 
while trying to adopt the new standards. That all became visible during the implementation phase 
as will be discussed below. 
 
Institutional structures and rules. 
Much like SB60, the Utah Social Studies Standards created new rules. The new rules 
were clearly specified in the standards and required teachers in grades 7-12 to change the way 
they taught social studies. But, much like with SB60, the new policy did not create new 
institutional structures. The existing institutions—district administrators and primarily 
teachers—were tasked with implementation. Although the USBE did deploy some resources 
through its policy instruments to aid implementation, the efforts were short-lived and the bulk of 
the work was left to the existing institutional structures to undertake. 
For SB60, the lack of an institutional structure played a role in generating varied district-
level responses, by empowering localities that did not buy-into the policy to not make 
concentrated efforts to aid implementation.  In the case of the Standards, the districts were 
equally empowered by the absence of new institutional structures. This empowerment meant that 
implementation outcomes rested very much on how implementers interpreted the new rules, as 
their interpretation played a critical role in their willingness to implement them. In the case of 
SB60 only one district bought-into the new rules, Cook. In the case of the Standards, the other 
 




three districts did. Cook was the outlier again in some respects, as it created its own version of 
the Standards. Whether district leaders and teachers agreed with the rules themselves shaped the 
degree to which they were willing to implement them. A discussion of the implementation phase 
follows.   
 
The Implementation Phase of the Standards 
 
 
With the new standards adopted districts throughout Utah were tasked with finding a way 
to respond to the state-led policy reform. This dissertation looks at the implementation of 
Standards in the same four school districts in Utah: Apple, Cook, Stone, and Mineral.  Table 7 
below presents the implementation outcomes in all four districts, as well as the key variables of 
interest: administrative capacity (that is the degree to which a district had the ability implement 
the Standards) and interpretive frameworks (the degree to which district administrators and 
teachers wanted to implement the Standards based on how they interpreted the policies). Table 7 
below summarizes the implementation phase outcomes in all four districts.  
 
 Table 7. Utah Standards Implementation Outcomes in Select Districts 









Apple S.S. Coordinator present: N 
Degree of resources devoted to 
implementation:  High 
High Low Varied 
Stone S.S. Coordinator present:  Y 
Degree of resources devoted to 
implementation:  Low 
Moderate Low   
Varied 
Mineral S.S. Coordinator present: Y 
Degree of resources devoted to 
implementation: Low 
Low Low  
Varied 
Cook S.S. Coordinator present: Y 
Degree of resources devoted to 
implementation: High 







Note: Implementation outcomes, administrative capacity, and buy-in are rated using a three level scale: low, 
moderate, high.  
 
 As shown in Table 7, administrative capacity is assessed using the same two metrics used 
to analyze SB60:  the presence of a designated social studies specialist and the degree to which a 
district devoted resources to aid implementation of the Standards. Interpretive frameworks, like 
in the analysis of SB60, are assessed at the level of the district (that is the degree to which the 
social studies specialists and/or district administrators tasked with implementation bought into 
Standards) and at the teacher level (the degree to which the teachers bought into the Standards).  
 As Table 7 illustrates, implementation outcomes varied within districts. None of the 
districts implemented the Standards comprehensively. In each district, the Standards are 
implemented well in some classrooms, partially in others, and in some not at all. The factor that 
has the highest explanatory power in understanding the outcomes is the one that is most 
consistent: teacher-level interpretive frameworks. Unlike the implementation of SB60, in the 
case of the Standards teacher-level buy-in did not align with the district-level buy-in. Even in 
districts that had high or moderate district-level buy-in, like Apple and Stone, most teachers did 
not buy into the new Standards. Additionally, even in districts that had high capacity for 
implementation and devoted resources, like Cook, the teacher-level buy-in was still low.   
As noted earlier, the enactment coalition of the Standards sought, at the policy design 
phase, to minimize negative interpretations among implementers and employed policy 
instruments to aid compliance. The implementation outcomes suggest that the efforts of the 
enactment coalition were not successful. Much like with SB60, by not establishing new 
institutional structures, the policy design left it to local implementers to determine 
implementation. District-level capacity and buy-in had little effect, as the primary factor that 




interpretations, as will be discussed below, stems from a combination of factors, including: 
interpreting standards as meaningless, disagreeing with the premise of the standards, feeling that 
the district did not support them with implementation, and competing priorities as a result of 
school-specific characteristics.  
 
District-level administrative capacity and interpretive frameworks 
 
The USBE did not provide school districts with funding to aid in the implementation of 
Standards. Any funding allocated by the USBE for this purpose was used for USBE-led 
professional development opportunities for teachers. Thus, how a district responded during the 
implementation phase and what it did to implement the standards depended, as in the case of 
SB60, on district level capacity and resources.  
Even though it lacked a designated social studies coordinator and is the district with the 
least financial capacity (based on funding per pupil), Apple mobilized extensive district level 
resources to support teachers to implement the new standards. This was in contrast to how the 
district dealt with the implementation of SB60. District efforts included professional 
development opportunities, where teachers “compare the old standards to the new ones” and are 
trained to make the pedagogical shifts required to teach to the new standards. The district also 
provided teachers with extra planning time and summer grants for lesson development, as well as 
support from the TSA. According to one Apple teachers,  
 All [school social studies] teams that applied [for the summer grant] were paid 
for each day for their time. They had to be at the school and the team had to put a 
specific amount of time for each day. And they could just work on it. The team 
had the autonomy to choose days and times and they worked on it on their own. 
They filled out a report and turned in their report to get paid. The report went 





In Apple, the implementation of the Standards came at a time when the district was 
implementing another initiative that the district hoped will help teachers transition to a teaching 
model focused on student knowledge, dispositions, and six critical skills: critical thinking, 
creativity, communication, citizenship, collaboration, and character. The goal of this initiative 
aligns well with that of the Standards, as it aims for teachers to provide students with knowledge 
that they could then mobilize using experiential learning opportunities to build the skill set in all 
content areas. Teachers will be evaluated based on these practices.  
The district, according to the TSA, is also working on creating district-based assessments 
to accompany this new model: “Hopefully, we want to see not a standardized type of assessment 
but more a performance type of assessment for our students.” To implement the new model, the 
district has provided multiple paid, professional development sessions for teachers, including 
specific ones for the social studies teachers. The district TSA also visits social studies school 
teams on a weekly basis to guide teachers on the new expectations. According to the district 
TSA:  
There are definitely teachers who are completely onboard and others who are 
more hesitant. … We need to get teachers on board. … Learning needs to change 
from the standard teacher lectures … School culture matters. We have some really 
forward thinking principals and their schools are further ahead than others. 
Overall, the message is getting across to all schools. It’s a process but I do think 
the message is getting across. 
 
These administrative capacity factors worked in favor of implementation of the 
Standards in Apple and district-level buy-in aided further. Comments made by the 
district-level administrator for social studies suggest that the district bought-in to the 
Standards ’new outlook on social studies and civic education. Apple District appears to 




as its experiential learning component, strongly enough to extend it to all content areas. 
The district TSA for social studies had a favorable opinion of the inquiry focus of the 
Standards: “I’ve been around since we revised our standards. They definitely are more 
inquiry based which could lead to more civic engagement, but this is just my own 
opinion.” 
Asked how this type of learning connects to civic education, the TSA replied: “I 
know it’s part of the vision because citizenship is in there. … It’s definitely, I think, a 
positive step toward civic engagement in social studies.” The Standards, according to the 
TSA, are better positioned to prepare students for civic engagement than the civics exam. 
For social studies and civic education, the TSA would like to see experiential experiences 
that build skills and dispositions develop as follows:  
Community service projects would be a great example of giving students an 
opportunity to show what they’ve learned. … We would like to have some type of 
exhibition for students to show what they are learning. … [The students] will have 
guidelines and rubrics but they will choose the topic. … To me that is a better 
project than taking that test. 
 
 Mineral District also focused on familiarizing teachers with the Standards, but not as part 
of a comprehensive, district-led initiative, nor with any professional development. Rather, in 
Mineral the social studies specialist in collaboration with members of the department of teaching 
and learning took, according to the specialist, the “new core and unpacked them to provide 
teachers with links that will support them in teaching the content standards.” The department 
website links directly to the USBE resources related to the Standards. Additional links were 
communicated to the teachers via email bringing to their attention resources provided by the 
Library of Congress, or programs like iCivics, and the Stanford History Education Group, which 




These communications aimed to help teachers find additional resources that they would 
need to adequately incorporate the standards into their curriculum. Yet, the efforts did not seem 
to have produced the intended results for all teachers. As one Mineral District social studies 
teacher said: “They basically said here are the new standards, go for it.” Another teacher 
concurred: “I have no memory of anybody at the district level saying ‘OK here is the core 
curriculum and here are some ways to approach it. ’I was really on my own.” 
According to the Mineral social studies specialist, limited district funds available for the 
use of social studies were used to partly subsidize professional development opportunities and 
paid collaboration time not for the Standards, but for a small subset of social studies teachers in 
the district that participated in an “action based civics” program organized by a national 
nonprofit group. That Mineral, which is the most well resourced district, had according to the 
coordinator, limited funds to use for social studies, suggests that the district may not give high 
priority to social studies but to other content areas given the district’s student body composition 
and low levels of student proficiency. The outcome also suggests that district level buy-in of the 
Standards was not as high as that in Apple, as the district specialist believed that civic education 
should be delivered through action projects, not curriculum. According to the specialist,  
As our new secondary standards rolled out they had that component embedded 
within them to a degree. I think to what we degree we interpret them is up to each 
district. … Action civics is something that has not been at the forefront in the 
past. … That has been our focus for the past couple of years; figuring out how to 
support more civics action and more civically engaging practices. 
 
The specialist defined action civics as follows: “When I say action civics I mean making 
sure that kids understand not only the processes of our government and their roles of citizens of 




learning about things, but actually being able to take it a step further and knowing what to do 
with that knowledge and how to exercise that knowledge to better our society.”  
The teachers that participated in the action civic program were provided with paid 
collaboration time and professional development, partly subsidized by the district. The specialist 
noted that “Teachers need time to figure out how this will be more long term. It’s critical on any 
front, not just the civics front.” The program runs in 18 classrooms across the district. The 
partnership was established after the nonprofit reached out directly to Mineral District to inquire 
about interest in district participation. Asked how many teachers do not participate in the 
program, the specialist replied:  
The majority don’t. But, what I can tell you there is increasing interest because 
they see the type of support that we provide to teachers that participate in this type 
of process and that was critical in not only having teachers continue and not give 
up, but to see the process through with our students.  
 
The specialist indicated that the district remains committed to continuing the partnership 
and to promoting action civics.  
In Stone, the current social studies specialist did not hold this position when the 
Standards were rolled out in the district. The specialist’s understanding of how the district 
handled implementation of the Standards is as follows: “From what I’ve learned … is that they 
created a resource where [teachers] went to and it explained ‘here is the standard and here is a 
way when you teach that standard that you could integrate the social studies curriculum. ’They 
gave resources that could go with it. That was something initially put together by the social 
studies specialist.” These resources could be found on the district’s website. Similar ones have 
been created for all other content areas, suggesting that this practice was not unique to the social 




The Stone specialist, who was a social studies teacher in the district before taking on this 
role, acknowledged the limitations of the district’s approach: “Really what ended up happening 
is that even though there is a district resource there, teachers have to go out on their own and find 
the resource they want.” The specialist attributed the district’s response to the Standards not to 
low administrative capacity or low district buy-in, but to the district’s focus on other areas, 
including testing and standards-based grading, which has made social studies less of a priority:  
 
I think testing drives a lot of what is the focus [in the district]. Our school board 
has been more focused on the system of [testing] implementation and what is the 
most effective way to implement. We started a few years ago moving to standards 
based grading and that is where their focus has been. A lot of the social studies 
areas have been placed on the back burner as we focus on creating standards-
based education and proficiency-based learning.  
 
Asked if the district has interest in supporting civics-oriented programs, the specialist 
replied: “There are little seeds being planted here and there but nothing cohesive, systematic at 
the district level for implementing action civics.” 
Cook interpreted the Standards as a step in the wrong direction, even before they were 
adopted. The coordinator liked the overarching questions present in the Standards, but believed 
that the Standards were more focused on history, and less so on civics. According to the district 
social studies specialist, who was involved in the Standards review process: 
The person in charge of the 7th grade [Standards] was a history professor. The course became 
in my opinion much more Utah’s history. It’s not that I’m not a fan of state history. I am. ... I 
didn’t feel like, and many of our teachers didn’t feel like, that was a good direction. [Author 
interview]. 
 
 The specialist voiced these concerns when the Standards were being written: “I sort of 
complained in meetings and said I’m not in agreement with this. … They went and put in an E 




don’t believe it. I disagree with it.” The comments of the specialist suggest that despite its efforts 
to include teachers and district leaders in the policy design phase, the enactment coalition was 
not successful in gaining buy-in from all of those involved. Cook responded by creating its own 
7th grade curriculum, even before the Standards were officially adopted. According to the 
specialist:  
We rewrote our 7th grade curriculum and divided it into sections: geography, 
history, economics, and government. The government section was not just Utah’s 
constitution but also a module on forms and participation in government. More 
like a civics course. … So our district teaches more civics in the 7th grade than 
most of the districts simply because we wrote our own 7th grade course. 
 
In addition to rewriting the curriculum, the district also wrote teaching materials for 
teachers. When the Standards were adopted, Cook created comprehensive district-level guiding 
resources for teachers that communicate what standards take priority, how teachers should assess 
student proficiency of knowledge, skills, and dispositions, and sample class syllabi with guiding 
questions. All resources were made available on the district website and were communicated to 
teachers. From the onset the District interpreted the Standards as problematic. It had the capacity 
and resources to invest in establishing its own social studies curriculum and a platform that 
aligns with the Standards, but made it clear (as all the documents have specific district-branding 
on them) that these resources come to teachers by the district and not the USBE.  The investment 
seems somewhat paradoxical, given the specialist shared a belief that “by and large, I don’t think 
social studies teachers pay much attention to standards because they are not tested.” This, 
however, does help explain Cook district’s comprehensive attempt to implement SB60. 
 The above analysis suggests that district-level buy-in and administrative capacity varied. 
Apple embraced the Standards and offered teachers extensive support to ensure the desired 




social studies) and utilized district resources to ensure that whatever implementation actually did 
occur aligned with the district-level interpretation. Mineral interpreted the Standards as an 
opportunity to pursue its own civic education vision as it relates to action civics and committed 
district capacity and resources to entice teachers to view the Standards through that lens. Stone 
used limited capacity and resources to somewhat aid implementation but the efforts were not 
comprehensive, as the district priorities at the time were not focused on social studies.  
 
Teacher-level interpretive frameworks 
 
Analysis of teacher-level interpretive frameworks suggest that their willingness to 
implement the Standards was not aligned with district-level administrative frameworks. Even in 
districts where the district-level administrators thought highly of the Frameworks, like Apple, 
and demonstrated high administrative capacity, teacher level interpretive frameworks had low 
ratings. Most teachers, as discussed below, did not interpret the Standards favorably and did not 
exhibit high willingness to implement them. Their interpretations were influenced by their 
individual perceptions of Standards, competing priorities at the district and school levels, and 
their individual teaching philosophies.  
In Cook district, despite the district-led efforts to provide teachers with resources to roll 
out the standards, not all teachers responded favorably. Despite the district’s efforts to provide 
teachers with what it considered to be a better version of the 7th grade standards, the change, 
according to the specialist “was received in one of two ways: Either eagerly, they loved it and 
wanted to teach a social studies course, or there were the people that wanted to teach it as a 
history course.” The specialist appeared to accept the varied outcome and did not indicate that 




classrooms the same way. Asked how district teachers responded to the Standards, the specialist 
in Cook district said: “Most social studies teachers said ‘Oh, new standards. They are probably 
very similar to the old standards. I will keep doing what I’ve always done because I think it’s 
good instruction.’I think that new teachers looked at the new standards and incorporated them 
and used them.”  
In all districts, some teachers interpreted the Standards as meaningless because they were 
not tied to a high-stakes assessment like math, science, and language arts. As one Mineral 
teacher explained, “In social studies teachers have their pet projects, their interests that they 
really reserve a lot of time and energy and resources toward. … You have that freedom and that 
independence because there isn’t … a test to ensure that you’ve covered everything in an 
equitable manner” (Author interview).  Even in Apple, where the district undertook a 
comprehensive effort to assist teachers with implementation of the Standards, a teacher felt that 
“There is so much autonomy given [to social studies teachers]. … There are some schools that 
require teachers to turn in lesson plans, but I haven’t met any teachers that have to do that. Again 
they are not a tested area, so administrators don’t pay much attention to social studies.”  
Some teachers in Stone indicated that they do not have an equivalent sense of autonomy, 
as a result of the district social studies benchmark test, which some interpreted as a strategy to 
incentivize teachers to follow the standards and to “teach to the Core.” Interestingly, the district 
social studies specialist made no reference to the benchmark test, suggesting a disconnect 
between the district and the teachers. According to a Stone teacher, “[The Core] is part of a 
grading scale now. … A student is assessed on the standards so each assessment needs to 
measure the standard. This is a change that will create uniformity and the expectation that kids 




Not all teachers, however, shared the same interpretation of the benchmark test.  
According to one Stone teacher, “the benchmark is more of a tool to assess growth and not a 
requirement for graduation. …It all depends on the teacher.” Additionally, schools in Stone have 
much autonomy of when they would adopt the new grading scale, suggesting that the district’s 
initiative may not really have been a strong mandate. As one teacher explained, “They have been 
heading in that direction [proficiency based learning] direction maybe four, five years through 
email, through our district department heads, through the principals. It’s not like the principal 
comes in to say teach to the core. Nobody does that. …This year our school finally went on 
board with it.” According to another teacher it was the adoption of the new standards that 
prompted more Stone schools to embrace the “teaching to the core” strategy: “There has been a 
gradual shift to teaching to the standards as they are written. ... Since the revision, the process is 
now to teach to the standard.” 
Additionally, even those Stone district teachers that interpreted the benchmark as a 
district tool to “teach to the core,” still felt that they could exercise discretion. According to one 
teacher: “Although I teach all that, I still do what I think is important as long as I cover what they 
think is important too.” Another teacher concurred: “Our district has embraced [the Standards] in 
the sense that we are to teach to the core. That is a district mandate.  You are teaching to the 
standards. … I don’t necessarily like all the standards so there are some that I might stress more 
than others.”  
In Mineral, which does not offer a district benchmark test, teachers highlighted that 
teaching philosophy, determines how and if a teacher will use the standards. As one teacher 
noted, “generally there is a lot of teacher autonomy here in Utah and it really comes down to the 




mandate how [teachers] teach. It most often comes down to the team dynamics and teaching 
philosophy.”  
Some teachers noted that if districts want social studies teachers to “teach to the core” 
they must take steps to make sure that social studies teachers feel valued and supported, 
suggesting a tension between teachers and district level administration, but also that teachers feel 
that they have the freedom and right to act as they wish because of limited district support. A 
teacher in Apple identified as “a problem” that few district resources are allocated to social 
studies compared to English, science, and math. Another in Stone highlighted that the district, 
despite the benchmark test, has done little to give resources to teachers to implement the 
Standards: “One of the other areas [teachers] struggle with in Utah Studies in particular is lack of 
resources. There isn’t anything out there that aligns with the standards of teaching civics in Utah 
Studies. … Teachers kind of have to create from scratch all of their content and curriculum.” 
In Apple, which is now transitioning to the new teaching system described earlier, the 
anticipated district benchmark test will focus less on testing the content of the Standards and 
more the skills. Some teachers viewed this favorably as it would alleviate another challenge that 
the Standards create: not having time to teach it all.  Teachers in other districts also highlighted 
lack of time as a problem in trying to implement the Standards. According to one teacher in 
Stone:  
The thing that most teachers struggle with is having time to teach it [the Core]. 
The Utah Studies is full of stuff, but the teachers, especially those teaching for a 
while, have a structure of how to teach it. But, I think one of the weaknesses is not 
having time in there for them to teach it. Utah studies is only a semester. We have 
less times in Utah Studies than we do in US History to cover all content. Teachers 
being asked to add something to what they’ve been doing is kind of difficult.  
 
 How much time a particular school devotes to a given area of the Standards remains a 




Utah Studies 7th grade course as a full year course, while others offer it as a semester course. In 
Apple most schools offer it as a semester course. According to the Apple TSA, the semester 
offering poses challenges for teachers: “[The Standards] have an expansive core and yet they 
each get a semester. It’s hard for those teachers. You can’t teach anything.” In Cook, the 
specialist also noted that variation across schools in how much time they dedicate to Utah 
Studies also has implications for teaching. More specifically, some schools devote a full year to 
the course “in which case they devote a semester to the government section [of the Utah Studies 
course],” while other schools offer it as a semester course and devote “only five weeks to the 
government section.” The TSA expressed frustration with the lack of uniformity between and 
within districts: I wish we were all at the same page statewide on this, but we are not. … I can’t 
tell you how many times I’ve had this conversation with different people. I’m not the one in 
charge. I don’t know why it’s not consistent. I wish it was.” 
 In addition to time, study body characteristics at the school level also has implications for 
how teachers teach the Standards, particularly incorporating the emphasis on inquiry and student 
deliberation. According to one teacher in Mineral District:   
A lot of teachers don’t [change their traditional lecture based teaching practice in 
response to the Core] because of time... One other element could also be the 
makeup of the classes. So, in my school we offer only honors government to all of 
the students and we do that purposely to help them see that they could all handle a 
rigorous class…It means that the classes have a broad variety of students: AP and 
IB students and students who are ELL, recent immigrants. It’s really challenging 
to break into things beyond the more traditional approach to teaching in that type 
of an environment.  
 
Some teachers also noted that competing priorities at the school level, such as increasing 
student proficiency levels in math, science, and English, also impact how the Standards are 




I had the kids for 90 minutes every other day. Then they switched that up because 
in math, English, and science the kids were not being successful on their testing. 
So now … it’s just one hour every other day. … I have this whole curriculum and 
they’ve cut the time by a third. ... That is just not enough time.  
 
The emphasis on testing and the other content areas, was also noted by a teacher in 
Apple. According to the teacher: “I’ve seen a shift in the testing and extreme emphasis on testing 
in science, math, and English. It has created a mindset. The administrators in Utah are so data 
driven that they put their focus on those three content areas that it has become as if those three 
areas are the core content areas and everything else is secondary. … Social studies is simply left 
off the list, even though we are a core content area.” According to the Cook social studies 
specialist, the district prioritizes dual language enrollment courses and technology. Civic 
education “is not on their radar.”  
Teachers attributed the variability of implementation of the Standards not only to school-
based priorities and dynamics, but also to individual teacher philosophy. Several teachers noted 
that how the Standards are taught simply comes down to the teacher. As one Apple teacher 
noted, and others concurred, variation has to do with the fact that not all teachers buy the inquiry 
angle of the Standards:   
“Utah came out with a new core and at the foundational level of every core content area 
they have a civic preparation outline guide. … It’s very skills oriented and hands on and I 
think the way this gets applied is depended on the teacher’s teaching philosophy, not 
necessarily the school’s or the districts. I think a lot of teachers have not bought into the 
idea of the empowered student. They feel like the information has to come from them, the 
teachers. So if the teacher hasn’t said it, the student hasn’t learned it. … There is a 
growing population of teachers that are more hands on, but there is still a large 
percentage of teachers that have a different perspective of how to apply that civic prep.”  
 
 Variation in how the standards are taught also has to do with individual teacher interests, 
as they are more likely to focus more on the part of the Standards that they like and less so on 




topics and they spend a lot of time and resources teaching those things and then they kind of go 
more quickly over other parts of the curriculum that do not interest them in particular.”  
 Individual teacher philosophy generates variation in how the Standards are taught on a 
classroom to classroom basis, suggesting that the Standards had little effect on changing how 
teachers teach. As one Mineral teacher noted, and others concurred,  
Teachers in general interpreted that [the Core Standards] however they wanted to. 
… Some teachers are very traditional and straight forward. … A lot of them took 
it [the Core Standards] as “OK, I need to make sure that my students know what 
their civil rights are and I can do that traditionally. I can give them a couple of 
lectures on this and give them a test on it and cover that part of the core. I think 
very few teachers took that as ‘OK you guys are going to undergo an individual 
project of your own where you will walk through the process of government to 
pursue some type of an outcome. I think it would be very rare to find a teacher 
that did that.  
 
Asked if they felt that the Standards could prepare students for civic engagement, 
teachers offered various perspectives. One Apple District teacher believed that the Standards 
have the potential to do so: “because .. every single core each standard and strand ... tries to get 
students to do more real world application. In each strand of the new core there is a way for 
teachers to empower students to engage in civic prep.” Other teachers were more skeptical, 
however. According to one Mineral teacher, “I really don’t think that many teachers were 
looking at that Standards as an opportunity to encourage students to become active participants 
in civic engagement.”  
None of the teachers interviewed expressed enthusiasm for the Standards. Their 
comments focused more on the challenges of implementation. Prominent among teachers is a 
sense that Standards really mean little, as social studies teachers have high discretion in what 
they do in their classrooms. This level of discretion was visible even in districts, like Stone, that 




indicated that they strongly opposed the Standards, or took concrete actions to mobilize against 
them, a certain degree of complacency underlined most interpretations. The teacher interpretive 
effects were primary in how the Standards were implemented in these districts studied.  
The implementation outcomes demonstrate that the USBE’s attempts to bring to Utah’s 
public schools the C3 model of civic education were not successful. In essence, this means that 
Utah’s students are educated differently for citizenship. Arguably, as will be discussed in the 
next section, it was a keen awareness of this inequitable outcome that prompted interest groups 
to mobilize and to seek new policies that sought to ensure more uniformity in access to a C3-
inspired civic education. To achieve that, however, the mobilization did not look to the USBE, 
but to the state legislature.  
 
 
How the Politics of Implementation Shaped Future Policies: HB152 and HB334 
 
The analyses of the implementation of the Civics Education Initiative (SB60) and 
the 2016 Utah Core Standards for the Social Studies demonstrate that policy 
implementation outcomes were heavily affected by how teachers interpreted the policies. 
Their interpretations were influenced by an interaction between elements of the policy 
design, the effects of a district-specific context, their personal motivations, and 
competing priorities. These interpretations contributed to substantially varied 
implementation outcomes across and even within districts. The varied implementation 
outcomes challenged the original expectations of the enactment coalition to give Utah’s 
students a uniform civic education experience.  How the civics exam and the standards 
were actually implemented in Utah’s classrooms varied widely suggesting that the 




those that “are not consistent with policymakers ’expectations can contribute to negative 
policy feedback that cycles back into new enactments that weaken the initial policy” 
(McDonnell & Weatherford, 2016).  
As will be discussed below, the negative feedback effects produced during 
implementation prompted interest groups to mobilize to advance policies taking civic 
education in Utah in a new direction.  Both policies were advanced in the legislature. 
HB152 sought to repeal SB60 and HB334 sought to take civics education in a direction 
that emphasized an “action civics” model. Although to a degree this model builds upon 
the informed action portion of the C3 Framework, it emphasizes the need for students to 
engage in civic-oriented experiential experiences in a much more dynamic way.  Both 
mobilization efforts were launched in the Spring of 2018 by the same coalition,  
thereafter referred to as the New Civics Direction Coalition. The coalition, according to 
one of its members, was a product of “grass tops” efforts and less so grassroots 
organizing (Author’s interview).  
The coalition included members of a national civic education advocacy 
organization (Action), USBE officials, and stakeholders from organizations like the 
League of Women voters, Veteran Legacy Civic Engagement Group, and Utah History 
Day. It also included representatives from the Utah Education Association, some district 
social studies specialists, and legislators who were “cultivated” by the coalition to 
participate (Author’s interview). According to a coalition member, at its core, the 
coalition was composed of 14 individuals, but in whole consisted of about 80-90 people 
who participated by offering lobbying support and building relationships. The coalition 




promoting action civics. As will be discussed below, these two wings shaped how the 
policies, HB152 and HB334, were presented to the legislature in 2020.  HB152 was not 
successful, HB334 only partially.  
The analysis that follows begins with a detailed description of these two efforts 
and then discusses how feedback effects, time, the external political environment, and 
decision venues interacted to bring about the New Civics Direction Coalition and the new 
policies it sought to create.   
 
 
HB152 and HB334 
 
 When Utah’s legislative session started in January of 2020—five years after the 
enactment of SB60, and four years after the adoption of the Utah Core Standards—civic 
education was back on the policy agenda. On February 3, 2020 Representative Elizabeth 
Weight—a Democrat and former high school teacher who joined the legislature in 
2017—introduced to the House Education Committee HB152 (the bill had been publicly 
distributed on January 17th). The bill sought to: “repeal the requirement to pass a basic 
civics test as a condition for receiving a high school diploma or adult education 
secondary diploma.”97F98 As she presented the bill, Weight provided a rationale for the need 
to repeal and cited as evidence conversations that she has had with teachers and 
students. 98F99 According to Weight the civics test fails to meet its intended objectives of 
enhancing civic knowledge and participation and has become an administrative burden 
 
98 See HB152, Civic Education Testing Requirement, available at https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/HB0152.html. 





for districts and teachers. She noted that civic education should be more focused on the 
Core Standards and on project-based, action civics programs. According to Weight:   
The teachers always knew that [the test] was not going to really create active, 
engaged citizens. ... It became more about just passing that test and the 
requirement, than learning about anything. …[Students] think it’s a game and 
they think that it’s just stupid to pass this requirement. …It would be one thing if 
it were meaningful, but it’s still not connected with any course or any actual 
learning. It’s just an in-the-moment, bubble test. Literacy means more than 
passing one bubble test and this requirement … We don’t want to give kids kind 
of a false sense that they’ve accomplished civics … [House Education Committee 
Hearing, February 3, 2020). 
  
At the hearing, Weight was joined by Sydnee Dickson, the Utah State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction (who five years earlier, as Deputy Superintendent of the USBE, spoke against 
SB60). Dickson spoke in favor of the bill and shared a comment that she attributed to Robert 
Austin, the USBE social studies specialist: “The test influencing outcomes and curriculum is 
akin to teaching students how to drive in driver’s education using a pedal car. … That is sort of 
the low bar that this test creates for the robust instruction that we want in our classrooms.” Jay 
Blaine from the Utah Education Association (Utah’s largest teacher union) also attended the 
hearing and spoke in favor of the HB152:   
Every teacher who teaches civics, social studies is in favor of this bill. They 
consider that it doesn’t measure any meaningful knowledge or learning in civics. 
… People think that the students have learned something but really they may have 
studied some flashcards, crammed for it and then that knowledge is gone. The real 
learning occurs through a rich curriculum, experiential projects, experiences in the 
community, experiences with people. 
 
 By February 21st, when Rep. Weight came to House Floor for the Debate of HB152, the 
bill had been rewritten, suggesting that the New Civics Direction Coalition recognized that 
repeal of the test was not a politically viable strategy.  Weight explained that the substitute bill 




placed as a required tool in the U.S. History 1 course typically taught in 8th grade.” The 
substitute bill also created the Civics and History Education Task Force “to study methods for 
strengthening civics and history education in public schools” and required the Task Force to 
“present a report, including legislative recommendations, to the Education Interim 
Committee.”100 Weight explained that the substitute bill resulted after hearing from “multiple” 
legislators “a lot of concerns of something to put in its [the test’s] place before we simply just 
pull it out.” 
 In discussion, Representative Steve Christiansen summarized the concerns of those 
opposing HB152. Christiansen introduced a counter substitute bill that also formed a Task Force 
but maintained the civics test as a high-stakes requirement for graduation for several reasons:  
First, there are in fact many people who appreciate this requirement. … Number 2 
… I think it would be wise for the study group to serve and function before 
making the recommendations to eliminate the test requirement. Number 3, 
concerns have been expressed that the current test creates some anxiety among 
high school seniors …I can appreciate that … But … school is intended to help 
children for life and quite frankly they will face virtually every day stress and the 
need to succeed. … [F]inally, … these high school seniors are in some cases very 
close to 18 years of age if not already 18 and our law allows them the right to vote 
and we need to make sure that they are prepared to exercise that right. And I 
believe that the current test while not perfect does a good job of preparing them to 
do that.  
 
Representative Eliason, the House Sponsor of SB60, voiced his support for 
Christiansen’s substitute as follows: “When we ran this bill we said let’s not tell our schools 
what they should teach, let’s just make sure that when our students graduate from high school 
they have a rudimentary level of civics education. … I don’t think we just throw it all out and say 
we figure it out later. Let’s keep what we got and see how we could improve it which is what 
[this] substitute does.” Not everyone agreed.  More specifically, Representative Stoddart noted: 
 




“[The test] is biased toward students who are not native to this country ... By keeping this test we 
are prejudicing them and not giving them the opportunity to graduate which will hurt their ability 
to get a good job and progress as citizens of this country.”  
 The House voted to move the substitute version introduced by Christiansen and that 
motion passed by a vote of 41-29-5. Subsequent discussion to the bill followed. Rep. Poulson 
questioned whether the Legislature should partake in this debate: “We are the legislature, not the 
super school board. We have people in place that do that curriculum. I don’t think it’s the 
responsibility of the legislature to dictate curriculum or a test that is not tied to the curriculum. I 
oppose this bill.” The House voted to not pass the substitute bill by a vote of 18-50-7. The House 
was not ready to repeal the civics test, nor to create the Task Force. 
 Three days later, Representative Dan Johnson—a Republican and former teacher who 
joined the House in 2019—presented another iteration of a civic education bill to the House 
Education Committee. HB334, which had been publicly distributed while substitutes of HB152 
were being debated, originally called for the following: “This bill creates a civics engagement 
pilot program to assess the benefit of and methods for, implementing a requirement to complete a 
civics engagement project as a condition for receiving a high school diploma; provides for 
training for teachers in school participating in the pilot program; requires school participating in 
the pilot program to submit a report to the State Board of Education; and repeals the requirement 
to pass a basic civics test as a condition for receiving a high school diploma.”100F101 The version that 
Johnson presented to the House Education Committee on February 24th constituted an 
amendment to the original version and, given the outcome of HB152, removed the call to repeal 
 




the civics test but preserved all other elements. In his opening remarks introducing the bill, 
Johnson explicitly noted how HB334 was different from HB152:  
One of the things about this bill I want to explain is that originally when I was 
running the bill I had this concept: let’s develop a pilot study and leave what is in 
place which is a civics test that students have to pass until we have the pilot 
completed. Other individuals wanted to run to a bill to eliminate that test and to 
go down that path. …So there is an amendment to this bill that I want to do…I’ll 
take that part out of my bill. Amendment 1 leaves the test in place while we are 
doing the pilot.102 
 
Johnson went on to describe the benefits that the bill would produce for Utah’s students:  
 
The difference between kids with first hand experiences versus kids with that a 
second hand experience is often pretty big. … Experiential learning is an 
incredible way to take what you’ve learned in the classroom and drive it deeper 
for a child. … This bill is about trying to have a pilot study to see in a formal 
setting what it’s like to have students engage in civic activity [and evaluate if it 
will] make a difference in the level of learning.  
 
 Johnson communicated that experiential learning, supported by professional 
development, is the missing piece in how Utah delivers civic education:  
It’s important that students have concrete knowledge about citizenship; it’s in the 
standards; it should be and is taught. What is lacking is the staff development for 
people who will teach about civic engagement…this gives us the chance to over 
time find the answer to [the] question. What really works? What difference does it 
make? I’m not saying that that test is bad…but this piece is something that has 
never been tried as far as a pilot is concerned in a controlled setting. That is what 
is different about this.  
 
 At the Hearing, Johnson was joined by Austin, the USBE social studies specialist, who 
began his remarks by noting that USBE “has not taken a position on this bill.” Austin shared a 
positive assessment of HB334: “The importance of the doing of civics, this concept of civics that 
transcends knowledge and actually puts it in practice is akin to … not just learning about dribble 
 





in a basketball, but getting in the game … If we could get a program that would actually 
encourage students to think about that kind of work where the rubber hits the road that’s 
something that we need to explore and consider.” 
 The House Committee moved to pass HB334 after an extensive discussion in which 
Johnson and Austin addressed questions from legislators related to how one measures “success” 
of experiential learning, how those metrics would be established, and details about the pilot 
program, such as how many districts would partake in the pilot project. A passionate call to 
action came from Representative Adam Robertson who said:  
Let’s move forward. Why are we waiting? This is action folks. We have a 
problem. We need to address it. Let’s go ahead and try this out…We are directing 
[the school board] to do things that we care about. We care about civics a lot.  
 
 HB334 passed the House Education Committee with a vote of 8-2-3. Three days later, on 
February 27th, HB334 was on the House agenda for Floor Debate. Aware that House legislators 
had voted down HB152 a few days earlier, Johnson highlighted that HB334 not only preserves 
the civics test, but builds further upon it: “HB334 does not eliminate that test. … This is really 
about taking the knowledge that students are gaining and providing them with an opportunity to 
engage in activity, integrative, citizenship activities. That’s an important way for us to reinforce 
what students are learning and to get them actively engaged.”102F103 HB334 passed the House with a 
vote of 66-4 with no debate. 
 On March 2nd, Johnson took the bill to the Senate Education Committee. In this setting, 
Johnson reminded legislators of Utah’s legislative commitment to civic and character education: 
 





Civic education in public schools is not intended to be a separate program. It’s an 
integrated approach to teaching and learning … I want you to know that HB334 ... 
upholds the values of Utah’s commitment in character and civic education.104 
 
Jeffrey Van Hulten, policy advisor to the USBE made a brief statement at this hearing 
informing the Senate Education Committee that the USBE took a position of support on HB334. 
The bill passed the Senate Education Committee unanimously and on March 10th moved to the 
Senate floor for debate. Senator Lyle Hillyard introduced HB334, described its objectives and 
added that: “ It’s more than just taking a test, it’s more than just taking a class, this is really civic 
engagement.”105 HB334 passed the Senate (with no discussion) with a vote of 26-3-3 and a fiscal 
note of $147,000 (for each of the three years).  
HB152 and HB334 had different outcomes. One passed, the other did not. The varied 
outcomes can be attributed to elements of the policy design and the political composition of the 
Utah legislature. In terms of policy design, the amended version of HB334 called for incremental 
not major change, whereas HB152 called for major change in repealing a high stakes test 
originally but also in substitute in that the test was no longer high stakes but a formative 
assessment. HB334 had specific targets: students that stood to benefit from pilot projects and 
implementers (the teachers) who also stood to benefit by receiving support to implement the 
projects. HB152 did not have specific targets, it was very much a reactionary, anti-SB60 bill that 
was very vague in the goals that the proposed Task Force that would undertake to evaluate civic 
education. In contrast, HB334 established a specific pilot program with clear goals and identified 
USBE as the policy instrument that would oversee the pilot program, create rules for LEAs, and 
manage oversight.  Additionally, HB152 was introduced by a Democratic legislator (Weight), 
 
104 HB334 Senate Education Committee (March 2, 2020). Audio available at 
https://le.utah.gov/av/committeeArchive.jsp?timelineID=159922 




whereas HB334 was introduced by a Republican legislator (Johnson). In 2020, Utah’s Senate 
and House was dominated by conservatives. Reflecting on the outcome of HB152, one member 
of the coalition noted that partisanship mattered: “we picked the wrong legislator [to introduce 
HB152]” (Author interview). 
 
Feedback Effects and the Mobilization of Interests 
   
As discussed earlier in this chapter, districts throughout Utah responded with variation 
during the implementation phase of both SB60 and the Standards. At the district level, these 
varied outcomes resulted primarily from the interpretations of implementers. Varied 
implementation outcomes and outcomes that do not meet the original intent of the enactment 
coalition“ contribute to negative policy feedback that cycles back into new enactments that 
weaken the initial policy” (McDonnell & Weatherford, 2016, p. 239).  HB152 and HB334 
constituted such enactments.  
The presence of Jay Blaine, a representative of Utah’s Educational Association (which 
represents 18,000 Utah educators) at the initial hearing of HB152 suggests that teachers who 
were left out of the conversation during the enactment process of SB60 now sought to have a 
relatively more prominent seat at the table. The comments of Representative Weight throughout 
the process of HB152 suggest that she was speaking on behalf of the teachers. The New Civics 
Direction Coalition gave those implementers somewhere to place the negative feedback effects 
that became visible during implementation. In addition, in the New Civics Direction Coalition 
USBE officials and some district social studies specialists found an opportunity to advocate for 
their preferred civic education practice: project-based, action civics.  
That representatives from the USBE were involved in the legislative hearings of HB152 




to change the nature of civic education in Utah. This could partly be attributed to the fact that 
Sydnee Dickson, an advocate of experiential civic learning, became the Superintendent in 2016. 
But, more integral appears to have been the role of the USBE social studies specialist. The 
metaphors of Robert Austin are telling of how the position of the USBE evolved over time. On 
the civics test, Austin said: “The test influencing outcomes and curriculum is akin to teaching 
students how to drive in driver’s education using a pedal car.” On the Core Standards, Austin 
highlighted the need for teachers to understand the “doing of social studies.” And, on project-
based, action civics, Austin saw an opportunity to enhance even more the “doing” of social 
studies. 
 In June 2020, at a virtual conference organized by UServeUtah to discuss the post-
HB334 era in Utah, Austin noted:   
Imagine for a moment [a student] being a basketball player on a team and I was 
her coach. I would have her practice her drills, shooting, passing, dribbling … and 
then more drills and more. But if I never let her play the game why does she want 
to continue doing that work? And that is what happens far too often when we 
teach civics. We teach procedures, we explore bills, or the separation of power, or 
our rule book, the Constitution. We study for the high school graduation civics 
test. Yet, we rarely support and encourage students to get in the game. That is 
what today is about. Getting in the game. 
 
A careful reading of the reports that the USBE submitted to the Utah State Commission 
on Civic and Character Education are also telling of the USBE’s progression on civic 
education.106 The 2016 report laid the groundwork for the new standards as it indicated, in 
alignment with the proponents of the C3 Framework, that “there are many proven practices that 
 
106 The Commission was established by the Utah legislature in 2006 and was placed under the auspices of the Governor’s office. 
The Commission was responsible for promoting Civic and Character Education in Utah, including providing funding to promote 
educational civics activities like the Utah Council for Social Studies Conferences, field trips to the state capitol, etc. The 
legislature required the USBE to report to the Commission on annual basis on the state of civic and character education in Utah. 
The legislature repealed the Commission in 2019 as the legislature opted to minimize Commissions and reporting requirements 




can result in effective civic and character education in public school, but in particular the leading 
research in civic education focuses on six practices.”107 The 2017 report appears to attempt to 
solidify the value of the new standards noting that they “include specific references to civic 
preparation in every course description” and “are the bedrock upon which classroom instruction 
is based.”108 The 2018 report informs the Commission that the USBE organized a conference 
with LEAs to discuss civic and character education and that an “important point from the 
conference was the strong desire to develop action-oriented civics programs in schools so 
students can apply civic goals and service ideals.”108 F109  
The timing of the reference to “action civics” in the USBE report coincides, perhaps not 
accidentally, with the implementation of the action civics-oriented program in Mineral District. 
This suggests that political pressure for HB334 and opposition to SB60, via HB152, came 
partially from the presence of an external actor. McDonnell and Weatherford (2016), note that 
post-implementation “political pressure (or opposition)” to a policy comes does not come only 
from those “involved the policy’s enactment or implementation” but could also be generated “by 
the external political environment—for example, ideological movements, electoral politics, and 
competing policies.” In the case of HB334 political pressure was spearheaded by an external 
organization advocating for a type of civic education focused on action civics on a national scale 
(thereafter referred to with the pseudonym Action).  Through Action, the USBE found in 2018, 
an ally through which to promote its preferred direction on civic education. As these two entities 
joined forces to pursue what would later become HB334, another set of actors (most notably the 
 
107 Utah State Board of Education (2016). Civic and Character Education Report. Accessed at 
https://www.schools.utah.gov/file/8712b828-92f7-476c-bc14-07a75ff1e751. 
108 Utah State Board of Education (2017). Civic and Character Education Report. Accessed at 
https://www.schools.utah.gov/file/ff1bcfaf-251b-4924-8d0b-4af144eb4a2b. 





UEA) saw an opportunity at this time to repeal SB60. According to a member of the coalition, in 
2018 the original sponsor of SB60 (Howard Stephenson) retired from the legislature. The 
retirement was seen by the anti-SB60 wing of the New Civics Direction Coalition as an 
opportunity to mobilize to repeal the test (Author’s interview). It found allies in the action-civics 
wing of the New Civics Direction Coalition.  
Action, according to one of its representatives, is “very much project-based, student-
drive, and student-led,” thus considered to be “action civics” (Author interview). Students 
engaged in the program collaborate to research and identify a problem in their community, 
research its causes, identify possible solutions, and then “move into action figuring out who are 
the targets and the key players that can actually make a change happen” (Author interview). 
Participating students present their work at a public event at the end of the semester.  
 Action came to Utah by reaching out to the social studies specialist of Mineral District 
and asking for collaboration starting in the Fall of 2018. The district specialist welcomed the 
prospect and “got buy-in” from the district administrator (Author’s Interview) to proceed. The 
District did not have all the funding required to implement the program. According to an Action 
representative, “funding was an issue. The district did not have money set aside for [Action].” 
Action’s CEO was able to secure the remaining funding for the district through an external 
donor.   
 With funding secured, the district specialist reached out by email to social studies 
teachers in the district and invited them to participate. According to a Mineral teacher who 
participated in the program: “I think [the district specialist] targeted specifically people in the 
high schools that taught government and made it more of a personal invitation [and] explained 




what I wanted to do for my students.” According to the social studies specialist, during the first 
year, 4 teachers participated in the Action program and brought it to 17 classrooms. The next 
year, 6 teachers (4 returning and 2 new) participated and brought the program to students in 18 
classrooms. Action provided the teachers with professional development at the beginning of the 
semester, with materials, and access to online resources, as well as student handbooks. Action 
provided the teachers with weekly emails on “tips and tricks,” two virtual coaching sessions, a 
mid-semester classroom visit, and help with facilitating the end of semester culminating event.  
 Action’s work focuses on programming and advocacy. Through its advocacy wing, 
Action had successfully brought “action civics” to several states. Arguably, by establishing a 
program in Utah it set the foundation for future advocacy in the state. According to an Action 
representative who works on the advocacy end, the organization sought to establish a coalition in 
Utah in Spring 2019 and started a “conversation” with “some folks” involved in civic education, 
including USBE officials, and other stakeholders from organization like the League of Women 
voters, Veteran Legacy Civic Engagement Group, and Utah History Day. Access to these 
individuals came from personal connections that Action had access to as a result of its 
networking efforts (Author interview).   
The coalition worked on “cultivating law makers and in particular Johnson” (Author 
interview). Representative Weight was another legislator “cultivated” by the coalition and was 
characterized by an Action representative “as another key player.” It should be noted that it may 
have not been coincidental that Action chose to “cultivate” legislators who were former 
educators, but also legislators from two different political parties. The coalition also included 
representatives from the Utah Education Association and social studies specialists/specialists 




member, at its core, the coalition comprised 14 individuals, but in whole consisted of about 80-
90 people who “participated with emails to lawmakers” and lobbying support from legislators, as 
well as building relationships with education staff in the Governor’s office who were “very 
helpful.” 
According to an Action representative, members of the coalition participated in weekly 
calls.  The initial goal of Action was to advocate for a bill that would make project, action-based 
civics a requirement for graduation. The debate centered on whether the coalition should seek 
state-wide or district-wide reform. Originally, Action advocated for a state-wide reform because, 
according to a representative, “we realized that in order for Utah students to get access beyond 
the district, where it depends on the priorities of district personnel, they really need to think at a 
big picture scale and not a district by district scale in order to deliver more comprehensive civics 
education.” For that to occur, the change had to come from the legislature.  
According to an Action representative, coalition members, primarily district 
representatives, some lawmakers and representatives from the USBE, cautioned against a swift, 
state-wide change and suggested pursuing a pilot program that would give the coalition “the data 
and research” to “drive where we go” and also offer examples of local success. In this respect, 
the local members of the coalition appear to have an understanding that implementers would not 
respond well to a legislated, top-down mandate, informed perhaps by their experience with 
SB60.  So, the coalition settled on seeking “state level change over time” (Author interview). 
According to an Action representative,  
one of the big things that made the shift is that there was concern that teachers may not 
get behind a shift from the citizenship test requirement as a graduation condition to 
having a project based civic requirement across all of Utah in a rapid shift. We instead 
thought about a more graduated pace of change and also to make sure that we could put 




the Board of education level and having three districts selected to participate in a pilot 
program as demonstration sites of the goal of how you do this over time.” 
 
But, not all coalition members agreed. According to an Action representative, 
“Representative Weight really wanted to repeal the citizenship test.” In this regard, Weight was 
joined by the UEA who also wanted the test repealed. The coalition compromised by pursuing, 
according to an Action representative, “the two bill strategy of repeal and replace”: HB152 
would repeal the civics test requirement and HB334 would replace it with an action-civics based 
requirement. When HB152 was defeated, the representative noted “that fueled the fire to fight 
the fight.”  The coalition “regrouped” and “Representative Weight continued to be a supporter 
but that weekly huddle did not happen with the same active strategy. …At that point 
Representative Johnson emerged as a more prominent champion. … We started focusing more 
on the pilot there as well.”  According to a coalition member, the coalition members urged 
Johnson to “amend the repeal out of the bill” and noted that if that had not happened “the deal 
would not have made it through either chamber.”  
When asked directly “why did HB334 pass” an Action representative explained:  
[It passed] because we had a very solid champion (Rep. Johnson) who got behind it and 
… was willing to go to the mat for this. … A second [reason] is that we were able to 
work with so many folks on the ground in Utah, and I want to be clear about the fact that 
even though we were able to cultivate and galvanize action, the action itself was taken 
and owned by Utah’s preexisting spirited community. … The wide margin in the house 
and in the senate are a testament to deep engagement across the board there. And maybe 
the third [reason] that I could think of is the adjustment of policy design. Johnson’s 
willingness to take the citizenship test of the table was a key factor in helping the bill get 
through.  It may not have been the preferred strategy but it was a reasonable compromise 
with the policy preferences of the legislators. 
 
It took five years after the enactment of SB60 and four after the adoption of the new 
Standards for interest groups to formally mobilize. For the mobilization of interests, time matters 




not present or were less influential during enactment will mobilize during implementation … 
because interests that did not prevail during enactment [may] mount a counterattack against the 
new policy … or because the policy being implemented becomes the target of “spillovers” from 
related policies” (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016). In the case of the implementation of the 
Standards, a number of these elements related to time were visible.  
First, social studies specialists who were not enthusiastic about SB60 or the Standards 
found during the implementation phase opportunities to promote their preferred project-based, 
skills-centered, action civics type of civic education. Time allowed them to mobilize and to join 
the coalition that was spearheaded by Action in early 2019. Second, those interested in 
mobilizing were further aided in their efforts by the fact that during the long period of 
implementation of the Standards it became clear that multiple factors stood in the way of 
uniform implementation between and within districts. Third, the longer time frame of the 
implementation brought to the attention of social studies specialists the importance of resources, 
a concern that HB334 addressed.  
Implementation’s longer time frame, however, had the opposite effects on efforts to 
repeal SB60. On this front, the New Civics Direction Coalition may have simply waited too long. 
By January 2020, implementation of the Civic Education Initiative had already been solidified in 
districts, regardless of whether teachers and administrators felt that that test did not achieve its 
intended results and regardless of the varied implementation methods employed in the districts. 
Even though Representative Weight sought to make use of her participation in the coalition to 
achieve the goal of repeal first and even though her leadership gave voice to feedback effects 
generated during implementation, the outcome of HB152 was not favorable because the civics 




enabled those legislators who favored SB60 to argue that the exam, regardless of inconsistencies, 
has been implemented and we should not undo what has already been done without having 
something to replace it.  
Furthermore, the outcome of HB152 appears to have also been influenced by the 
dynamics of implementation related to decision venues.  During implementation, unlike 
enactment, policies are “introduced into deeply entrenched … local political cultures” which 
leads to varied implementation outcomes and to varied “interpretations of the same statute” 
which cycle back to negative policy feedback, as happened with HB152 and HB334 (McDonnell 
and Weatherford, 2016).  More importantly, however, the complex venue environment created 
during the implementation process favors groups that are more powerful (Lukes, 2005). As 
Henig (2013) notes, the venue-shopping environment of the new political content of education 
policy making “allows some flexible and well-resourced groups to tactically shift their battles 
into more congenial institutional niches” and that means that “those with limited resources and 
limited mobility might be at a distinct disadvantage because of the expense of playing politics in 
this complicated landscape.”  
The venue-shopping environment arguably enabled Action, a well-resourced organization 
to strategically position itself in Mineral District in an effort to pursue its long-term objectives in 
Utah. Action established itself as a stakeholder in Utah and gradually built a network and then a 
coalition that successfully put its civics action platform on the policy agenda.  Action also 
exhibited flexibility in that it was willing to compromise on its initial intended objective and to 
agree to pursue the more tactical strategy of the pilot project in hopes of reaching its long-term 
objectives of making civics action a graduation requirement in Utah. On the contrary, the 




member of the coalition, the comments of the Action representatives suggest that the decision to 
start with HB152 was more of a political compromise to ensure that the coalition remained intact 
and less as the preferred objective, which was HB334. The core of the enactment coalition was 
very much a product of a “grass tops” effort, as an Action representative noted (law makers, state 
officials, lobbying) and less so grassroots organizing. According to the social studies specialist of 
Mineral district, “A lot of this was backroom conversations and that is why I think the civics bill 
flew through which is very rare. All of us working on this bill, we were shocked that it flew 
through. I interpret that to back-room conversations.” 
The coalition viewed the enactment of HB334 as a positive development and the start of 
a new beginning. A member of the coalition, characterize it as follows: “This legislation is a flag 
in the ground of what the likely trajectory is in Utah.” Asked about anticipated outcomes, an 
Action representative noted:  
It will all have to do with political meaning the legislature will need to act at the 
end of this process. I don’t think it’s something that can be resolved at the district 
or state board of education. I think it will take some more legislative action to 
resolve these competing models. Because of Utah’s unique political context, I 
think the next policy would be likely to have an experiential emphasis with a 
complementary support on character, civic education, civic duties.   
 
 At the time of the interview, the representative could not foresee the impact that 
the looming COVID-19 pandemic would have on HB334. The financial impact of the 
pandemic on the state of Utah led to the legislature suspending all funds appropriated for 
the implementation of HB334 were not approved. In 2021, Johnson returned to the 
legislature to seek appropriations for HB334, but the request was not granted. According 
to a USBE representative, the development posed a fundamental challenge for the 
implementation of the policy and the USBE in collaboration with Representative Johnson 




Learning Coalition” that could support further the goals of HB334. What outcomes such 
a potential partnership will have for HB334 remains to be seen, as does the intent of the 
legislature to change course of appropriating funds. What is certain is that HB334 will 
generate a new set of civic education policies. What those policies will look remains to be 
seen.   
 
Conclusions from Utah  
 The preceding analysis of the implementation of SB60 and the Standards in Utah 
describes how two enactment coalition—motivated by a particular theory of action on the 
direction that social studies and civic education should take in Utah—managed to capture the 
attention of the state legislature and the state bureaucratic educational agency, which 
subsequently adopted  policies that sought to alter the way by which students across Utah’s 
public school were educated in social studies and prepared for civic participation. Because both 
policies were designed in a way that left implementation to school districts, implementation 
depended on the administrative capacity and interpretive frameworks of implementers at the 
district and classroom levels. These interpretations played a primary role in producing varied 
implementation outcomes and were shaped by elements of the policy design, competing 
priorities, district-specific context, and personal motivations.  
Figure 4 offers a visual illustration of the politics of implementation of these dual 











In the case of SB60, several characteristics of the policy design phase predisposed 
implementers to interpret the policy negatively before and during implementation. These 
characteristics included: 1) that the policy originated in the legislature, which teachers 
interpreted as an entity that should not dictate curriculum; 2) that it focused only on the long-
term outcomes of students and did not consider other policy targets, like the teachers; 3) that it 
offered no support instrument to aid implementation; and, 4) that it mandated a high-stakes 
exam, signaling to teachers that implementation was necessary and that the burden of ensuring 
that students take it and pass it would fall directly on them.  
Viewed through this lens, it is not surprising that in three out of the four districts studied, 
most implementers (district level administrators and teachers) viewed SB60 by and large as a 
misplaced, misguided, top-down mandate that could not achieve its stated objective to enhance 




level exacerbated the negative perceptions. As some district administrators also viewed SB60 
negatively they opted to devote energy and resources into alternative forms of civic education, 
like action civics and the Standards, thus offering little district-level support to the 
implementation of SB60.  Thus, interpretive frameworks played a primary role in shaping 
implementation outcomes.  
SB60 was implemented in all districts because of the policy design: it was legislated. Yet, 
the policy design left implementation details to the discretion of the districts. This empowered 
the implementers to participate in the policy making process during the implementation phase 
and their choices were largely a function of the degree to which they bought into the policy. Only 
the one district that perceived the policy favorably engaged in comprehensive implementation 
consistent with the vision outlined at the state level and that outcome was attributed primarily to 
the fact that district teachers were already using the civics exam in their classrooms.  
Unlike SB60, in the case of the Standards, the characteristics of the policy design had less 
of a negative impact on interpretive frameworks (that is, the degree to which district 
administrators bought-into the framework and were willing as a result to implement the policy). 
Even though the Standards, much like SB60, sought to bring about major change in that they too 
called on teachers to change their practices, the policy design did not prime implementers to 
view it negatively for several reasons. First, the Standards came from the State Department of 
Education, not the legislature and, as noted earlier, teachers were more willing to view the policy 
as one legitimately grounded in education practices. Second, because the policy was not 
implementers did not interpret it as a mandate, but as one whose implementation was optional.  
Third, the USBE did employ make, through policy instruments, efforts to support teachers and 




Despite these elements, however, how the Standards were implemented between and 
within the districts varied widely. The Standards were fully implemented in some classes and not 
at all in others. That the policy design left implementation ultimately to the district level 
empowered implementers during implementation (much like it did with SB60). Out of the four 
districts studied only one district administrator was highly supportive of the standards and 
teachers in all four districts were not enthusiastic. Some district level administrators saw the 
Standards as not going far enough to foster an “action civics’’ component and opted to devote 
resources and time in that direction. Most teachers saw the standards as meaningless, others 
viewed them as simply not good enough, and others felt that competing priorities at the district 
and school levels compromised their capacity to implement them. These negative interpretive 
frameworks contributed not only to varied implementation outcomes, but also to negative 
feedback effects that prompted the New Civics Direction Coalition to mobilize in 2018 to 














CHAPTER VII  
THE POLITICS OF CIVIC EDUCATION POLICY REFORM IN 
CONNECTICUT 
 
 On May 1, 2013, John Tully, the President of the Connecticut Council for the Social 
Studies led a presentation to the Connecticut Commissioner of Education and the State Board of 
Education outlining the organization’s vision and priorities pertaining to social studies and civic 
education in the state. Tully was joined by the Secretary of State, Denise Merrill. With them was 
Steve Armstrong, President-Elect of the National Council for the Social Studies who was a 
Connecticut native, as well as David Bosso, the National Social Studies Teacher of the Year, also 
from Connecticut. Their goal was to convince state education leaders that the time had come to 
prioritize social studies and civic education. At the meeting, Tully noted:  
“We simply cannot let the fates determine if our future generations understand the duties 
and freedoms associated with being members of a democratic society, gain perspective 
on the world, or appreciate the sacrifices our parents made. ...All of us, as citizens of the 
state of Connecticut, and you, as stewards of our state’s schools, need to work actively to 
give our students the learning experiences they need to join our ranks as educated and 
skilled members of our society. And while I’m sure that nobody in this room would 
disagree with any of this, history will judge us, as we will surely judge ourselves, by how 
much effort we make to align our actions with our values.”110   
 The CCSS-led coalition requested three actions from the State Board of Education. First, 
a position statement on the importance of social studies. Second, to fill the position of Social 
Studies Consultant at the State Department of Education. Third, the adoption of a new Social 
Studies Framework.111 A month later, Tully issued a call to action encouraging social studies 
teachers across the state to reach out to their elected officials in support of their discipline: 
 
110 Connecticut Council for the Social Studies, Yankee Post (2013). Retrieved at http://www.ctsocialstudies.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/YPJune13.pdf. 





“Social Studies is the class that teaches students to be effective and engaged citizens. Our future 
depends on that, it goes to the heart of what education is about, and it is in peril.”112 
 A year later, in May 2014, the Connecticut State Board of Education issued a position 
statement affirming its commitment to social studies. In June 2014, the Board filled the position 
of the Social Studies Consultant. In February 2015, the Board approved the new Connecticut 
Elementary and Secondary Social Studies Frameworks. With all three demands met, the CCSS 
along with the State Department of Education, led by the newly appointed Social Studies 
Consultant, set off to ensure district implementation and to reform the way social studies and its 
civics subset was delivered throughout Connecticut. Unlike in Utah, the “mandate” from the 
state level was not conflicting. Connecticut’s school districts were asked to implement civic 
education reform only by aligning their curricula to the C3-inspired, Connecticut Frameworks. 
What type of politics surfaced during the implementation phase of the Connecticut 
Frameworks and how did these politics affect implementation outcomes and sustainability of the 
state initiated civic education reform? How did district level administrators and teachers interpret 
the policy and to what degree were these interpretive frameworks affected by the policy design 
and other factors, like competing priorities? Did the resulting politics of implementation generate 
feedback effects that encouraged the mobilization of interests to seek new policies? These are the 
questions that this chapter takes on in an effort to understand what, if anything, happened when 
the Connecticut Frameworks hit the level of the school district.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it describes the policy design phase of the 
Connecticut Elementary and Social Studies Frameworks starting with introducing the enactment 
coalition, its beliefs and theory of action, and the subsequent policy change. It then analyzes 
 





specific characteristics of the policy design phase, including origins, type of change, policy 
targets and instruments, and institutional structures and rules. Second, the chapter analyzes the 
implementation phase, looking specifically at implementation outcomes in four districts and 
factors that led to these outcomes. Finally, the chapter discusses how the politics that surfaced 
during the implementation phase generated feedback effects prompting the mobilization of 
interests that sought to create new policies aiming to enhance the sustainability of the existing 
one.  
The Policy Design Phase of the Connecticut Social Studies Frameworks  
Just like with Utah, the analysis of the politics of implementation of the Connecticut 
Frameworks starts with an evaluation of the policy design whose characteristics set the tone for 
the implementation phase by contributing to how implementers interpret the policy and its 
effects on them. The specific design characteristics examined include: enactment coalition and 
theory of action, origins, type of change, policy targets and instruments, and institutional 
structures and rules.   
Enactment Coalition: Beliefs, Theory of Action, and Policy Change  
 Connecticut’s Frameworks were the product of a long-term, sustained effort launched by 
an advocacy coalition composed of the leadership of the Connecticut Council for the Social 
Studies (CCSS), political elites, academics from the state’s institutions of higher education, 
members of the bureaucracy at the State Department of Education (SDOE), and leaders at the 
National Council of the Social Studies (NCSS). Like other advocacy coalitions, the one that 
emerged in Connecticut operated within a particular subsystem--the field of social studies 
education-- shared a “particular belief system,” and showed a “nontrivial degree of coordinated 




 Analyzing the advocacy coalition’s belief system through the lens of the advocacy 
coalition framework (ACF), allows this analysis to identify its deep core values, policy core 
beliefs, and secondary aspects (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The coalition’s deep core 
values, which according to ACF are highly resistant to change, was that social studies education 
served a vital purpose in American education and was critical in preparing students for 
citizenship. In December of 2010, the CCSS started laying the groundwork for a more strategic 
advocacy effort reflective of these deep core values. Reflecting on that time, one member of the 
enactment coalition described the mobilization effort as follows: “Finally we said it’s time for us 
to take our own advice that we give to students about being strong civic agents and find out what 
we can do” (Author interview). Highly instrumental in this effort was the newly elected CCSS 
President, Tully, who announced to CCSS members, via the organization’s newsletter, the 
Yankee Post, that the organization had established a Strategic Planning Committee aiming to 
strengthen social studies in Connecticut by employing communication strategies in line with the 
coalition’s deep core value: “social studies skills and knowledge are critically important to the 
future of our state and nation ... social studies educators are the primary providers of citizenship 
education for the young people of Connecticut.”112F113  
The coalition’s policy core beliefs114 were that social studies was being marginalized in 
Connecticut as a result of an emphasis on other content areas due to the Common Core’s focus 
on testing. Another part of the policy core beliefs was that the mobilization of interests 
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committed to preserving the status of social studies education and its civics subset was necessary 
to entice the SDOE to act to resolve the problem. In September 2010, as the Common Core was 
rolling out in Connecticut and districts shifted their focus to subjects that were tested, through the 
Yankee Post, the CCSS warned members that “in the absence of a formal social studies advocate 
in the State Department of Education social studies in Connecticut [is] at risk”115 and noted that 
“it is up to all of us to demonstrate and advocate for the need for social studies as a major subject 
in all grades.”115F116 A few months later, the coalition leaders highlighted their policy core beliefs 
further. Tully announced in the Yankee Post that:  
There is not doubt these are challenging times for the social studies. At the 
elementary level, social studies is being crowded out when it is even thought of at 
all. At other levels, the nature of a culture of testing has meant that those areas not 
tested, and not likely to make the cover of newspapers when test scores are 
announced, are much less likely to get resources. … without our efforts to teach 
[students] to recognize arguments, evaluate evidence, ask questions, and develop 
their own arguments, they will be at the mercy of whichever end of the political 
spectrum shouts the loudest, appeals to baser instincts, or has the slickest 
marketing campaign. … Together, we can fight for the importance of … all of the 
other social studies disciplines that teach our students to understand the world and 
their place in it.”117 
Finally, the secondary aspects118 of the coalitions belief system were that to resolve the 
marginalization of social studies the SDOE should issue a statement of support of social studies 
education, fill the position of Social Studies Consultant, which had been vacant for four years, 
and adapt new social standards that aligned with the C3 Framework. These secondary aspects 
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were clearly communicated by coalition leaders to the Connecticut State Board of Education two 
years after the advocacy efforts began. In May of 2013, Tully, Armstrong, Merrill, and Bosso, 
met with the Commissioner of Education and the State Board of Education. At that meeting, 
Merrill spoke about the problem concerning the marginalization of social studies education in 
Connecticut and nationally, Tully about the need to fill the position of social studies consultant at 
the DOE, Bosso made the pitch that the discipline “represents the values of public education and 
the foundations for a democratic society,” and Armstrong “expressed the need to finalize the 
social studies framework and review in the context of the Common Core.”119 Reflecting back to 
the May 2013 meeting a member of the enactment coalition shared that the coalition members 
asked the Board to “right now” put their “resources behind [their] values” (Author interview).  
Motivated by these beliefs, the coalition generated a specific theory of action. As noted 
earlier in this study, a specific theory of action assumes that “if you intend to produce 
consequence C in situation S, then do A” (Argyris & Schon, 1996, p. 13). In the case of 
Connecticut, the theory of action was the following: to ensure that social studies continues to 
play a vital role in American education at a time when its being marginalized, a mobilization of 
interests that value social studies must convince the Connecticut State Board of Education to: 1) 
issue a statement in support of social studies; 2) hire a social studies consultant at the SDOE; and 
3) create new social studies frameworks aligning with the C3 Framework.  
Mobilizing the theory of action produced positive outcomes for the coalition. In the 
months that followed the coalition’s May 2013 appeal to the State Board of Education, the Board 
agreed to start a review process of the new social studies Framework, which “opened up money” 
to aid their development, invited the CCSS to be part of the search committee to fill the position 
 





of Social Studies Consultant and asked the Council to help put together a position statement on 
the importance of social studies (Author interview). Once the coalition got the “green light” to 
start working on developing a new Framework, it turned to Armstrong to lead the effort, while at 
the State Department of Education the Chief Academic Officer, Diana Wentzell presented 
updates to the Board on progress being made.120 At that time, the NCSS was putting the finishing 
touches on the C3 Framework. The Connecticut writing team, led by Armstrong who as 
president of the NCSS oversaw the development of the C3, followed the national lead and from 
the onset aimed to align the Connecticut Frameworks directly with the C3. “It was pretty 
unanimous that this is exactly what we wanted to do,” said one of the enactment coalition 
members.  
According to one of the Frameworks writers, the team was motivated by the shared 
understanding that the “Connecticut frameworks were old and needed to change, society 
changed, the way students learn has changed” and that it was “time for an update” (Author 
interview). They saw the C3 as the tool that would bring about the desired update. “The 
Connecticut Frameworks are the C3 Framework with just more specific content,” explained 
another writer and added: “we followed the inquiry arc, we used the interdisciplinary dimension, 
and the idea of compelling questions. But then we made it content specific” (Author interview).  
When reporting to the State Board of Education on the progress made on the 
Frameworks, the coalition “sold” the direction of the new Frameworks as “the opportunity [for 
Connecticut] to be at the cutting edge. We sold it as ‘hey you will be one of the first states to do 
this” (author interview). Their efforts worked, as the comments of member of the State 
Department of Education involved in the process suggest:    
 





In working with the team and really examining how to make the C3 Framework a 
state specific document the part that was most appealing to me was the K-12 civic 
pathway. I like the way the Framework blends specific knowledge of government 
but also puts an emphasis on developmentally appropriate, place-centered 
development of the civic behaviors and attributes from an early age. … I was 
really excited about the way the C3 gave us a chance in Connecticut to focus on 
that aspect of civics education in particular.  
According to one of the writers, the Board of Education and the Commissioner were 
“very open minded and willing to let us the experts come up with what we wanted to come up 
with and then explain why we did it” (Author interview).  
As the Frameworks were being prepared, the other two objectives outlined in the  
coalition’s theory of action were met. As noted earlier, in May 2014, the Connecticut State Board 
of Education adopted a position statement on social studies. According to that statement, “the 
Connecticut State Board of Education believes that the first guiding principle that forms the 
foundation for educating all students in Connecticut’s public schools … is: that schools must 
provide challenging and rigorous programs of study to all students to prepare them to become 
fully educated, responsible citizens. To achieve this guiding principle, all schools in Connecticut 
must provide meaningful and relevant programs in social studies.”120F121 
In June 2014, as Armstrong was preparing to end his tenure as President of NCSS, he was 
appointed to the position of Social Studies Consultant at the SDOE. For the enactment coalition 
this position was seen as critical, as one member explained, because “as discussions were being 
held at the State Department of Education and they were making decisions about legislative 
priorities or deciding about resources, it would be important to add someone who would 
advocate for social studies and be that voice internally in discussions. We also felt it was 
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important for districts looking for help in social studies that they had someone to call for 
answers. It was both that strong internal advocate and a resources person for social studies 
supervisors around the state” (Author interview). In February 2015, the Board approved the new 
Connecticut Elementary and Secondary Social Studies Frameworks. 
The policy change brought about by the coalition, according to ACF, can be “understood 
as the product of two processes. First, advocacy coalitions within the subsystem attempt to 
translate the policy cores and the secondary aspects of their belief system into governmental 
programs. … [Second], system-wide events—changes in socioeconomic conditions, outputs 
from other subsystems, and changes in the system-wide governing coalitions—[affect] the 
resources and constraints of subsystem actors” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 34). In this 
regard, the policy changes made by the Connecticut State Department of Education can be seen 
as the product of the belief-driven strategic communication efforts of the advocacy coalition, but 
also of changes in the external environment, including the ability of the coalition to leverage the 
roll out of the Common Core standards and the election of Denise Merrill to the position of 
Connecticut’s Secretary of State in 2011.   
Merrill, a former social studies and civic education advocate, extended support to the 
CCSS-led enactment coalition that captured the attention of the SBOE, which according to 
coalition members had not done so in years. “We knew we had an ally in the Secretary of State. 
She was highly respected and knew members of the BOE. When she threw her weight behind 
this, they realized that this was not simply going to go away,” said one member of the coalition. 
Another member concurred: “We had another secret weapon. … Denise Merrill was totally 




make it virtually impossible for the Department to not fill [the position of social studies 
consultant].”  
Merrill did question in 2015 an aspect of the coalition’s belief and asked whether the 
coalition should consider supporting legislative change seeking to bring the Civic Education 
Initiative to Connecticut.122 According to Sabatier, “coalition members will resist information 
suggesting their deep core or policy core beliefs may be invalid and/or unattainable,” (Sabatier, 
1998, 104). They did just so in this case, successfully convincing Merrill that this type of test did 
not align with deep core beliefs.  According to one member of the coalition on the CEI:  
It is counterproductive to have [students] be able to just memorize the answers on 
a test … with no application, no inquiry, no way to retain the impact on their 
life…What we want is to be able to have students pass the citizenship test because 
they were motivated to know this stuff inside and out because they are passionate 
about it. … That is what the inquiry model is designed to do… the other path 
would have taken all oxygen out of the room and would have been all about 
knowledge [Author interview]. 
 
Although the coalition’s decision to not pursue a test (CEI or other) may have hampered 
implementation efforts to some degree, as will be discussed below, its beliefs dictated a course of 
action focused on Frameworks, not testing. And, even more so, the coalition wanted policy 
change to come from Frameworks to be seen as one resulting from a mobilization of interests 
motivated by the same deep values. The coalition very much wanted the policy outcome to be 
considered, according to one coalition member, as a “story of teachers and an organization 
coming together in order to effect some change” (Author interview). In this regard, the coalition 
was motivated by a desire to get the support and commitment of the future policy implementers 
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and to do so in the policy design phase. Thus, the coalition’s beliefs and its related goal had 
direct effects on characteristics of the policy design, as will be discussed below.  
Origins 
The origins of a given policy directly sets the tone of implementation as it identifies the 
general parameters for implementation and the scope of the intended reforms. An analysis of 
origins, like the one that follows, examines the following: “who advanced the policy; whether it 
originated in the legislative, judicial, or executive branch; and the governmental level(s) enacting 
and implementing it” (McDonnell, 2009, p. 419). The coalition advanced civic education policy 
reform in Connecticut in the state’s bureaucratic educational agency. The outcome was not 
accidental. In fact, as noted earlier, the coalition believed that to end the marginalization of social 
studies the required actions (statement, consultant, and Frameworks) had to come from the State 
Department of Education. In this regard, the intended implementation outcome--the 
Frameworks--had to originate in the state educational bureaucratic agency.  
Additionally, the coalition believed that Frameworks, not a legislated mandate would best 
serve its vision of bringing to Connecticut’s classroom a social studies curriculum that could 
enhance civic education.  The coalition members were skeptical of any type of legislative reform 
on civic education, as past experiences with legislative mandates were not seen as academically 
sound. According to one coalition member,  
There had been legislative activity ... that made civics education at the high school 
a requirement for graduation. … But what happened as a result of that is that it 
trivialized in many ways ... the study of government and civics to a requirement 
and confined it to a semester in high school and not being central to the world of 
public education in the first place [Author Interview].   




Public Act 156, signed into law in 2000 by Governor John Rowland that made a semester of 
civics a requirement for high school graduation.123 A major proponent of that legislation was 
Merrill, who at that time was a legislator and was motivated by what she perceived as “an 
alarming lack of knowledge and interest among high school students about the tradition and 
values of democracy.”124 Merrill attributed this outcome to the “disappearing [of civic education] 
from the curriculum.”124F125 In communicating the new requirement to district superintendents, the 
Department of Education in 2000 noted:  
The civics requirement grows out of a concern that young citizens are disengaged 
from the democratic process. ... The structures of government and the processes of 
how laws are enacted and changed can be a tedious process that can quickly lead 
to a disconnect with everyday life. Relevance to life is imperative for students to 
reconnect with democratic behaviors and institutions as citizens of the United 
States. It is this connection which must be explicitly made for students as a part of 
civics education.126  
The 2000 legislative action generated some controversy. The Hartford Courant published 
an editorial questioning the role of the legislature in crafting education policies, in a vein 
reminiscent of some of the sentiments expressed when Utah was rolling out SB60. The editorial 
noted: “The state Department of Education, not the legislature, should be setting education 
policy. ... [F]or legislators to meddle with graduation standards is a political minefield. Today 
civics, tomorrow the pet subjects of every conceivable constituency.”126 F127 Even more critical was 
an op-ed published in the same paper by Laurence Cohen, a senior fellow from the Connecticut-
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based, conservative think tank, the Yankee Institute for Public Policy. That writer criticized the 
law as follows:  
To understand the prosperity that comes with liberty and free markets requires not only a 
curriculum full of dry stuff about how a law is made, but a dynamic stew of economics and 
philosophy and, if it can survive First Amendment scrutiny, a touch of theology. … The 
informal philosophizing that accompanied the General Assembly’s decision to require 
civic indoctrination suggested that enthusiasm for both politics and voting would rise 
among the youngsters when they were exposed to the wonders of the process. … The road 
to political education is filled with potholes. The answers aren’t always in the textbook.”128  
The coalition members were committed to the Frameworks as a policy solution. They 
were not only skeptical of a legislative mandate, but also of any type of testing including, but not 
limited to the CEI. According to one SDOE official involved with the coalition: 
“ The teachers unions in Connecticut who are very pro civics education but generally 
anti-testing. … I was worried about the use of an assessment that had been developed for 
one thing being used for another and I [was concerned that we] might lose everything 
because … testing was at the time so unpopular with the teachers unions. I wanted to 
keep their support. … Social studies leaders were on the fence about the idea of the 
citizenship test anyway [because some] thought that it put too much emphasis on high 
school [and to the] mandate on the civics class and also [because it] put too much 
emphasis on knowledge and not enough on dispositions and developing a civics 
experience for young children. … It was politically unwinnable” (Author interview).  
 Finally, the coalition’s belief that the policy change had to originate in the SDOE ensured 
(intentionally or not) that the coalition could play a role during the implementation of the 
Frameworks. It did so because the position of SDOE consultant was filled, with the assistance of 
the coalition, with one of its own members: Steve Armstrong. The SDOE social studies 
consultant would be the individual responsible for overseeing the implementation of any state-
led initiative related to social studies. That meant that implementation of the Frameworks that the 
 







coalition sought to bring to Connecticut via the SDOE would be overseen by an advocate and 
ally. For implementation, that matters, because a “critical factors in shaping implementation 
outcomes is the motivation and capacity of street-level practitioners in responding to policy” and 
that response hinges on “whether a political support coalition is mobilized and sufficiently 
influential to press for the resources that street-level practitioners needs” (McDonnell and 
Weatherford, 2016, p. 240).  
Type of Change  
Also relevant for understanding the policy design remains the nature of the change that is 
whether the policy constitutes incremental or major change and doing so matters for 
implementation “because it signals whether existing institutions and political arrangements are 
likely to be disrupted” (McDonnell, 2009, p. 419). The adoption of the Connecticut Frameworks 
could be seen as constituting major policy change because the Frameworks outlined a new way 
to teach social studies. The Frameworks sought to reduce the emphasis that social studies 
teachers had traditionally placed on content knowledge and to encourage a shift in instruction 
toward inquiry, skills, and dispositions. According to one member of the coalition, “the older 
frameworks were more traditional in terms of their scope and sequence and in terms of how they 
framed social studies. They didn’t give as much agency to students [and] weren’t updated to take 
into account the online type of learning” (Author’s interview).  
As major change, the new Frameworks had the potential to disrupt the way existing 
institutions, as in theory they challenged districts to change their social studies curricula and 
teachers to change their teaching methods. As one of the writers noted, one of the goals of the 




and give a multiple choice exam. That’s not what the frameworks are calling for” (Author 
interview). According to a teacher involved in the writing process of the Frameworks,  
 Inquiry is a great shift because it actually moves things from being teacher centered to 
being student centered. We are putting the student in the driving seat. If the students are 
asking the questions, they are more enticed to answer the question. That is the essence 
behind. And, also about the skills that students need to be successful not only in the 
classroom, not only in their career, but in civic life. So, for example, knowing how to 
interact with folks, how to engage in discourse, knowing how to access people of power.  
In practice, however, the policy change may not have been as major for a couple of 
reasons. First, district leaders and teachers were familiar with the Frameworks that were being 
prepared, some by being involved in the writing process, others through seating on the CCSS, 
and others from attending CCSS conferences. This ensured that they and their colleagues were 
familiar with what the state policy would look like and, according to one coalition member, 
“they all seemed to be eager” partly “because it had been languishing,” partly because there was 
not a powerful force against it,” and partly because “it was not getting any attention at the district 
because it was all about science and math. So we knew that a lot of districts would say ‘oh ok. 
This will be neat, interesting, and helpful let’s go ahead’” (Author interview). 
Second, not all teachers followed the previous frameworks, as several interview sources 
notes. According to a district social studies specialist,  
[The] previous frameworks were too generic to please everyone and because they were 
too generic they were never used. They never spoke about a suggested course sequence. 
They would just stay “study conflict, study people.” And because it was applicable to 
everything it became useless. I would argue that what drove us prior to 2015 is really 
good textbooks or whatever teachers decided to do (Author interview). 
Third, some teachers were already teaching along the lines of the new Frameworks. According to 
one social studies teacher, “I don’t know if there has been a big change. … we’ve always made 




a teacher that was always the way I preferred to teach” (Author interviews). According to one of 
the coalition members who was involved in the writing stages,  
I think the way its framed and the way it’s made accessible to teachers is an innovation. 
A lot of those ideas have been around for a very long time. They did a good job in pulling 
all the pieces together and making them meaningful for teachers and students and 
modifying them for a modern society. That is what they did. They didn’t invent all the 
ideas, but pulled them together nicely (Author interview). 
 But the coalition knew that not all districts and not all teachers would feel this way. 
According to one member, “we knew there would be teachers set in their ways that would not 
change what they do.” Coalition members explained that they also knew that the transition would 
simply not be easy even for teachers interested in adopting the framework, so they hoped the 
Frameworks would give “individual teachers who wanted to use it new ideas and help them 
reframe things.” With the knowledge of potential resistance from the implementers due to lack of 
will or lack of capacity to implement, the coalition sought, as will be described below, to acquire 
as much buy-in from some of its policy targets (the district leaders and the teachers) as quickly 
as possible during the policy design phase.  
Policy Targets 
 The policy targets of the Connecticut Frameworks included students, district leaders,  
teachers, and parents. The coalition believed that the Frameworks would give students across 
Connecticut a type of social studies education that would prepare them for citizenship. On 
December 3, 2014, as members of the enactment coalition gathered in Hartford to testify in favor 
of adoption of the Frameworks, the CCSS President, Dan Coughlin noted: “One of the most 
important goals of public education, arguably the most important goal, is to develop well 




classes where students are actively engaged and become better informed every day. Engaged, 
informed students become engaged, informed adult citizens.”129  
The targets were also district leaders, as the coalition aimed that district leaders would 
change their curricula to align with the Framework. According to one member of the coalition, 
“we were hoping that districts would use this as an opportunity to redo their K-12 social studies 
curriculum” (Author interview). If districts redid their curricula, explained this coalition member, 
the Frameworks would reach another policy target, the teachers and would frame “what they are 
teaching [and] the way they think about civics, social studies, and history education” (Author 
interview). According to one member of the coalition, the hope was that district leaders would 
welcome the new Frameworks as “districts often look to the state and adopt the state 
recommendations because they simply don’t have the resources to figure out a whole thing on 
their own. … this saves [them] to pay 10 teachers all summer to try to come up with something 
from scratch.”  
 As noted earlier, the coalition wanted to create a product that would be “winnable” 
among the policy targets: the district leaders and the teachers. Eager to gain the support of future 
implementers, the coalition sought to bring about policy change in a manner that would be 
viewed as not a top-down mandate (such that would originate if the policy change was 
legislated), but also in a manner that would be viewed as a state-led change originating from the 
input of the implementers and one that would constitute the best course of action for the 
longevity of social studies without being a mandate.  
 The enactment coalition knew that to bring the intended result to the students, they 
needed to capture the attention and gain the support of the implementers (the districts and 
 





teachers), as they would be the ones tasked with making their vision a reality. This understanding 
influenced the policy design stage in several ways. First, the enactment coalition knew that the 
new document would have to be called a “framework” and not “standards,” even though as one 
member of the coalition noted, “it provides a lot more than a framework” (Author interview). 
The coalition was aware that Connecticut is a local control state and that Connecticut “schools 
and districts have a lot of flexibility in what they do [and] Connecticut is not really dictating to 
schools and districts and teachers what to do in the way other states are” (Author interview). As 
one member of the coalition noted: 
 Those of us sitting around the table and writing them always said that our target audience 
were teachers knowing that they would be used by district administrators and department 
chairs as well but really we were speaking to teachers. It’s a guide not a mandate (Author 
interview). 
 
 By creating a Frameworks, the coalition hopes that they “made it more likely [for the 
Framework] to be seen as a helpful, supportive document and less likely to be perceived as a 
mandate since we were in a time when there was a feeling [among teachers] that too many new 
things were happening” (Author interview).  
Additionally, the enactment coalition knew that keeping teachers informed about the 
progress made on the Framework was critical for future implementation and used its 
communications with members to update them on the process and the direction in which the 
coalition was heading. In the September 2013 issue of the Yankee Post, Armstrong (as President 
of NCSS) communicated with members that the C3 will be officially released and sought to 
generate support by stating: “This is an exciting document, which has the possibility of greatly 




C3 document is being used to reform social studies instruction in Connecticut.”130 Along the 
same lines, the CCSS devoted its Fall 2013 conference to the topic of “C3-Framework for the 
Future” and brought Kathy Swan (the C3s lead author) to address Connecticut’s teachers. 
The other way the coalitions sought to gain the support of the policy targets, according to 
one member of the coalition, was to include teachers and district social studies leaders in the 
actual writing of the Frameworks, as there was “such an effort to put together an inclusive social 
studies community” that included “K-12 teachers, higher ed folks, and policymakers” (Author 
interview).   The writing team established by Armstrong included teachers, higher education 
scholars, some district curriculum writers and instructional leaders and was a “diverse group in 
terms of background and length of teaching” (Author interview). Author interviews validate that 
this was the case and that the majority of writers had teaching experience, most were practicing 
teachers. The team was divided into two groups: a big one that met frequently to work on the 
details and writing and a smaller group of three or four individuals who, according to one of the 
writers, was “driving the bus” (Author interview). Although some debate did surface within the 
writing team “around world history and the scope that would be covered in different grades” 
(Author interview), it was resolved and did not derail the larger project goal of aligning to the 
C3.  
Finally, to keep all policy targets, including parents, informed of the Frameworks, the 
coalition announced in September 2014 plans to launch a “campaign plan” to present the draft to 
multiple stakeholders, including parents, unions, PTAs, and the local media. 130F131 The campaign 
plan included a press release by the SDOE announcing that new social studies Frameworks were 
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nearly complete that “present a new way of teaching social studies in the Information Age. The 
frameworks advocate that students ‘take informed action, ’that they become active and engaged 
citizens, and directly link to the Connecticut (CT) Core Standards. The frameworks also 
advocate for social studies at the elementary school level, something many districts have put less 
emphasis on in recent years.”132 In the same press release, the Commissioner of Education 
indicated that this was part of the Department’s response to ensuring that students in the state 
receive a “well-rounded education” and that the Framework will provide districts with guidance 
to “help students become active and engaged citizens.”132F133  
As much effort went into keeping policy targets informed and engaged, the coalition was 
not able to curtail all negativity. As the Frameworks reached the final writing stages, reactions 
from local media were mixed. The conservative Bristol Observer, published an article in 
December 2014 highlighting that the Frameworks are “associated with the Common Core 
standards, so critics of those standards are wary of the revisions that may be more subjective than 
changes to math and science.”134 According to the article, “local education activists” were 
“cautiously looking at [the Framework]” because the “social studies curriculum that includes 
history, economics, and disciplines that may include a political perspective are not so easily 
standardized” leading one educator to ask “what’s behind this? What are we marketing here?”  
The article also noted that Republican State Senator Toni Boucher (a member of the 
legislature’s Education Committee) had expressed additional concerns about the Framework. 
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According to the article, Boucher believed that “high school students may be mature and ready 
for courses requiring self-direction, but she doubts elementary or middle school students are 
ready for independent action because they are much more susceptible to being led.”  
The more liberal, Connecticut Post, offered more positive teacher reactions in its own 
December 2014 article, highlighting that the Framework corrects the marginalization of social 
studies and quoted one proponent who argued that the Framework offered teachers something 
that is “unique” and “really smart” and another who claimed that “it gives structure and 
foundation a very complex, deep and multifaceted discipline. Its aim is to create engaged 
citizens.”135 Even with it’s more positive spin, however, the article did include quotes from 
educators who, while excited about the Framework, were also concerned about finding “time” to 
implement them in light of pressures on teachers related to testing priorities: “with our 
professional evaluation resting on the results of student performance on standardized tests, most 
of us are teaching to those tests and not doing the hard and meaningful work necessary to lead 
students on in-depth, meaningful independent study.”  
In January 2015, the liberal Hartford Courant published an editorial highlighting the 
capacity of the Frameworks to enhance civic education: “Although reading, math and science are 
important, the lessons of social studies … are equally vital to producing responsible citizens. The 
new guidelines are aimed at righting that balance. The new guidelines … are a framework, not a 
set of requirements. They advocate and encourage, but don’t dictate, mandate or provide specific 
topics. They also don’t add a standardized test for social studies. But smart teachers will do what 
they can to make social studies once again a vital part of public education.”135 F136  
 
135 Linda Conner Lambeck, “State to Make Social Studies as Vital as 3 Rs,” CT Post, December 1, 2014. Retrieved at 
https://www.ctpost.com/local/article/State-to-make-social-studies-as-vital-as-three-Rs-5926653.php. 







The Frameworks were approved in February 2015 and the enactment coalition made use 
of various policy instruments to galvanize support and compliance of the state led reform among 
districts. Policy instruments can be understood as the “myriad techniques at the disposal of 
governments to implement their public policy objectives” (Howlett, 1991, p. 2). The types of 
instruments used are “bound to engender a different type of politics” (McDonnell, 2009, p. 419).  
Collectively the instruments employed during the policy design phase of the Connecticut 
Frameworks sought to “engender” a positive type of politics by communicating to implementers 
the following points: 1) districts did not have to adopt the state-led reform; 2) districts stood to 
benefit by adopting the state-led recommendations; 3) districts that choose to comply with the 
state-led reform would be supported in doing so by the resources made available through the 
SDOE. 
The first instrument used was the Frameworks document itself which made clear the 
point that this was a guide and not a mandate, as the first page states:  
“It should be noted that the new social studies frameworks are designed to assist 
curriculum writers at the district level as they write or revise the social studies curriculum 
for their districts. This document is not intended to be a state curriculum. In a ‘local 
control ’state such as Connecticut, each district can use the document as it sees fit. 
However, there is much that is new and exciting in these frameworks, and it is highly 
recommended that this document be used as a model of curriculum change in any 
district.”137 
The second instrument was a sustained communications campaign that many 
interviewees referred to as the “travelling roadshow.” The roadshow consisted of a series of 
information sessions aiming to “get the word out” about the new Frameworks (Author 
 





interview). They were led by the SDEO Social Studies Consultant and other members of the 
original enactment coalition and funded by the SDOE.  The financial support resulted, according 
to one coalition member, because “we had a couple of state board members that were really 
committed to do this [support implementation]. If you don’t have highly placed people asking 
how are we doing this, then it’s not on the front burner for anyone” (Author interview).  
The roadshow targeted district superintendents and teachers. The SDEO consultant held 
presentations with administrative councils in various districts consisting of groups of 
superintendents and, according to one source, “it was really those meetings that got the word out 
to highers ups in the districts.” The roadshow also consisted of informational sessions for 
teachers offered by the SDEO consultant in the afternoons and early evenings, to “introduce 
teachers to the Framework and to practice inquiry instruction.”138 Additionally, the roadshow 
included  in-service sessions at the district and school level at the request of a school or 
district.139 Another dimension of the “roadshow” was a vast, targeted communication effort to 
get the word out about the Framework and the opportunities available to teachers. According to 
one coalition members, “there was a lot of outreach broadly to make sure they knew they were 
out there. Emails went to curriculum coordinators and department chairs. A lot of outreach. You 
will be hard pressed to find social studies teachers in Connecticut who don’t know about the 
frameworks, even if they are not using them” (Author interview). Most of this type of 
communication/outreach activity subsided after the Summer of 2016, when the Department 
 
138 Connecticut Council for the Social Studies, Yankee Post (March 2015). Retrieved at http://www.ctsocialstudies.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/YP-Mar15.pdf. 





hosted a three-day summer institute on “Using the Connecticut Social Studies Frameworks and 
Inquiry to Impact Social Studies Instruction.”139F140  
Finally, the last instrument used during the policy design aimed to communicate to 
districts and teachers that the state would support them with implementation. This effort was led 
by the CCSS Professional Development Team in collaboration with the State Department of 
Education’s Social Studies Consultant. The effort was supported through a grant made available 
by the Connecticut State Department of Education.141 The funding would support the following 
activities, which the coalition had identified as necessary as early as November 2014 before the 
Framework was formally adopted: the creation of a companion document to the Framework, a 
series of workshops across the state, a webinar series, summer workshops, and professional 
development activities for individual schools and districts. 142 The companion document offered 
additional information on content and sample teaching material written by classroom teachers for 
each grade level.143 That document was made a few months later (in October 2015) and has since 
been updated with more lessons plans forthcoming.144  
The Department also created a webinar series on inquiry-based instruction, aimed at 
teachers and museum educators and as early as May 2015 held a full-day informational sessions 
for district leaders on “implementing curriculum related to the Frameworks at the district 
level.”144F145 To incentivize district collaboration and learning from one another, the Department and 
 
140 Connecticut Council for the Social Studies, Yankee Post (June 2016). Retrieved at http://www.ctsocialstudies.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/YP-June-16.pdf. 
141 Connecticut Council for the Social Studies, Yankee Post (March 2015). Retrieved at http://www.ctsocialstudies.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/YP-Mar15.pdf. 
142 Connecticut State Board of Education. Minutes of the November 12, 2014 meeting. Retrieved at https://portal.ct.gov/-
/media/SDE/Board/Minutes2014/Minutes_ASA_111214.pdf. 
143 Connecticut Elementary and Secondary Social Studies Frameworks (2015). Retrieved at https://portal.ct.gov/-
/media/SDE/Social-Studies/ssframeworks.pdf. 
144 Connecticut Elementary and Secondary Social Studies Framework: Companion Document (Revised July 7, 2016). Retrieved 
at https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/SDE/Social-Studies/Social_Studies_Companion_Document_8-3-2016.pdf. 





CCSS worked with eight districts that served “model social studies districts” to support them as 
they created curriculum material and that would then be shared with all other districts. During 
the Summer of 2015, the Department and CCSS held two four-day workshops on the 
Framework; one for teachers new to the C3 and the Framework and another for teachers who had 
already started implementing curriculum changes in alignment with these documents.146 Helpful 
in professional development sessions, were Connecticut’s six Regional Education Centers, many 
of which had at the time designated social studies coordinators who led professional 
development sessions for teachers in their districts. According to one member of the coalition, 
the “in the years of the roll out they were invaluable” (Author interview).  
Although the funding provided by the SDOE supported some of the above activities, 
according to one member of the SDOE involved with the Frameworks, it was not sufficient and 
was “dependent” on “a legion of volunteers through the Connecticut Council of Social Studies to 
lift this work and get it off the ground” and the “minimal” funding for the State Department of 
Education may have assisted this effort for the first couple of years but was not extended further. 
More progress could have been made “because we have terrific capacity in that group and 
infrastructure” but that did not happen because of “low resources” (Author interview). In 
addition to volunteering their time, some members of the original coalition obtained grant 
funding from other sources to run professional development sessions in some districts (Author 
interview).  
Institutional Structures and Rules 
 
 





The theoretical framework that guides this study assumes that the policy design affects 
implementation through the institutional structures and rules established. The effect could come 
in the following ways. First, institutional structures and rules have a bearing on how policy 
targets “interpret the policy’s intent, its effects on them, and its likely costs and benefits” 
(McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p.239). If benefits are “uncertain, diffuse, or far into the 
future” and costs “immediate and concentrated on particular groups,” policy targets may be less 
likely to interpret the policy in a positive light (McDonnell and Weatherford, 2016, p.239). 
Second, institutional structures and rules determine whether a given policy comes with resources 
that incentivize “political action” for or against a policy during implementation (Pierson, 1993). 
More specifically, in “allocating resources or in regulating their use, policies create incentives 
for targets to organize to preserve and expand their benefits or to minimize their costs” 
(McDonnell, 2009, p. 420). 
When the Connecticut Social Studies Frameworks were adopted a new set of rules was 
created at the state level regarding social studies. These new rules, however, were meant to serve 
as guidelines and did not mandate district compliance. This in essence weakened the potential for 
groups to mobilize against the policy since, in theory, if they do not want to adopt the 
Frameworks, they simply did not have to. Thus, in an ideal scenario for the enactment coalition, 
all districts would implement the new rules, but even if they did not, those that resisted would 
not have incentive to mobilize against the policies. Noncompliant districts would simply operate 
with their existing social studies rules and miss out on the opportunity to participate in a wider 
project. The policy design did not offer any concrete repercussions for non-compliant districts. 





Additionally, the policy design created a new institutional structure: the SDOE social 
studies consultant. By filling this position with an ally, as discussed earlier, the enactment 
coalition ensured that it would remain involved during implementation. Furthermore, it was 
through this position that the state-led coalition planned to lead and oversee the policy 
instruments employed to strengthen implementation. Without this institutional structure, the 
districts would have simply been encouraged to follow the new rules. Through the institutional 
structure, however, the state policy offered support mechanisms to incentivize district leaders 
and teachers to bring the Frameworks to Connecticut’s classrooms. In this sense, the new 
institutional structure communicated to all districts the benefits of compliance: the state had done 
the work for them (it invested the resources to create the Frameworks), all they had to do was 
align their district curricula to them. Additionally, the new institutional structure would provide 
support to those districts that wanted to do so in the form of professional development to district 
teachers as described earlier. The presence of these support mechanisms, these centralized 
localized resources available to all potential implementers also sought to incentive favorable 
interpretations and compliance during implementation.  
The institutional structures and rules created through the policy design sought to ensure 
wide implementation and policy sustainability by minimizing opposition. More specifically, 
because the Frameworks were not mandated, those districts that did not want to implement them 
could simply not do so without any repercussions that could, in theory, generate mobilization 
against them. Furthermore, those districts that chose to implement them were told through the 
new structures that any challenges that they faced should be handled by asking the state for help 




against the Frameworks.  Finally, by involving implementers during the policy design, as 
described earlier, the policy design also minimized mobilization for opposition.  
The preceding evaluation of policy design phase of civic education reform in Connecticut 
leads to some key findings both of which matter for analyzing implementation outcomes. First, 
the coalition’s theory of action (that reform was necessary at a time when social studies and its 
civic subset was marginalized and that this reform had to come from the state-administrative 
agency adopting new Frameworks) influenced subsequent elements of the policy design. More 
specifically, as Savaya et al. note: “Existence of a theory, whether formal or informal, is 
important to program sustainability. Such a theory would include clear definitions of the target 
population, the need to be met by the program, the expected outcomes of the program, and the 
interventions employed to attain them (Savaya, et al., 2008, p. 479). The coalition aimed to 
incentivize commitment and compliance from the implementers by crafting a policy in a way 
that did not seem like a mandate and in a way that was inclusive. In this regard, the policy design 
phase was used to favorably prime implementers for the reform that they were tasked with 
implementing. The policy design sought to make implementers interpret the policy’s intent as 
beneficial for all policy targets and to communicate to implementers that the costs to them would 
be minimal, as the SDOE would extend supportive mechanisms to roll out implementation. 
Second, the steps taken by the enactment coalition during the policy design phase assured that 
the coalition would remain intact and involved during implementation. Ensuring that the “glue 
that holds the enactment coalition together” does not dissolve is critical for implementation and 
sustainability of a policy as “the essential problem for advocates intent on sustaining a reform” 
rests upon “keeping the enactment coalition united and mobilized during implementation” 





The Implementation Phase of the Connecticut Social Studies Frameworks 
 
With the Connecticut Social Studies Frameworks adopted and an implementation plan 
clearly defined by the State Department of Education and the CCSS coalition members, school 
districts throughout Connecticut were tasked in early 2015 with deciding if and how they would 
respond to the state-led policy reform. To assess factors that contributed to local response to the 
state-initiated policy reform, this study looks at the implementation phase in four districts. The 
criteria for district selection were discussed earlier in this study. The selected districts--Mall, 
Store, Beach, and River, differ in terms of various characteristics including size of student body, 
district location, district political ideology, characteristics of the student body, and per pupil 
district expenditures, as discussed in the methodology section of this dissertation. Table 8 below 
summarizes the implementation outcomes in the four districts.  




















Beach S.S. Coordinator 
present: Y  
Degree of resources 
devoted to 
implementation: High  
High  HS: High 
MS:  High 
Elem: Very Low 
High High Very Low 
Mall S.S. Coordinator 
present: Y 
Degree of resources 
devoted to 
implementation: High 
High HS: Moderate  
MS: High 
Elem: Very Low 




River S.S. Coordinator 
present: N 
Degree of resources 
devoted to 
implementation: low 
High HS:  Moderate 
MS : Moderate 
Elem: Very Low 
Moderate Moderate Very Low 
Store S.S. Coordinator 
present; Y 
Degree of resources 
devoted to 
implementation: low 
Moderate HS: Moderate 
MS:  Low 
Elem: Very Low 
Moderate Very Low Very Low 
 
Note: Implementation outcomes, administrative capacity, and buy-in are rated using a three-level scale: low, 
moderate, high.  
 
As Table 8 shows, district outcomes are assessed at three different levels: high schools, 
middle schools, and elementary schools. Administrative capacity is assessed using two different 
metrics: the district level capacity (meaning the presence of a designated social studies 
coordinator) and the degree to which a district devoted resources to aid implementation of the 
Frameworks.  Interpretive frameworks are assessed at the level of the district (that is the degree 
to which the social studies coordinators and/or district administrators tasked with implementation 
bought into the Frameworks and were willing to implement) and at the teacher level (the degree 
to which the teachers bought into the Frameworks and were willing to implement). The analysis 
that follows describes how these factors affected the implementation outcomes.  
As Table 8 illustrates, Beach achieved the highest success with implementing the 
Frameworks at the high school and middle school level, followed by Mall and River, while Store 
was least successful. The findings suggest that the success of Beach was attributed to the 
following factors: 1) district level administrative capacity, as the social studies coordinator was 
present and the district supported the implementation with professional development, allocated 
resources for curriculum writing to the coordinator and teachers to write curriculum over the 




high rated district interpretive frameworks, as the district level specialist bought highly into the 
Frameworks; 3) teacher level interpretive frameworks rated high at the middle and high school 
levels, as those teachers bought into the frameworks and were willing to implement them. Mall 
district also had the same three factors and was similar to Beach in another respect: they are the 
most relatively-conservative districts of the four studied. However, in Mall district unlike in 
Beach, the teachers were not all equally committed to the Frameworks. In Mall, teacher-level 
interpretive frameworks mattered more for explaining implementation outcomes than district 
level administrative capacity and buy-in.  
River and Store districts had the least level of success with implementation outcomes at 
the high school and middle school levels. Both districts have the lowest performance rates in 
terms of state assessments and are the ones that have the most students categorized as 
economically disadvantaged. Additionally, they both are ideologically liberal districts. River 
district had high district level buy-in, like Mall and Beach, as the director of curriculum was a 
proponent of the Frameworks, but River fell behind the other two in terms of administrative 
capacity as it lacked a designated social studies coordinator to oversee the changes required for 
implementation and devoted low specific resources to the implementation of the Frameworks. 
These factors, combined with moderate buy-in at the teacher level, generated moderate 
implementation outcomes at the high school and middle school levels compared to Mall and 
Beach. 
Finally, Store had the least successful implementation outcomes. Like River, it too 
devoted low resources to implementation, an outcome attributed to competing priorities that 
required that district resources be devoted elsewhere. But, Store is the only district that had 




in as those in other districts. Additionally, in Store teacher level buy-in was moderate at the high 
school level and almost non-existent at the middle school level. The combined district-level and 
teacher-level buy-in generated the poorest implementation outcomes. The findings here also 
suggest that buy-in may matter more for understanding implementation outcomes than 
administrative capacity.  
Of note in Table 8 is the lack of variation in terms of implementation at the elementary 
level in all districts. If competing priorities played a moderate role in determining the 
administrative capacity of River and Store, they played a highly significant role in shaping the 
implementation outcomes at the elementary level in all districts. Despite variations in 
administrative capacity and buy-in at the district and teacher level, the outcome at the elementary 
level was the same across all districts. The Frameworks were introduced at the same time as the 
Connecticut state standardized exam for science. Elementary teachers, even those that bought-
into the Frameworks, collectively indicated that they simply could not undertake both initiatives 
at once. District level leadership also prioritized the science curriculum, which came with a high 
stakes exam. The political environment at the time among teachers was so charged against 
testing that districts recognized that they had to make a choice and they chose science, not social 
studies.  The competing priority here was much more substantial and politically motivated and 
should be treated not as simply a factor that challenged district administrative capacity, but as the 
product of separate forces that had a profound impact on how implementers interpreted the 
policy.  
District-level administrative capacity and interpretive frameworks 
The policy design of the Connecticut Frameworks, particularly the institutional structures 




implementation effort. The institutional structure signaled to implementers that if they wanted 
they could follow the Frameworks and if they needed help in doing so the state would provide it 
through specific policy instruments, but the policy design did not specify who exactly would lead 
the implementation effort at each district. This was certainly intentional and not an oversight to 
incentivize district compliance by telling districts essentially: it’s up to you, you decide how. 
But, by leaving the implementation fluid the policy design contributed to varied district 
outcomes, as a critical factor during implementation was the presence of a social studies 
coordinator at the district level.  
The two districts that had social studies coordinators involved in the policy design phase 
(during the writing and review process of the Frameworks) had better implementation outcomes 
at the middle school and high school levels. In this regard, the strategic efforts of the enactment 
coalition to include district social studies leaders at the design phase mattered for 
implementation. Specifically, it ensured that the institutional structures in place at the district 
level would view the implementation process as a natural extension of a work process that they 
had participated in and not an external “top-down” mandate. In this sense, the policy design 
phase ensured that implementers would view the policy favorably during implementation, a 
factor that would aid with compliance.  
The social studies coordinators of Mall and Beach Districts participated in the writing 
process of the Framework, as did the director of curriculum and instruction at River. The 
coordinator in Store did not participate at all. When the Framework was adopted, the first two 
saw implementation as something that they had to do and as a natural extension of their role as 
social studies coordinators.  “It was my job to educate teachers in my department about the 




inform district leaders, such the Board of Education, about the Framework. In Beach the 
coordinator said: “I was the deliverer … that is what I was there to do.” Their involvement 
during the policy design phase also helped them prepare the teachers of what was about to come: 
“Even as it was being created, I was communicating with teachers telling them this is where we 
are going with this, this is the why. … I have weekly department meetings … It was part of the 
agenda to talk about this,” said the Mall district coordinator.  The comments of the Store 
coordinator, however, suggest that the lack of involvement at the policy design phase made 
implementation less personal and familiar. The coordinator referred to the Framework as a “state 
requirement” that she/he had to work with.  
The scope of the policy design required implementation to rely also on existing 
institutional structures within districts. The presence of a designated social studies coordinator 
made some difference in terms of district-level buy-in, primarily in districts that had coordinators 
who were involved in the policy design phase. In Beach and Mall, where buy-in from the 
existing institutional structures was high, the Framework roll out was completed for the 
secondary level within a year of adoption. In Store, where buy-in was moderate, the 
implementation of the Framework is still a work in progress, as it is in River where the 
curriculum director bought into the Framework, but a social studies coordinator was not present. 
This suggests that an existing institutional structure designated to social studies (the coordinator) 
along with high buy-in generates positive interpretations and aided with implementation.  
Interpretations at the district level, however, were mitigated to a degree by administrative 
capacity. The policy design generated policy instruments that were state, not district specific. In 




implementation, but were encouraged to tap into the state-level resources if necessary. These two 
factors constrained administrative capacity that had a bearing on interpretive frameworks. 
District-level administrative capacity are measured looking at the above two factors: the 
presence of a social studies coordinator147and the allocation of district resources to aid 
implementation. The presence of a social studies coordinator at the district level mattered for 
implementation because it increased the likelihood that a district would implement the 
Frameworks, as a designated individual with expertise in this content area was present. The 
degree to which that actually happened, however, at the four districts studied depended on two 
factors: the resources offered to the social studies coordinator by the district and the coordinators 
involvement with the Frameworks during the policy design phase. Both of these actors had 
spillover effects for the interpretive frameworks. 
More specifically, districts that had social studies coordinators that were, as a result of 
their involvement in the policy design phase, already positively predisposed toward Frameworks 
and offered district-level resources to support implementation, had more positive implementation 
outcomes for middle school and high school. Three out of the four districts studied had a 
designated social studies coordinator: Beach, Mall, and Store. In River, the policies related to 
social studies fall under the director of curriculum and instruction. According to one coordinator, 
the inconsistency has much to do with district financial resources. More specifically, “I think it 
just crystalizes what communities can afford to value. I believe the communities value it but they 
can’t afford to value it. We are a small state with 169 different districts and I love that town 
model, but it’s expensive and they have to make choices. And many districts, especially the 
smaller ones, cannot afford to value social studies”(Author interview).  
 
147 Note that these individuals carry different titles across Connecticut. I refer to them collectively here as social studies 




In Mall and Store, the social studies coordinators were responsible for social studies at 
the middle and high school levels, whereas in Beach the coordinator oversaw social studies K-
12.  In River, the director of curriculum and instruction oversaw the implementation of the 
Frameworks. The social coordinators were responsible for curriculum writing and professional 
development offered at the district level. In Mall and Beach, additional support mechanisms 
were provided at the district level, suggesting that the travelling roadshow resources may not 
have been deemed sufficient.  
 According to the Mall coordinator, “it was my job to educate teachers about the 
Frameworks.” According to the coordinator, the district supported the efforts of implementation 
by establishing dedicated time for professional development and curriculum writing, provided 
pull out time to teachers who got covered from their classes to sit down and rework the 
curriculum, and dedicating some department time to the Frameworks. The coordinator 
interpreted these resources as sufficient and indicated “I felt supported by my administrators.”  
 In Beach the coordinator also oversaw curriculum writing and led dedicated professional 
development sessions. The district here also provided release time for teachers to participate in 
the process and funding for curriculum writing over the summer. The coordinator indicated 
feeling “supported” and enabled to “do what I needed to do.”  
In Store district, however, the district did not provide the same level of resources. 
According to the coordinator, the professional development made available to teachers was 
mostly that offered at the state level, as well as a session offered by one of Connecticut’s 
Regional Education Centers. The rest of the professional development and curriculum writing 
tasks fell to the coordinator. But the district did not offer dedicated PD time, nor pull out time for 




meetings that the coordinator offered and is still underway at the time of this study. According to 
the coordinator, “I had to be intentional with how I planned our meeting time each month so that 
we have time to plan lessons and work on curriculum” (Author interview).  
In River, the absence of a coordinator meant that there was no dedicated individual 
tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Frameworks. The district also did not offer any 
resources dedicated specifically to the implementation of the Frameworks.  Implementation was 
lumped into a larger district initiative that brought together teachers from various grades levels to 
assess district goals related to Common Core, testing, and the creation of standards that align 
with these two areas. According to the director of curriculum, the Frameworks became part of 
that larger discussion: “they were looking at ELA and math curricula and pushing a standards 
driven climate and social studies became part of that larger movement.” Teachers that 
participated in this process wrote curriculum and shared their outcomes with their colleagues in a 
“peer model,  teacher-leader model.” Although the district supported participating teachers with 
release time, the effort was not focused exclusively on the Frameworks as it did in Mall and 
Beach.  
To understand the variation in resource allocation in the four districts, a look at district-
level factors offers some compelling insight. The districts that had the least successful 
implementation, River and Store, have more economically disadvantaged student populations 
than the other two. Additionally, River and Store underperform compared to the other districts, 
on state assessments, including ELA, math, and science.148 River had the second lowest 
performing scores, while Mall and Beach the highest. This finding suggests that competing 
 
148 In Store district, 83 percent of students achieved in 2018-19 mastery level on ELA, 75 percent in Math, and 75% in science. In 
River the percent of students that achieved mastery level on ELA was 95%, 88% in Math, and 88% in science. In Mall and Beach 




priorities, such as districts placing more emphasis and resources on supporting content areas that 
are tested to elevate testing performance may also have affected implementation outcomes of the 
Frameworks.  
The director of curriculum in River explained that when the Frameworks were adopted 
the district was engaging in a process of revising the curricula in a “really broad fashion … 
trying to embrace a structure” (Author interview). The impetus of this revision was the district’s 
underperformance in the state-mandated Smarter Balance Assessments. The district sought to 
redesign curricula in a manner that would identify grade-level mastery benchmarks. Although 
social studies was part of this conversation, according to the director, it did not carry the same 
weight as the tested subjects. As the director commented, “we had to make some difficult 
choices about where to put our energy” (Author interview).  
In Store, an administrator noted that the efforts to implement the Frameworks “worked 
very well in districts that at the time afforded themselves the opportunity.” But in districts that 
are large and urban the priorities are many and competing and instructional time and professional 
development time has to be devoted to other content areas because teachers are worried about 
“evaluations.” So, some districts, like Store, “missed the window of time” and as a result, 
“missed the boat.”  
The combination of district administrative capacity and interpretive frameworks mattered 
for implementation outcomes. But, arguably the outcomes were also affected by the interpretive 
frameworks of another set of implementers: the teachers. District level buy-in, did not 
necessarily align in all four districts with an equivalent enthusiasm at the level of the teachers, as 
will be discussed below.  




In all four districts the district-level coordinators and the director, took concrete steps to 
involve the teachers in the implementation of Frameworks, some in hopes that this would help 
with how teachers interpreted the policy. “Collaboration and buy-in is important. Folks were 
involved with the process of rewriting and revising curriculum,” said the Mall coordinator. The 
same happened in Beach and is still happening in Store, where monthly department meetings at 
the high school level are still being used to draft curriculum to align with the Frameworks. But 
efforts to facilitate collaboration did not lead to uniform, positive interpretive frameworks among 
teachers. Implementation’s longer time frames and multiple decision venues had two effects: 1) 
time enabled teachers to interpret the process as a period of “visible costs without benefits”; 2) 
multiple decision venues offered teachers the opportunity to voice their concerns.  
The benefit of the policy for students—to generate critical thinkers armed with skills and 
dispositions for citizenship—did not resonate with all teachers, but the cost of revising their 
long-established practices (especially for seasoned teachers) did. In Mall, according to the 
coordinator, middle school teachers “bought into the inquiry and a lot of change happened.” At 
the high school level, however, the change has been “slow” said the coordinator because some 
teachers disagreed with the inquiry focus and “believe that in order to prepare students for 
college things like lectures need to continue.” This resistance from the teachers and the 
coordinator’s partial admission that their concerns were pedagogically sound—he said “I guess I 
don’t totally disagree with them”—or the realization that the coordinator was not in a position to 
mandate the shift led to a compromise. In Mall, at the high school level inquiry was incorporated 
into every unit, but not “necessarily every lesson.” Interestingly, the coordinator noted that buy-
in among high school teachers was generated less by support for the Frameworks and more by a 




“emphasized a student centered [approach]. They didn’t ’call it inquiry based but [inquiry] fits 
the model that the evaluation plan promotes. [After that] I saw more effort on their part to adopt 
and change to a more student based inquiry approach.” In this respect, implementation’s longer 
time frame may have actually helped sustain the Frameworks in the district. Because 
implementation did not have a concrete time frame and was continuous, the district coordinator 
was able to strengthen its implementation a while after the initial stages when the district 
evaluation system changed. 
In Store, according to the coordinator, middle school teachers “were the most resistant” 
and high school teachers more willing to align with the Framework. As the coordinator 
explained, “part of that was because of the makeup of the teachers at the middle school. I had 
newer teachers at the high school, whereas at the middle school I had experienced teachers set in 
their ways. The teachers who were more traditional in their approaches were more hesitant to 
take on an inquiry approach especially those teaching for quite a while.” But even those high 
school teachers willing to make the change (about half) needed more support with how to do it 
from the coordinator. The coordinator, as noted earlier, still works with the high school teachers. 
The resistance of the middle school teachers was strong and the task of coming up with a 
curriculum and lesson plans for these teachers was taken up by district administration, because 
according to a district administrator, middle school teachers “don’t think kids could do it [the 
inquiry component] … It’s easier to just say it to them. … Too much telling kids what to think. 
What I’m trying to do is to get the curriculum aligned with the Frameworks.” This suggests that 
resistance from middle school teachers extensively slowed down implementation, as did the 




In River, teachers at the middle school level were not so much resistant to the changes 
that the Frameworks required as they were hesitant because they required training on how to use 
the inquiry model of the Frameworks. According to the curriculum director, “our middle school 
teams find it challenging at times.” The director noted that the district has given the teachers the 
time that they have requested even if it has meant rolling out the Frameworks in a slow manner.  
According to the curriculum director, middle school teachers are “moving toward inquiry more 
and more and embracing that model. They are always refining their practices but they are 
moving in that direction.”  At the high school level, implementation of the Frameworks in the 
district has been more challenging in AP courses that do not align with the C3 focus on inquiry. 
Outside of the AP courses, the director noted that “teachers do implement it.”   
Only Beach district did not experience variation in terms of teacher-level interpretive 
frameworks at the middle school and high school level. In Beach, both middle school and high 
school teachers bought into the Frameworks. According to the coordinator, teachers certified in 
social studies “had been waiting for this.”  The coordinator explained that the middle school 
teachers “grabbed it a lot” and “had no trouble” understanding and implementing it, as they saw 
it as a tool that aligned well with middle school content and instruction.  The high school 
teachers in the district also welcomed the Frameworks. According to the coordinator, this buy-in 
at the high school level had much to do with the fact that their curriculum “was already in line 
with what the frameworks provided and part of that was because the people that wrote the 
frameworks on the high school side were high school teachers and wrote what they already 
knew. So, there wasn’t much work to be done.”  
The local politics engendered at the district level varied and so did the implementation 




reform at the state bureaucratic level, it did not experience the same level of success when it 
came to implementation.  The analysis finds that implementation on the Frameworks was most 
visible at the middle school and high school levels in each distinct, but not to the same degree, 
nor uniformly and certainly not with the vigor envisioned at the state level immediately post-
adoption. The analysis also finds that implementation of the Frameworks at the K-5 levels failed 
in all four districts. The finding of varied implementation at the middle and high school level is 
not surprising given that in implementation variation is not the exception, but the rule (Honig, 
2006). For the purposes of this analysis the finding matters more in understanding the factors that 
led to this variation (the what mattered more and what didn’t in each district). However, the 
finding of lack of variation of implementation at the elementary level deviates from the rule. The 
subsequent analysis engages with understanding the factors that interacted to generate this 
unexpected, compelling outcome. 
Competing priorities coming from the external political environment had a direct, critical 
bearing on how teachers interpreted the policy, particularly at the elementary schools. More 
specifically, as shown in Table 8, whereas teacher interpretive frameworks are rated high or 
moderate for middle schools and high schools, the ratings for elementary school are given as 
very low.  Teachers did not interpret the Frameworks in the same manner when it came to 
elementary schools. The timing of the Frameworks played a critical role.  
The adoption of the social studies Frameworks coincided with adoption of Connecticut’s 
Next Generation Science Standards and the latter came with a state standardized test. For 
elementary school teachers the science standards added another layer of expectations at a time 
when some had just started to adjust to the new expectations of the ELA and math Common 




this.  Being a tested subject, science took priority for teachers and for school districts, as “the test 
assigned to them affects the accountability rating for districts in Connecticut” (Author 
interview). Resistance from elementary school teachers came from general unhappiness with 
test-based accountability which then influenced reactions to social studies as well. For 
elementary school teachers, the Frameworks were simply one more burden that they could not 
endure at a time when they were held accountable for the other major content areas: math, ELA, 
and science. To retain their writings districts made choices to focus on the other areas and to put 
social studies at the elementary level on hold.  
According to a member of the enactment coalition, “If you are going to do quality work 
in reading and math that takes time. Then when science was added because it’s something that is 
tested, now we care about that too. Now we have to make sure that science is taking time, which 
carves out less time for social studies. That is a problem for the social studies community.” 
When being created, the Frameworks placed particular emphasis on elementary schools, as the 
coalition members knew that social studies was particularly marginalized at that level as a result 
of the common core accountability expectations.  
Their efforts, however, were not sufficient because district implementation required, as 
explained above, more than new rules. So, the implementation of the Frameworks in elementary 
schools was minimal at best and in most cases nonexistent, as they came at a time when the 
priority was student performance on math, science, ELA, and accountability. The experiences of 
the four districts studied, as will be described below, are telling of the interpretive frameworks of 
teachers.  
 In River, according to the director of curriculum, prior to adoption of the Frameworks the 




“teachers did their passion projects in social studies not aligned across the grade level … they all 
taught what was of interest to them. The benefit of that is that you get a lot of depth but not a lot 
of consistency. So the middle school teachers would say that [students] show up and they know 
different things and it was not skill driven, it was content driven.” While the Framework was 
seen by some in the district as an opportunity to generate more consistency, “the push on science 
took their eye off the prize.”  
While a discussion of the Framework implementation was lumped into the work of the 
district-established committee, the focus of that group was on accountability as the district at the 
time when the Frameworks were adopted was “looking at ELA and math curricula and pushing a 
standard driven climate.” Social studies, according to the director, became “part of that larger 
movement” and the committee did include some social studies teachers. It also included 
elementary school teachers, mostly volunteers (some of whom really wanted to be there and 
some who said ‘if I have to volunteer for something I’ll do this’).  
According to the director, all elementary school teachers who participated “were very 
professional, engaged, and curious” but also “practical about the limitations to implement [the 
Frameworks]” in the environment of competing priorities as well as “their own limitations in 
terms of content and how that would out in an inquiry model.” The concerns voiced by the 
teachers, along with the district’s desire to maintain performance in the new accountability 
structure forced district leaders “to make some difficult choices about where to put our energy.” 
According to the director, the district did not ask elementary schools to emphasize social studies, 





 In Beach, the Frameworks for the coordinator aimed to serve as “a catalyst to ensure that 
we didn’t go down the road of eliminating social studies in favor of ELA, math, and science.” 
For elementary schools in the district, however, they failed to achieve that purpose because of 
competing priorities. According to the coordinator, the most challenging aspect of implementing 
the Frameworks was at the elementary level. “I did a lot for the younger grades because it was 
needed. A lot of our teachers weren’t as familiar.” All efforts to align the elementary curriculum 
were undertaken by the coordinator including rewriting curriculum, leading team meetings with 
teachers, writing unit plans and doing model lessons. “I would go in and teach for a week to 
show the teachers how to do this and what type of activities we were looking for and how we 
wanted kids to demonstrate what they are learning,” he said.  
Aware of the ELA and math demands on the teachers, the coordinator created unit plans 
that connected to what they were doing in those areas. But the efforts did not lead to any 
substantial implementation of the Frameworks in the elementary schools as teachers were and 
“are still being forced to focus on ELA and math.” When it came to implementation of the 
Frameworks at the elementary school level, the coordinator did not feel supported by the district 
“when I knew that they would say ‘that’s really great, but focus was still on ELA and math. ’
Teacher evaluations were still focused on ELA and math. They were being evaluated on those 
scores.” This district response could partially be explained by the fact that Beach had the highest 
level of student proficiencies from all districts studied, making it very likely that district 
administrators had a stake at preserving that status.   
 In Store, the coordinator did not “deal much with elementary teachers” but knew that 
when the Frameworks were adopted these teachers were “overwhelmed not resistant.” The 




standardized exams. The district responded to competing demands with prioritizing ELA, math, 
and science and the frameworks were not implemented in the elementary schools. Efforts to 
align the elementary school curriculum have started in recent years, as the district started to focus 
on social studies across all grade levels making the teaching of it a daily occurrence in a K-12 
progression. The curriculum writing effort for the elementary schools has been led by the 
assistant superintendent, who noted that successful implementation of the Frameworks rests on 
district buy-in and administrative capacity, but also support and buy-in from teachers. “Teachers 
need to see the connection of what has been deemed as an effective performance of teachers 
[through the teacher evaluation system]. …Teaching with a curriculum aligned to the 
frameworks will make you a better teacher except people are afraid of change and they need to 
be supported for change instead of being yelled at that they didn’t change yesterday,” said the 
assistant superintendent, and added that teachers need a comprehensive curriculum and to 
“become part of the process, to read the frameworks, and unpack it” something that not all 
districts have capacity to do, but Store hopes to acquire.  
 Interestingly, Mall made use of all these techniques when attempting to implement the 
Frameworks at the elementary level, but the outcome was still not all that successful, primarily 
because of conflicting priorities, but also the lack of a designated social studies coordinator at the 
K-5 level. According to Mall coordinator, at the time of implementation of the Frameworks the 
district came to “ask about becoming coordinator for K-5 unofficially” and to look at how “we 
could embed civics education as part of the learning K-5.” The coordinator was asked to work 
with elementary teachers to find a way to “embed social studies daily” in ELA. The elementary 
school teachers “were very receptive to the idea of having a curriculum” because one did not 




on math and English which are tested subject areas.” The coordinator viewed the district’s 
unofficial invitation as a “positive move” that showed that the district was starting to prioritize 
social studies at the K-5 level something that “you could tell by the fact that there was no K-5 
instructional leaders in my subject area, but there was in others.”  
The coordinator met regularly with a team of elementary school teachers who were given 
time to come to the central office for meetings, an initiative that the district supported by using 
funds from the district budget to support the creation of the new curriculum. According to the 
coordinator, “I sat with teachers and told them I don’t teach K-5. Let’s create something that you 
will actually do not something that is perfect that will never happen. So we created something 
that they could feasible work in.” The team created the curriculum that “went over very well”, 
but it was not uniformly implemented across the district, as the teachers in the face of competing 
demands required more than a curriculum: they needed lesson plans. “I didn’t understand how 
much K-5 teachers rely on premade resources,” said the coordinator, adding that “in the 
secondary world that I lived in up until then, they actually would be disgruntled if you tell them 
how to teach something. If you give them premade or pre-canned stuff they will push against it 
because you are limiting their creativity. But at the K-5 level, and I understand it now because 
they have so many other subjects to teach and so many other components to their day, they are 
looking for a lesson.” When the coordinator came to this realization an attempt was made to 
encourage teachers to fill this void: “I said you guys are the leaders, let’s do this. When you have 
a lesson that works well, share it with me and I’ll share it out with the rest. And that didn’t go 
very well. I just didn’t get a lot of lessons. And then I started making them and sharing them out 
and I wasn’t getting much feedback and my job because very busy…that was my shortcoming at 




implement the Frameworks at the elementary level but that that effort required an extra step that 
was not granted because of additional constraints: “The only thing they didn’t give me was a K5 
coordinator or liaison but in fairness the way the budget is in our town that was not feasible.” 
 When it came to implementation of the 2015 Connecticut Social Studies Frameworks, 
elementary schools were the Achilles heel. Since the Frameworks were adopted, little has 
changed in how social studies and its civic component is delivered in the state’s public schools. 
The enactment coalition knew that elementary schools would be a challenge, but they did not 
anticipate the degree to which competing priorities would overshadow the Frameworks in 
elementary schools. Five years after adoption, according to one member of the enactment 
coalition, “Social studies in the elementary level has taken a back seat because it’s not tested. 
Since science came on board to be tested in Connecticut elementary teachers had to make room 
in the school day to prepare for that test so they pinched away social studies. They will tell me 
we teach it, but they do in the language art block. That is not doing the historian’s craft. The 
consequence of that is that every district is different and there is no equity. When [students] 
come to the middle schools they arrive with different vocabulary, different understanding of 
concepts, and that is a disservice.” The individual added, and other social studies teachers and 
leaders concurred, that “implementation and fidelity depend on the teacher” and that “trumpets 
need to be sound about the inequity.”  
 
How the Politics of Implementation Shaped Future Policies: K-5 Social Studies Initiative  
 
This study is guided by the hypothesis that all of the factors that impact the politics of 
implementation interact in a manner that generates a politics that have some bearing on 




“these factors, resulting from a given policy and the politics it creates, then shape and constrain 
the direction and scope of future policies,” (McDonnell, 2009, p. 420). An outcome, as noted 
earlier, is deemed sustainable “as long as the basic objectives and means remain unaltered” and 
as long as there is no “strategic retreat on objectives” (May and Jochim, 2013, p. 433). When the 
interaction of these forces during implementation generates a politics that encourages the 
mobilization of interests seeking to terminate it or scale it back, the feedback effects produced 
are said to be negative. In contrast, when these forces generate a mobilization of interests that 
seek to “reinforce” the existing policies, the feedback effects are positive (McDonnell, 2009, p. 
420).  
In Connecticut, the feedback effects generated during implementation were not negative, 
even though there was variation in implementation outcomes in middle schools and high schools. 
That varied implementation outcomes did not contribute to challenged sustainability in 
Connecticut, even though they did in Utah. The difference can be attributed to two factors. First, 
unlike in Utah, variation of implementation outcomes in Connecticut at elementary and middle 
school levels resulted from an interaction of administrative capacity, interpretive frameworks, 
and district-level competing priorities. Although interpretive frameworks were primary, they 
were shaped less so by policy design and more so by the interaction of other factors. Second, in 
Connecticut, the policy design was more robust than in Utah in its efforts to curtail negative 
interpretations. Teachers that interpreted the policy negatively were less likely than those in Utah 
to blame the policy itself, as they were all primed well to preserve it as a much needed, long-
missing policy aiming to solidify the place of their profession.  The lack of negative feedback 
effects in Connecticut can also be explained by the lack of variation of implementation outcomes 




not like the Frameworks, but more so that they simply could not implement them at that moment 
in time.  
The policy design element, however, that was most impactful in mitigating for negative 
feedback effects, and thus for challenges to policy sustainability was the following: the 
enactment coalition in Connecticut included social studies coordinators and that coalition had 
remained united and played an active role during implementation. The unity of the coalition was 
made possible because of the institutional structure introduced at the policy design phase:  the 
social studies specialist at the State Department of Education, who was a prominent member of 
the enactment coalition. That the coalition remained active during implementation enhanced its 
ability to ensure that localities remained committed to its goal, but also gave little opportunity to 
opposing interests at the state or the local levels to offer a competing vision of civic education. In 
this sense, the policy design phase ensured that “the glue that held the enacting coalition 
together” did not dissolve and the policy would be sustainable (McDonnell and Weatherford, 
2016, p. 237).  
In all four districts when some middle and high school teachers did not respond favorably 
to the Frameworks because they did not agree with them pedagogically or they because they 
simply felt not trained enough to implement them, the social studies specialists (almost all 
members of the original coalition) stepped in to offer support through professional development 
and even to make compromises in how the Framework would be implemented. Additionally, 
when social studies specialists across the districts understood the elementary challenge they 
quickly channeled it back to the other coalition members, particularly to the SDOE, which 
responded promptly with the K-5 Initiative. Thus, that coalition members were active during 




critical difference. Even in Store, which had the least successful implementation outcomes, the 
feedback effects were not negative partly because a new district administrator was a member of 
the original enactment coalition and also communicated out the elementary challenge. That 
Connecticut did not have negative feedback effects is a testament to the critical role that the 
policy design plays during implementation.  
The feedback effects prompted a mobilization of interests seeking to create new policies 
that would reinforce the existing one. This mobilization effort included the original coalition: the 
SDOE social studies specialists, members of the CCSS, social studies coordinators, and teachers 
(thereafter called the K-5 Coalition). Their goal was to reinforce the existing policy by 
strengthening its weakest element: creating resources and tools that will aid implementation of 
the Frameworks in elementary schools. 
Motivated by a desire to bridge the equity issue and, once again, the marginalization of 
social studies at the elementary level, the CCSS President announced in the Spring of 2020 that 
“our vision is for a world in which all students are educated and inspired for lifelong inquiry and 
informed civic action” and that to that end “we are embarking on a project with the State 
Department of Education to develop a curriculum for K-5 educators based on the State 
Frameworks.”149 The President highlighted that the project, the K-5 Social Studies Initiative, 
“will involve coordination with elementary school educators and administrators to be sure the 
end project is useful and user-friendly.”150 The Initiative is chaired by a K-5 social studies 
educator and a district assistant superintendent who in consultation with the State Social Studies 
 
149 Connecticut Council for the Social Studies, Yankee Post (March 2020). Retrieved at http://www.ctsocialstudies.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/YP-Mar-20.pdf. 





Consultant and other teachers will work to create a social studies curriculum for elementary 
school.  
According to a teacher familiar with the Initiative, “In Connecticut you have so many 
varied curricula on social studies and that’s not good because it’s not fair.” The individual noted 
that the CCSS met with the former Connecticut Commissioner of Education, Miguel Cardona, to 
discuss the need to establish a K-5 curriculum to serve as a tool that could help alleviate the issue 
of equity. The Commissioner was responsive, as the K-5 curriculum would serve as “Cardona’s 
tool to say to districts ‘here’ because in the past superintendents have said we can’t do [social 
studies and civics] in elementary schools. We have no tools, no guidance. So, Cardona said, if 
we build it, they will come. If we build these tools, they will do it.” Members of the Initiative are 
hopeful that teachers will “endorse” this because “what we often hear from elementary school 
teachers is that they are not specialists and too busy with science, math, and ELA. … They want 
a packet. They want to know what to teach and to know here is the materials. They don’t want to 
write it.”  
Another member of the Initiative noted that the curriculum will aim to help districts that 
“lack the internal capacity to implement high quality social studies instruction.” That was a 
lesson learned from the implementation of the Frameworks which, according to this individual 
“worked well in districts that at the time afforded themselves the opportunity.” Capacity at the 
district level, according to this member of the K-5 Coalition, includes having time to prioritize 
social studies in the face of competing priorities and time to pay attention to communications and 
happenings related to social studies, as well as designated social studies coordinator and 
someone at the district “championing the work.” Because not all districts have this, 




K-5 coalition members noted that the planned curriculum document, with funding that 
will be provided by the State Department of Education, “will be easy for districts to implement.” 
A member highlighted that the document must also be crafted in a way that will gain the support 
not just of the district, but mainly the teachers: “You have to be really careful about how you roll 
it out because if you roll it out as if it’s one more thing to do teachers are just going to throw 
their hands up in the air. So, you have to really roll it out in a way that is positive and that people 
can see that it’s feasible to teach social studies within the framework of [their] day. If they think 
it’s another add on, it’s not going to happen.” To achieve that, one member of the initiative 
noted, will require the participation of many elementary teachers in the project representing a 
plethora of Connecticut school districts. According to this individual, social studies at the 
elementary school level is “a totally different animal. … It’s not that we don’t want to do our job. 
It’s just that we have to find time to do our job” and that this job includes teaching to standards 
of all content areas, meeting accountability expectations, and meeting the social emotional needs 
of a younger student population.  
 Although the project remains in very early stages, and was delayed by the onset of the 
pandemic, one member of the initiative envisions that it would be prudent for the curriculum 
created to be tested in classrooms through pilots. According to a member of the initiative, “You 
can put something on paper. If you haven’t tried it out with real children, you just don’t know. A 
member of the initiative also noted that buy-in will also be required at the district level and 
success will depend on “salesmanship” and the capacity of the initiatives ’members to convince 
district leaders (starting with Boards of Education) that social studies education at the elementary 




the kindergarten level.” To achieve this dual buy-in, “the curriculum development itself needs to 
come from the bottom, but how it’s pushed out needs to come from the top.”  
 The K-5 initiative comes at a time when some districts are starting to focus again on 
social studies, as the science standards have by now been well integrated. In River, according to 
the director, the district has started to shift its focus back to social studies at the elementary level 
because, according to the director, “we want to do better” because “we’ve mastered some things 
and now are ready to move on.” The solution for the director requires making elementary school 
“more interdisciplinary” and acknowledging that “we can’t have these robust standards that don’t 
talk to each other because the teachers simply don’t have enough time.” In elementary schools 
were the demands for literacy, phonics, math, and reading interact with social emotional work, 
“if science and social studies are stand-alone events outside of these areas, then [the teachers] 
don’t have enough time in their day.” According to the directors, “we need to look at how we 
write units that talk to each other more because content is a great way for our youngest most 
inquisitive learners to master those skills. But we haven’t integrated that … and that is probably 
because secondary people write the standards frequently.” Additionally, teachers, including those 
in elementary schools, are asking the district to “revisit social studies” as “there are some drivers 
right now if you look at the political landscape that are bringing urgency to our social studies and 
civics curriculum.” For the director this is a positive development for social studies and civics 
because “from a priority perspective it’s a good thing that the teachers are asking for that because 
a year ago they were saying we don’t have the bandwidth. We are doing reading, math, literacy, 
and science. … I think there is just a renewed sense of ownership of social studies instruction.” 
 References to the current political landscape and to its interaction with social studies 




government classes are afraid to talk about topics even if the kids want to. I think politicization 
of the climate makes it very difficulty. … I know that schools for the last 5-10 years have tried 
hard to avoid the politicization of teaching civics and social studies. And despite the greatest 
efforts that teachers have gone through to avoid the third rail just this week they were accused of 
trying to teach kids to hate America. … I wasn’t doing it and I got blamed for doing it when I 
wasn’t. So, you know I might as well go and do it.”  
For other social studies leaders, the current political climate serves as an opportunity for 
social studies and civic education. According to one member of the original enactment coalition 
and the K-5 Coalition, “I think we are more relevant now then we’ve ever been. I think the 2016 
election energized people to start concerning themselves about the state of social studies and start 
to wonder about it. I think it’s a very important wave to use and to continue with. The internet is 
also playing a huge role because of kids being on the web and not vetting sources that they are 
using. And it’s just a practice of discipline in a democracy. …There is a revived interest in this. 
It would be a sin if teachers ignore this moment and don’t delve into these issues.”  
 Perhaps the current context will give momentum and relevance to the K-5 Initiative, or 
that political context may change by the time that work is completed. What is certain, however, 
as the analysis of the implementation phase of the 2015 Frameworks demonstrates, once again 
buy-in and capacity, at the district and teacher levels, will matter. If and how the policy design of 
this new initiative will be constructed to help deliver this buy-in and capacity remains to be seen. 
What also remains unclear is the level of support that the K-5 Coalition will receive from the 
State Department of Education, as Cardona, who has an affinity for matters of equity, has since 
left to serve as Biden’s Secretary of Education. This makes the success of the K-5 Coalition 




will be in Connecticut. Certainly, another potential outcome to consider, would be the influence 
that Cardona could have, at the helm of federal initiatives, both on the K-5 Coalition and civic 
education in general. The COVID-19 pandemic also delayed the work of the initiative and it 
remains uncertain if the funding necessary to support it will be provided by the State. The 
outcome remains to be seen and evaluated. 
Conclusions from Connecticut 
 The above analysis of the implementation of the Connecticut Social Studies Frameworks 
describes how the enactment coalition—motivated by a particular theory of action on the 
direction that social studies and civic education should take in Connecticut—managed to capture 
the attention of the State’s bureaucratic educational agency, which subsequently adopted a policy 
that sought to alter the way by which students across Connecticut ’public school were educated 
in social studies and prepared for civic participation. A visual illustration of the politics of 
implementation and sustainability through the lens of policy feedback perspective appears in 
Figure 5 below.  





As shown in Figure 5, the characteristics of the policy design predisposed most district-
level implementers to interpret the policy in a positive way as a result of the following. First, it 
ensured that district social studies specialists were highly involved in the enactment phase of the 
Frameworks, either as members of the enactment coalition and/or as writers of the Frameworks. 
This involvement secured district-level buy-in and commitment to this one policy and that during 
implementation they would in essence “fight” to secure compliance. By and large, district-level 
implementers viewed the Frameworks as a much needed, well-established policy that should be 
implemented. Additionally, the policy design helped prime positive interpretive frameworks at 
the teacher level. Through policy instruments, like the travelling roadshow, sustained 
professional development opportunities, and framing the Frameworks as a “win” for the entire 
social studies community, the enactment coalition at policy design communicated to teachers 
that this Framework was very much theirs and that they would have state support during 
implementation. Finally, that the Frameworks were spearheaded by the CCSS (the teacher 
organization), adopted by the State Department of Education and not the legislature, and that 
they were a Framework and not a mandate predisposed most teachers to view them favorably.  
The policy design in Connecticut, much like in Utah, left implementation to school 
districts and, thus depended on the interpretive frameworks and administrative capacity of 
implementers at the district and teacher levels. The policy design, as noted above, set the tone for 
positive interpretive frameworks. At the middle and high school levels most teachers interpreted 
the Frameworks positively (although seasoned teachers did not agree with some aspects). Thus, 
the varied implementation outcomes in Connecticut at the middle and high school levels can be 
understood by looking at the impact of administrative capacity, competing priorities, and teacher 




was not equally available in all districts, as not all had the same level of resources to devote to 
this task primarily because of district focus on other content areas. At the high school and middle 
school levels, the implementation outcomes varied with some districts moving quickly to 
implementation and others needing more time as a result of these constraints.  
At the elementary school level, the implementation outcomes were very much a factor of 
teacher interpretive frameworks and competing priorities. In all four districts elementary school 
teachers interpreted the Framework as not attainable given competing demands. They largely 
ignored the policy. In practice, this means that social studies in Connecticut’s elementary school 
remains disjointed, marginalized, and depended on the amount of time and/or interest an 
individual teacher chooses to devote to the subject. District level social studies specialists did not 
push back on teachers, suggesting that in the face of competing priorities at the district level 
social studies coordinators have less power. More specifically, as some social studies 
coordinators indicated, districts made a choice at that moment in time to prioritize science and 
there was little, if anything, that they could do to stop that.  
The varied implementation outcomes in Connecticut, however, did not contribute to 
feedback effects seeking to challenges to policy sustainability. On the contrary, the feedback 
effects that were generated prompted the K-5 Coalition to create new policies that would 
enhance the existing one.  This outcome can be explained by a key element of policy design: that 
the enactment coalition remained intact and heavily active during implementation. This 
continuity enabled the coalition not only to motivate local action, but also to block any challenge 
at the local or state level. Additionally, it enabled the coalition to control interpretive frameworks 
at the district and teacher level and channel potentially negative feedback in a manner that would 




enactment coalition meant that no other path would be promoted at the state bureaucratic level at 
least (the legislature would be a different story). When negative interpretations were generated at 
the level of the teachers, they landed at the feet of district level implementers who interpreted the 
Frameworks positively and very much as a product of their doing, thus willing to work to sustain 
it and to communicate challenges back to the core coalition. That enabled the core coalition, 
which was still very active during implementation, to respond swiftly and to mobilize to offer 

















CHAPTER VIII  
LESSONS FROM LOCAL RESPONSES FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
 
Civic education is once again at the center of education policy debates. Starting in 2014, 
policy reform has been enacted in 48 states and, with some exceptions, has consisted of state 
legislatures and State Departments of Education embracing one of two (and in many cases both) 
national initiatives: the College, Career, and Civil Life Framework for Social Studies State 
Standards (C3) and the Civic Education Initiative (CEI). Both initiatives were born out of 
sustained advocacy efforts of nonprofit organizations responding to a perceived marginalization 
of civic education as state and national education policies became more narrowly focused on 
testing, math, and literacy. The initiatives come at a time of high partisan polarization in 
American politics when many on the political left and right view civic education as a possible 
solution to the erosion of American democratic ideals.  
 The initiatives offer competing visions of civic education with the C3 focusing on 
inquiry and the cultivation of skills and dispositions and the CEI on content knowledge and 
testing. They constitute the latest manifestations of a debate that started a long time ago and seek 
to provide an answer to the question: how can civic education affect civic outcomes? Both 
initiatives were launched in the early 2010s to solidify the place and value of a civic education. 
They came at a time when newly available data, including but not limited to declining NAEP 
scores, was interpreted as indicating that American public education was in a dangerously critical 
moment for civic education. The two initiatives sought to provide a solution to the perceived 
crisis. C3 advocates argued that an educational experience that offers a social studies curriculum 
grounded in inquiry, critical thinking, and informed action will enhance the civic outcomes of 




requires that students pass the US Citizenship and Naturalization exam will enhance these 
outcomes. The competing visions signify that in that moment in time civic education may also 
have become polarized.  
Both initiatives managed to capture the policy agendas of state legislatures and State 
Departments of Education. Since 2014, 42 State Departments of Education have revised their 
social studies standards (or adopted social studies Frameworks) aligning with the C3. Somewhat 
paradoxically, given the conflicting dimension of the initiatives, 21 of these states adopted both 
the C3 and the CEI. Additionally, 4 states opted to pursue the CEI only. This dissertation sought 
to understand the degree to which these national initiatives that successfully captured state policy 
agenda actually trickled down to America’s classrooms and, if they did, the degree to which they 
remain sustainable. To do so it analyzed the implementation and sustainability of civic 
education policies in four school districts in Utah (adopted both the CEI and the C3) and four in 
Connecticut (adopted only the C3). Utah and Connecticut were two of the first states to proceed 
with civic education policy reform, with the former adopting the CEI in 2015 and the C3-
inspired Utah Core Standards for the Social Studies in 2016 and the latter the C3-inspired 
Connecticut Social Studies Frameworks in 2015.  
The study was particularly interested in assessing the degree to which the implementation 
and sustainability outcomes differed in school districts in Utah and Connecticut, given that the 
Utah districts were tasked with responding to dual mandates emanating at the state level but the 
Connecticut districts faced only one mandated program. Of particular interest was also assessing 
outcomes by accounting for variability between districts stemming from size, characteristics of 




To assess implementation and sustainability this dissertation mobilized a conceptual 
framework drawing upon scholarship of policy feedback. It hypothesizes that district level 
implementation outcomes can be understood by analyzing how elements of the original policy 
design (that is characteristics of the policies determined at enactment) and competing priorities at 
the district level (exogenous to the policies themselves) interacted to constrain and/or aid the 
willingness and capacity of implementers (district administrators and teachers). The dissertation 
views this interaction as a politics that becomes visible during implementation and explains 
implementation outcomes. The politics was captured through two variables: 1) interpretive 
frameworks of district level administrators and teachers (defined as the the degree to which 
district administrators and teachers were willing to implement a policy based on how they 
interpreted the policies--their level of buy-in); 2) administrative capacity (that is the degree to 
which a district had the ability to implement a policy based on resources). Consistent with policy 
feedback scholarship, the conceptual framework further hypothesized that the politics of 
implementation contributes to feedback effects that prompt subsequent mobilization efforts by 
interest groups seeking to challenge or strengthen the sustainability of an existing policy.   
The study mobilized this conceptual framework and made use of a qualitative case study 
research design to achieve its research objectives. This chapter summarizes the study’s main 
findings and discusses their implications for research and practice.  
 
Summary of Analytical Findings 
 
In both Utah and Connecticut implementation of the policies varied between and, in some 
cases within, the school districts studied, but the sustainability of the policies was challenged 




willingness of teachers (more so than district administrators) to implement the policies. That 
willingness had much to do with how teachers interpreted the policies. These interpretations 
were the product of policy design, competing priorities coming from the external political 
environment, and individual teacher philosophy and motivations.  
Although districts in both states exhibited a similar level of variability in terms of 
implementation outcomes, the paths that they took in terms of sustainability were different. In 
Utah, a coalition of interest groups, referred to in this study as the New Civics Direction 
Coalition, sought to repeal SB60 (the law that brought the CEI to Utah) and to take civic 
education in a direction less connected to the Standards (the Utah version of the C3) and more 
oriented more toward action civics. In Connecticut, on the other hand the coalition that 
mobilized, the K-5 coalition, sought to create policies that would strengthen the Connecticut 
Frameworks (the state’s version of the C3). In this sense, policy sustainability was challenged in 
Utah, but not in Connecticut. The varied sustainability outcomes stem from differences in the 
policy design and that school districts in Utah were asked to respond to dual, conflicting 
mandates. These findings are discussed in greater detail below.  
 
Implementation Outcomes in Utah and Connecticut 
In Utah state policies were not implemented in a uniform manner across districts and, to a 
degree, not even within districts. Several characteristics of how the policy was designed at 
enactment contributed to these outcomes because they influenced how district level 
administrators and teachers interpreted the policies. In the case of implementation of SB60, 
several policy design characteristics that impacted the interpretive frameworks of implementers. 
First, the policy came from the legislature and, as noted earlier in this study, teachers in Utah 




design left it up to the USBE to guide districts with implementation of SB60, but the USBE did 
not share the legislature’s enthusiasm for the policy and was more interested in developing an 
alternative policy: the Standards (the Utah version of the C3). Thus, it devoted little time and 
resources to helping districts and made no effort to oversee implementation. The USBE passed 
the responsibility of implementation down to the districts. This in essence meant that districts 
were now the primary level shaping policy implementation and that empowered district 
administrators and teachers to act based on their own interpretations of the policy.   
All ofour districts studied in Utah, proceeded with some level of implementation of 
SB60, but they did not do so with the same level of commitment or enthusiasm. Only one of the 
four districts made a comprehensive effort at the district administration level to implement SB60 
and achieved a level of uniformity in when and how teachers administer the civics exam. That 
this district proceeded this way with regard to SB60 was attributed to a relatively high degree of 
buy-in at the district and the teacher level: the district administrators and the teachers interpreted 
SB60 favorably and were, thus, willing to implement. The favorable district level interpretations 
resulted partly from to the personal perceptions of the district social studies coordinator who 
appeared to simply like SB60, but more so to the fact that this district had a student body 
population that was high performing and had a vested interested in seeing its high school 
graduation rates maintained at their existing levels. That the teachers interpreted SB60 favorably 
in this district can be attributed to two factors. First, the district level administrators devoted 
time, resources, and energy to creating a district-specific exam that aligned well with the 
curriculum of the 12th grade US Government and Civics course in which the exam would be 
given. Second, the majority of teachers in the district were already using the naturalization exam 




As a result, teachers in this district did not interpret SB60 as a threat to their practices, nor as a 
task that had to be implemented with high, visible costs to them. So, the district proceeded 
smoothly with implementation. 
In the other three districts in Utah, however, both district level administrators and the 
teachers did not interpret SB60 favorably. All district level administrators had little interest in 
devoting capacity and resources to aiding teachers with the implementation of SB60, primarily 
because they did not view the civics exam as a top-down mandate not capable of producing its 
intended outcomes. The administrators in these districts were more interested in other forms of 
civic education, such as the Standards or civic-action programs. So, district administrators made 
no efforts to aid or shape implementation other than deciding that the exam would be 
administered in the 8th grade and uploading that exam in the district’s assessment portals. This 
left the mechanics of implementation (how those exams would be administered, when during the 
school year, as well as how (and if) students would be prepared for it) to the discretion of 
teachers within the district.  
Teachers in these three districts were already predisposed to viewing the exam 
unfavorably because it came from the legislature. In some cases (primarily in schools that had 
students who could not pass the test with ease) the little support that teachers received from the 
district level exacerbated their interpretations of the exam being a burden with high, immediate 
costs for them and no benefit for their students. In other cases, the teachers interpreted the low 
district level commitment to implementation as a sign that this exam was not to be taken 
seriously and was just a “hoop to jump through.” This interpretation was further enhanced by the 
fact that districts were not required to collect and report any data on student performance on the 




student graduated from high school. The task of ensuring that the requirement was met was 
viewed by administrators and teachers at the high school level as a “bureaucratic nightmare,” as 
students who had not taken the exam in 8th grade (because they missed it the day it was given or 
moved into the district late) now had to be pulled out of classrooms at the high school level and 
prepared to pass this exam to graduate.  
In Utah, the implementation outcomes in each of the four districts were even more varied 
when it came to the second state-led policy, the Standards (the Utah version of the C3).  How the 
Standards were implemented varied not only between districts, but also within, again an outcome 
attributed to how implementers (and primarily in this case teachers) interpreted the policy. Much 
like with SB60, several characteristics of the policy design shaped these interpretations. First, the 
Standards came from the Utah State Board of Education (USBE) and teachers in Utah are 
predisposed to view policies coming from this entity more legitimately grounded in educational 
practice. This makes teachers less likely to resent or resist these policies, but not necessarily 
willing to comply with it. That these Standards were not tied to a state level, high-stakes exam 
(as they are in other content areas) signaled to teachers that their implementation was in theory 
highly encouraged, but, in reality, optional. Second, the policy came with supportive efforts from 
the USBE to incentivize district compliance (and encourage teacher buy-in), as professional 
development sessions were offered to teachers. But these efforts were not comprehensive and the 
USBE played a minimal role in incentivizing compliance post-enactment. The policy was 
designed in a way that left implementation up to the districts. So, much like with SB60, how the 
Standards would be implemented rested on the discretion of the districts and once again 




In the four districts studied, district level administrators demonstrated higher variability 
in how they interpreted the Standards compared to SB60. One district interpreted the Standards 
very positively and devoted substantial resources to ensure implementation, another simply did 
not like the Standards and devoted resources to making a district-version of them. In another 
district the district level administrator liked the Standards but had no resources to devote to 
implementation, while the last district administrator simply did not believe that the Standards 
went far enough to encourage civic outcomes so devoted resources to another civic education 
program.  
How teachers interpreted the Standards in all four districts, however, was much more 
uniform. In all districts the teachers were not enthusiastic about implementing the Standards. 
This lack of enthusiasm had little to do with actions at the district level and much more to do 
with their own interpretations of the Standards, competing priorities, and teacher philosophy. 
The Standards did not come with a high-stakes exam, as noted earlier. For some teachers, 
primarily seasoned, veteran teachers, that meant that their implementation was optional. These 
teachers did not see the reason to change what they considered as effective teaching practices, 
especially because their teaching methods would have no bearing on student performance on an 
exam. Additionally, some teachers did not believe that the Standards were in any way superior to 
their existing practices. Even in districts that sought to incentivize uniform implementation of the 
Standards through benchmark testing, teachers still felt empowered enough to exercise their 
discretion when it came to implementation. In these districts, most teachers said that they 
adjusted their curriculum to incorporate those elements that would appear on the test, but did not 




Additionally, some teachers indicated that they lacked the time required to faithfully 
implement these Standards because their schools had reduced the time allocated to social studies 
instruction because the district prioritized student performance in literacy and mathematics. 
Other teachers indicated that student composition in their respective schools did not allow them 
to implement the Standards as the abilities of their students varied. Finally, some teachers did not 
like the inquiry arc of the Standards, nor did they believe that the Standards could increase civic 
outcomes. Thus, how the Standards were actually implemented varied not only by district, but in 
some cases by school, and in other cases by classroom. Teachers in Utah may not have resented 
the Standards as much as they did SB60, but they certainly ignored, and in some cases resisted, 
implementation.  
In Connecticut, the implementation outcomes of the Connecticut Social Studies 
Frameworks (the state’s version of the C3) can be understood, much like in Utah, as a product of 
characteristics of the policy design and competing priorities. In terms of policy design, several 
characteristics played a critical role. First, the enactment coalition that convinced the State 
Department of Education to produce the Frameworks was led by the Connecticut Council for the 
Social Studies (an organization composed of teachers). The social studies specialist at the SDOE 
was a member of this original coalition. This ensured that the Frameworks were faithful to the 
vision of the original coalition and that that teachers would be predisposed to view them as a 
product that belonged very much to them, decreasing the likelihood that they will be resisted. 
Additionally, to ensure further that the policy would not be viewed as a top-down mandate the 
USBE called it Frameworks and not Standards. Second, social studies coordinators from most 
districts were highly involved in the writing process of the Frameworks, something that further 




they would work to ensure compliance. Third, the USBE rolled out a robust effort (much more 
so than Utah) to aid implementation by offering professional development, training and 
informational workshops, and personalized visits to school districts.  
These elements helped prime district level administrators and teachers to interpret the 
Frameworks positively during implementation. The findings of this study indicate that these 
elements were successful in doing so, particularly at the level of district administrators. All 
district level administrators interpreted the Frameworks positively, particularly the three who 
played an active role during enactment. When it came time for implementation these 
administrators devoted time and resources available at their disposal to ensure that teachers 
brought the Frameworks into their classrooms. The one administrator who did not play a role in 
the creation of the Frameworks also interpreted them favorably but did not exhibit the same level 
of commitment or will to implement them swiftly, an outcome attributed also to not having 
adequate resources or time to devote to working with teachers. Although this dimension partially 
explains the varied implementation outcomes in Connecticut, the factor that was primary was 
very much so teacher level interpretations resulting very much so (and much more than in Utah) 
from district administrative capacity, competing priorities, and teacher motivations.   
 In one of the four districts studied, implementation of the Frameworks at the middle and 
high school levels was very robust, as a result of the following factors: the district level 
coordinator was very supportive of the Frameworks, the coordinator had access to resources 
needed to aid implementation (i.e. funds for curriculum writing, teacher time to work on 
curriculum, professional development in addition to what the SDOE offered); teachers 
interpreted the Frameworks positively, felt that they had expertise to implement or were given 




aligned with the Frameworks. In the other three districts, however, these elements were not 
always present.  In some districts, teachers needed help to gain expertise necessary to adjust their 
teaching practices to align with the Frameworks and districts did not have resources to devote to 
this need, sometimes because the district prioritized other content areas. In other districts, lack of 
resources constrained the ability of coordinators to spend an adequate amount of time with 
teachers that needed help, thus delaying implementation.  
 At the elementary level in Connecticut the implementation outcomes were not varied. In 
all four districts, the Frameworks were not implemented. In practice, this means that social 
studies in Connecticut’s elementary school remains disjointed, marginalized, and depended on 
the amount of time and/or interest an individual teacher chooses to devote to the subject. The 
lack of variation in outcomes at the elementary resulted from lack of variation in how teachers 
interpreted the Frameworks. The adoption of the Frameworks coincided with the adoption of 
Connecticut’s Next Generation Science Standards and the latter came with a state standardized 
test. For elementary school teachers the science standards added another layer of expectations at 
a time when some had just started to adjust to the new expectations of the ELA and math 
Common Core Standards that Connecticut adopted in 2010.  Most teachers in all districts 
interpreted implementation of the Frameworks at this time as simply impossible given competing 
demands. Being a tested subject science took priority for district level administrators as well. 
Thus, district level social studies specialists did not push back on elementary teachers, and any 
efforts they made to help them were short-lived. At the elementary level, unlike the middle and 
high school levels, most teachers simply interpreted the policy not as not desirable, but as not 




compliance, the competing priorities crippled mobilization. The outcome speaks volumes about 
the impact that teacher interpretations of the policy had on shaping implementation outcomes.  
 In both Utah and Connecticut, the policy design left implementation of civic education 
policies to the districts. This characteristic empowered implementers, primarily teachers, to play 
a critical role during implementation and teachers, as discussed above, did just so. How teachers 
in both states interpreted the policies played a critical role in determining implementation 
outcomes. The interpretations of the teachers varied as a result of differences in the policy 
design, competing priorities, individual motivations, and the degree to which district level 
administrators had the will and capacity to aid teachers with implementation. The factors 
generated varied interpretations at the level of the teachers and, as a result, varied 
implementation outcomes in both states.  
Overall, however, the findings suggest that teachers in Connecticut were less resistant to 
implementation than those in Utah. This can be explained by two factors. First, the policy design 
in Connecticut was more robust in securing positive interpretations from teachers and district 
level administrators. Second, implementers in Connecticut were not asked to implement dual 
mandates, as they did in Utah. That teachers were not asked to implement two competing models 
concurrently, made the perceived cost of implementation lower in Connecticut than in Utah. And 
even though in Utah some implementers did see SB60 as only a “hoop” to jump through and the 
Standards as something that they could follow at their discretion, the dual mandates prompted 
some teachers to view both policies as one “hoop” too many given competing demands and 
priorities. Additionally, district level administrators and teachers in Connecticut did not indicate 
that they would support the Frameworks because they preferred another type of civic education. 




Standards over SB60, and in some cases a competing, action-civics oriented model (that was 
being advanced in some districts through a partnership with an external organization) over both.  
 
Sustainability Outcomes in Utah and Connecticut 
 
Although school districts in both states exhibited a similar level of variability in terms of 
implementation outcomes, the paths that they took in terms of sustainability, as noted earlier, 
were different. The politics of implementation, stemming from the interpretations of 
implementers, generated not only varied implementation outcomes, but also contributed to 
feedback effects that then prompted interest groups in both states to mobilize and to pursue new 
policies.  
In Utah, the varied implementation outcomes of both SB60 and the Standards challenged 
the original expectations of the enactment coalitions to give Utah’s students access to a civic 
education experience that would uniformly impact their civic outcomes.  How the civics exam 
and the Standards were actually implemented in Utah’s classrooms varied widely. Varied 
implementation outcomes and those that “are not consistent with policymakers ’expectations can 
contribute to negative policy feedback that cycles back into new enactments that weaken the 
initial policy” (McDonnell & Weatherford, 2016). In Utah, these negative feedback effects 
produced at implementation prompted a coalition of interest groups, referred to in this study as 
the New Civics Direction Coalition, (comprised of legislators, representatives from Utah’s 
largest teacher union and the USBE, stakeholders from various civics-oriented groups, and led 
by an external organization that had an interest in promoting an action-civics type of civic 
education), to join forces and advance two new legislature policies (HB152 and HB334). 




civic education in Utah in a new direction. HB334 called for maintaining the civics test while 
also creating a pilot program to assess methods for implementing a high school requirement that 
all students in Utah complete a civic engagement. Action civics emphasizes the need for students 
to engage in civic-oriented experiential experiences in a much more dynamic and systematic way 
than the informed action component of the C3 Framework.  
The members of the New Civics Direction coalition viewed SB60 as a misguided 
mandate that could not achieve its intended objective. Additionally, the absence of uniform 
implementation of the Standards, signaled to members of the Coalition, primarily the USBE 
representatives, that the Standards alone were not sufficient to incentivize teachers to move civic 
education in the direction of inquiry, skills, and dispositions that could enhance informed action 
as the C3 envisioned. The Coalition viewed the Standards as inadequate and the civics test as a 
hurdle that may have contributed to teachers simply feeling inclined to ignore state mandates all 
together. So, the New Civics Direction Coalition sought to undo both and to take Utah’s schools 
in a single “action civics” direction via a gradual, legislated experiment that they hoped would 
eventually morph into a new uniform state-wide policy applicable to all districts. That teachers 
had not uniformly embraced the Standards or SB60 made their task even easier to some extent, 
as the new policy had less chances of being viewed as yet another mandate that would require 
teachers to change their practices. HB152 did not pass in the legislature and HB334 did only 
after it was amended to maintain the civics test, but it did not receive requested appropriations to 
launch. 
In Connecticut on the other hand, the politics of implementation may have produced 
varied implementation outcomes, but they did not lead to a mobilization of interest groups 




feedback effects that were channeled into new enactments seeking to sustain the existing policy. 
The difference in these outcomes can be explained by looking closely at elements of the policy 
design in Connecticut and the absence of dual mandates.  
As noted earlier, in Connecticut the policy design characteristics ensured that 
implementers would be predisposed to view the standards favorably and as a long overdue 
guideline designed to help them solidify the place of social studies at a time when it was fading. 
The varied interpretive frameworks of teachers had less to do with ideological resistance to the 
Frameworks and more to do with having support from the district to implement them. In this 
sense, the policy design ensured that any feedback effects generated would be primarily positive. 
Most importantly, however, the policy design ensured that any skepticism that could surface 
during implementation would not threaten the policy itself. It did because 1) the enactment 
coalition in Connecticut included social studies coordinators and educators who remained active 
during implementation 2) the coalition remained united and played an active role during 
implementation. The unity of the coalition was made possible because of the institutional 
structure introduced at the policy design phase:  the social studies specialist at the State 
Department of Education, who was a prominent member of the enactment coalition. That the 
coalition remained active during implementation enhanced its ability to ensure that school 
districts remained committed to its goal, but also gave little opportunity for any opposing civic 
education model to gain traction at the state or at the local levels.  
Thus, district level implementers made substantial efforts ensure implementation at the 
middle and high school levels and their efforts were constrained only by competing priorities and 
limited administrative capacity that influenced teacher interpretations. Additionally, when 




perceived by teachers as realistic given competing priorities, they communicated that outcome to 
other members of the enactment coalition who remained very much involved in implementation. 
This enabled the coalition to mobilize and to channel that feedback efficiently into the creation 
of a new policy, the K-5 Initiative, that sought to enhance, not undo the Frameworks. 
 Thus, the policy design in Connecticut contributed to feedback effects that prompted 
mobilization efforts seeking not to challenge the existing policy, nor to generate new ones that 
would retreat from its original objectives. In contrast, the mobilization efforts in Utah aimed to 
challenge the sustainability of both SB60 and the Standards. The efforts failed with respect to the 
first, as HB152 did not pass and HB334 did only after it was amended to preserve the civics 
exam. But, the passage of HB334 does indicate that the mobilization efforts related to the 
sustainability of the Standards were successful, as the new policy aims to change the direction of 
civic education in Utah.  
That SB60 was not repealed, however, may also suggest that policies emanating from 
legislative mandates may be more sustainable than those emanating from the bureaucracy. With 
HB152, the New Civics Direction Coalition asked Utah’s legislature to effectively reject one 
type of civic education model and to replace it with another. The legislature was not willing to 
make that choice and opted instead to enact legislation that paved the way (as appropriations 
were not made for HB334) for the coexistence of two competing civic education mandates in 
Utah’s public schools. In theory, if HB334 receives the necessary fiscal note to move forward 
and the results of the pilot program are favorable, then subsequent legislation will emerge 
making action civics a state-mandated requirement in Utah, while the civics test will remain. 




Additionally, the varied sustainability outcomes were be related to dual mandates. The 
differences in the policy design in both states generated different feedback effects and, as noted 
earlier, these feedback effects were very much connected to the politics of implementation, and, 
therefore, to how district administrators and teachers interpreted the policies. In Utah, these 
interpretations were shaped by various factors, among them, however, a preference to focus on 
one type of policy over another. Additionally, that the USBE made a concrete choice to invest 
more resources and time in incentivizing district leaders and teachers to comply with the 
Standards, also impacted the degree to which districts and teachers viewed SB60 less favorably 
than the Standards. In Connecticut, on the other hand, the policy design, as described earlier, 
ensured that any impact that the interpretations of implementers would have on feedback effects 
would be positive. School districts were asked to respond to one state mandate and the policy 
design secured that no competing civic education models would be considered.  
 
Implications for Research and Practice 
The findings offer scholarship feedback scholarship an additional empirical case study 
demonstrating that policy sustainability is contingent upon elements of a policy’s design. 
Additionally, the findings from Connecticut and Utah suggest that school districts operate in 
institutional contexts that leave them room to ignore or superficially respond to state mandates 
and national initiatives.  That implementation outcomes were varied and principally driven by 
how teachers interpreted the policies suggests that school districts have the ability to respond as 
they see fit to shape policies enacted at the state level. The findings also suggest that teachers 
react differently to initiatives from the legislatures than to those coming from state education 




ignored, or resisted.  Finally, the findings demonstrate that sustainable policy outcomes are not 
always equitable outcomes, suggesting that those looking to civic education policies as a means 
to foster equitable civic outcomes, may have to look elsewhere. The findings have implications 
for research and practice, as will be discussed below.  
 
Policy Sustainability is Conditional and More Likely if State Mandates are not Divisive 
As noted earlier in this study, policy feedback scholarship has solidified that policies 
create politics that in turn shape new policies but has faced some challenges in identifying 
precisely when and why some policies generate feedback effects that aid sustainability (positive 
feedback) and others do not.  Comprehensive attempts to answer this question have been made 
by Patashnik and Zelizer who argue that feedback effects that reinforce policies (positive 
feedback) are contingent upon elements of the policy design that create the proper conditions to 
give policies the institutional support required and to generate interpretive effects among policy 
targets that will further sustain them. The policy design produces positive feedback if it provides 
adequate resources to gain support of its policy targets and/or when it adequately conveys to its 
policy targets how they stand to benefit by it (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2009). Additionally, 
positive feedback that aids sustainability when “enactment phase decisions undercut or destroy 
the institutional bases of support of the reformers opponents” (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2013, p. 
1076). Feedback scholars also emphasize that what happens after enactment may also impact 
sustainability. Positive feedback effects stand a better chance if a policy could rely upon 
institutional support and is able to “call upon state capacities” (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2013, p. 




The findings of this dissertation offer the field of policy feedback scholarship another 
empirical case study that validates that policy sustainability is conditional on elements of the 
policy design. The factors identified above as having a bearing on the production of positive, 
self-sustaining feedback were all present in Connecticut, and for the most part absent in Utah. 
Through the instruments created by the policy design (primarily the social studies coordinator at 
the SDOE who advocated for and gained material resources from the state to aid with 
professional development and communications), the Frameworks gained the support of most 
policy targets. Additionally, the enactment coalition communicated effectively to implementers 
that the policy stood to benefit them because it resulted from the long-term efforts of their 
colleagues (the Connecticut Council of the Social Studies) to create Frameworks that were much 
needed to solidify the place of social studies at a time when it was being threatened.   
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly as noted earlier, that the social studies 
coordinator appointed at the enactment phase who would be responsible for carrying out 
implementation and that the social studies specialists overseeing were members of the original 
coalition destroyed any institutional bases for possible opponents. The people tasked with 
managing implementation of the policy were at the helms of the institutions responsible for 
carrying out implementation. Finally, when the policy during enactment showed weaknesses, 
particularly at the elementary level, it had the capacity to call upon the state for additional 
institutional support. Thus, the policy design enabled the policy in Connecticut to remain 
sustainable in spite of varied implementation outcomes.   
 The findings of this study further validate the arguments made by feedback scholars that 
sustainability of a policy is less likely if the politics of enactment are divisive (Patashnik and 




feedback and political sustainability, as the trajectory of the Common Core in several states (i.e. 
Tennessee and Indiana) illustrate, a divisive enactment can undermine the credibility of a policy 
and prompt citizens and, arguably policy targets, to “conclude that there must be something 
wrong with a new law” if it was opposed (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2013, p. 1077). Sustainability is 
threatened further if divisiveness at enactment resulted from partisanship (Patashnik and Zelizer, 
2013, p. 1077).  
The enactment phase in Utah exhibited these characteristics. The enactment of SB60 was 
divisive and part of that dynamic was driven by partisanship. SB60 did not pass unanimously and 
those who opposed it were predominantly Democrats. The legislators that introduced SB60, as 
noted earlier in this study, made several concessions to the opposition to ensure that the policy 
passed. Additionally, the policy left implementation completely to districts and did not require 
any reporting mechanism. All this did signal down to implementers that the credibility of this 
policy was questionable.  
Additionally, however, the politics of enactment in Utah were divisive also in that dual 
policies were being created simultaneously. The Standards were being written while SB60 was in 
the legislature and they were adopted just months after SB60 was enacted. The Standards offered 
a competing vision of civic education. The competing visions offered implementers choices in 
terms of which policy to pursue, and the implementation outcomes suggest that they did make 
choices. In making these choices, the implementers, arguably, weakened the capacity of both 
policies to deliver on their intended outcomes and, thus, led to feedback effects that prompted 
interest groups to mobilize as described earlier to challenge the sustainability of both policies. 




identified in this study offer the policy feedback scholarship an additional lens through which to 
assess divisiveness at enactment.  
 
Districts have Room to Ignore or Superficially Respond to State Mandates 
  The varied implementation outcomes in districts in both states suggest that districts have 
room to ignore or to superficially respond to state mandates inspired by national initiatives. The 
district responses to the state mandates were not uniform in Connecticut nor in Utah.  In the case 
of SB60 three out of the four districts responded superficially, whereas in the case of the 
Standards some districts chose to implement them to a degree and others chose to ignore them. 
In the case of the Connecticut Frameworks, the uniformly negative response at the elementary 
level enhances the point that districts had room to ignore a state mandate.  
This finding contributes to scholarly literature seeking to understand the extent to which 
localities continue to play a role in shaping educational policies. The implementation outcomes 
in Utah and Connecticut clearly suggest that when school districts are asked to respond to 
policies enacted at the state level their response will be very much driven by elements of the 
policy design and local factors. The findings also have implications for practice, as they suggest 
that the strategy employed by education reformers of capturing state agendas to promote national 
initiatives may not always yield successful results. More specifically, the finding suggests that 
reformers seeking to bring about changes to education by capturing state agendas should not 
ignore the local dimension where the rubber meets the road. Capturing the state agenda does not 
constitute guaranteed policy success, particularly if the policy design is such that empowers 
localities during implementation.  
 




The findings also suggest that teachers react differently to initiatives from the legislatures 
than to those coming from state education officials with the former more likely to be seen as a 
top-down mandate to be regarded warily, ignored, or resisted. In Utah, most teachers viewed 
SB60 as a misguided, top-down mandate that had little legitimacy as it came from the legislature, 
whereas the Standards were received less negatively by teachers as they came from the State 
education agency viewed as having greater expertise and authority to craft educational policies. 
In Connecticut, the enactment coalition that advocated for the Frameworks made a strategic 
decision at enactment to not pursue change (and, even to block potential policies) through the 
legislature knowing that here too a legislative mandate would be viewed as less legitimate and 
could potentially produce greater resistance.  The degree to which teachers will regard warily, 
resist, or ignore both types of mandates depends on how teachers interpret the policies,  and on 
the extent to which they have expertise to implement it. Part of this reaction was related to the 
fact that in both states the majority of teachers expressed a high degree of confidence in their 
professional expertise and their own ability to identify what constitutes “good” teaching and 
“good” civic education.  
The charged civic education narrative that informed in the early 2000s national 
movements seeking to solve America’s civic problem through education and the subsequent 
policies in Utah and Connecticut appear to have been somewhat distant from classrooms. In both 
states, most teachers in both states did not view any of the three policies as mandates whose 
implementation would make or break the civic outcomes of students. The degree to which they 
were willing to implement them had more to do with how the policies affected them and less so 
with considerations of whether implementation would enhance or hamper the civic outcomes of 




the connection between policy and outcomes, were limited in their capacity to do so depending 
on their level of expertise. The willingness of teachers to implement a policy was partly 
dependent on the degree to which they feel that they have the expertise to do so. Additionally, in 
some cases this level of expertise prompted some teachers to ignore the policies as they perceive 
them as inferior to their existing practices.  
This finding reinforces further the point made earlier that the strategy employed by 
education reformers of capturing state agendas to promote national initiatives may not always 
yield successful results. The finding suggests that policies enacted at the state level stand a better 
chance of yielding implementation outcomes faithful to the intent of state actors if they are not 
legislated and/or if the policies come with resources necessary to enhance the level of expertise 
that educators feel that they require to implement.  
 
Sustainable Does Not Mean Equitable 
Even though the Connecticut Frameworks proved to be a more sustainable policy than 
those in Utah, its implementation was still varied. Although teachers in Connecticut were overall 
more receptive to the state policy than those in Utah, competing priorities, unequal 
administrative capacity, and some skepticism from teachers did generate in Connecticut 
implementation outcomes at the middle school and high school levels that were equally varied to 
those in Utah, and at the elementary level the Frameworks were largely ignored. Although the 
policy remained sustainable, the varied implementation outcomes suggest that policy 
sustainability does not generate equity. Students across Connecticut do not receive the same type 
of civic education, nor its intended subsequent civic preparation. The Frameworks sought to 




Frameworks had in fact the capacity to do so, then this study’s findings suggest that students in 
Connecticut are not being educated and prepared for citizenship equitably.  
For research, the finding has implications as the question of equity has not been fully or 
explicitly explored in policy feedback scholarship. The focus of policy feedback has been to 
explain how politics generated by policy A generate future policy B. In this regard, policy 
feedback has been primarily interested in understanding how the politics generated by policies 
affect policy entrenchment. Research on political sustainability does not assume that 
sustainability is beneficial in some normative sense as a desirable goal of public policy. Rather, it 
remains an analytical exercise that specifies the conditions under which political sustainability is 
likely to occur. In this regard, this body of research is not concerned with assessing if, in fact, 
entrenchment or equity should be the principal goal of policy makers. However, the findings of 
this study suggest that this larger conversation should consider the relationship between 
entrenchment and equity For practice, the finding suggests that those who consider capturing 
state policy agendas as the most optimal means to foster equitable civic outcomes for America’s 
students may have to look elsewhere. As this study demonstrated, enactment of civic education 
policies in state legislatures and adoption of such policies in state bureaucracies does not 
guarantee that the goals or visions of these policies will in fact materialize when the policies hit 
the local level. Policy enactment and policy sustainability may not constitute the means toward 
the desired end. The inherently fragmented nature of America’s educational system guarantees 
that the inputs of actors at the local level has a substantial bearing on shaping the outcomes of 
state-level mandates. If civic education outcomes could be strengthened through civic education 
policies, then these policies need to be crafted in a manner that accounts heavily for the local 




American’s public schools could foster civic outcomes that could strengthen, or save, American 
democratic ideals.  
 
Concluding Thoughts: Implication for the Future of Curriculum Politics 
In 2002, as nonprofits mobilized to launch a “call to action” described earlier in this 
study, 76 percent of Americans believed that civic education did not get the attention that it 
deserved.151 In the years that followed, the subsequent, successful efforts of C3 and CEI 
advocates to capture education policy agendas in 46 states suggest that civic education did 
receive more attention, at least at the state level. The development also signals and that in the 
post-NCLB era, American public education pivoted, somewhat, away from an emphasis on 
testing, accountability, literacy, and mathematics. The degree to which American public schools, 
however, truly underwent (or are still undergoing) a “civic education moment” remains 
uncertain, as the aspirations and goals of civic education reformers encountered challenges when 
the reforms hit the local level where the rubber meets the road. 
In the local education trenches, certainly in Utah and Connecticut, the state-level reforms 
were adopted in some places enthusiastically, in others warily, while in others they were ignored, 
and in some debated. Not all teachers and local administrators shared the enthusiasm of civic 
education advocates and, for some who did, the challenges of implementation overshadowed it.  
The degree to which the emphasis on civics at the state level, was perceived as a “civic education 
moment” at the local level remains questionable. Certainly, the findings of this study, suggest 
that there was a disconnect between the goals and motivations of civic education advocates and 
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those of teachers. This disconnect may have partly been a function of the nature of the initiatives 
themselves, as it is certainly plausible that as educational interventions the C3 and the CEI had 
limitations that made their implementation challenging or not feasible. For example, the C3s 
focus on breadth versus depth may render it challenging to implement and, perhaps, impossible 
to do so in a uniform manner. Additionally, the limited instructional resources accompanying 
both the C3 and the CEI may have additional explanatory power when assessing implementation 
outcomes. By failing to make more apparent how schools and teachers should change what they 
do, both initiatives made it less likely that they would be implemented as the enactors had 
envisioned. The feasibility of the policies as educational interventions may be as significant as 
the factors that I examine as part of the policy design.  
Even more uncertain remains the degree to which American students and parents 
perceived state level actions on civic education as critical or consequential. The civic education 
policy reforms discussed in this study came at the tail end of the very public debates that 
accompanied NCLB and Common Core. Given the varied ideological and pedagogical 
orientations of the CEI and the C3, one would expect to find some degree of debate at the level 
of the local mass publics. These civic education policies were heavily rooted in a long-standing 
debate about the civic purpose of public education, successfully captured almost all state 
agendas, but, somewhat paradoxically, have not (at least not yet) been publicly contested at the 
state or national levels. At the completion of this study, it appears that the C3 and the CEI did not 
spark national, state, or local public debates reminiscent of the social studies standards of the 
1990s or the Common Core.   
The absence of a public debate on the direction that civic education should and could take 




parents) were not paying attention to civic education. The absence of a debate may also suggest 
that parents may not view civic education as an area that has a bearing on civic outcomes, nor 
one closely related to the mission of public schools. Indeed, in 2019 only 25 percent of 
Americans believed that the main goal of public education should be to prepare students to be 
good citizens (the other 75 percent thought those goals to be academic or workforce 
preparation).152 Additionally, one could wonder whether the absence of a response may have had 
something to do with the very ambiguity of the term “civic education.” 
A more likely explanation, however, may be that the absence of contentious local 
reactions could be explained by the fact that the civic education reform that unfolded allowed for 
local adaptation. The implementation of the CEI in Utah was very much left to the discretion of 
the districts, and sometimes the teachers. Additionally, the C3 was intentionally devoid of 
content and called upon state departments of education to incorporate the Framework into their 
state-specific standards. The motivation of reformers and policymakers may have been deliberate 
seeking to generate state-level action, while sparing social studies (or themselves) from the 
backlash associated with the Common Core. In Connecticut and Utah, the Frameworks allowed 
for local adaptation, as districts were highly encouraged, but not mandated, to adopt it and, thus, 
able to exercise a degree of freedom. Implementation, therefore, allowed for adaptation to the 
local context and although that led to variation across jurisdictions, it also generated no counter 
mobilization from the local public, perhaps because local communities may have simply been 
satisfied with the particular outcome. 
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Although the factors that led to the absence of a public debate on civic education reform 
could be debated, what remains more certain is that in the absence of a public response, local 
districts had more room to ignore or warily adopt the reform agendas passed down to them from 
the state. Arguably, districts and teachers may have had less freedom to act as they did on civic 
education implementation if they had parents or Boards of Education knocking on their door.  
Additionally, the intentional lack of specificity of the initiatives may represent a tradeoff 
between policy design decisions that make sense for enactment and policy decisions that increase 
the fidelity of implementation once in place. The politics that unfolded in Utah’s and 
Connecticut’s educational trenches may have looked very different had this civic education 
reform unfolded because of more targeted, specific initiatives or at a period of higher visibility 
when the policies would be more publicly scrutinized both for their content and as educational 
interventions.  
The local politics of implementation may have also been different if districts were asked 
to adopt a different type of civics-related educational intervention and/or if the ask came from 
the federal level. Both scenarios may become a reality in the coming years as the civic education 
conversation did not end with the CEI and the C3. Rather, it continues to evolve at the state and 
national levels, with numerous bills related to civics introduced in state legislatures in 2021 and 
two pieces of legislation in Congress. Additionally, new reports published by the same civic 
education advocates, notably the Educating for Democracy Roadmap and the Educating for 
Civic Reasoning and Discourse attempt, much like their predecessors, to identify best practices 
to strengthen civic education, as they view the latter as explicitly linked to individual and 
collective civic outcomes, values, and virtues.153 Unlike the reports of the 2010s, however, the 
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recent versions appear to better acknowledge the challenges of implementation, as the Roadmap 
outright states that “to change curricula and pedagogy across the United States in any content 
area requires sustained attention to implementation.” Both, however, remain recommendations 
that civic advocates hope will be adopted at the local level.  
At the federal level, the Civics Learning Act of 2021 calls for an amendment to ESSA to 
“increase civics education programs.”154 More specifically, it would require states to “prioritize” 
civics (currently they are only “encouraged” to do so) and expands the use of federal grants to 
civics learning and teaching. It also specifies explicitly what would be considered “civics” and 
calls for an appropriation of $30 million. Additionally, the Civics Secures Democracy Act would 
invest $1 billion to support educational programs in civics and history.155 Both pieces of 
legislation have already been critiqued by some of the political right for placing too much 
emphasis on action civics, and from some on the political left for not going far enough.  
The future of recent nonprofit-led initiatives and federal legislative action remains 
uncertain, but the debates surrounding the content and nature of civic education appear to be 
gaining greater visibility. They all come at a moment in time when we still do not really know 
exactly if and how civic education relates to civic outcomes, nor what type of civic-inspired 
educational intervention remains most effective, for whom, where, and why. While some civic 
education advocates may view federal involvement as the vehicle that could propel states and 
localities to act on civic education, this study has demonstrated that comprehensive civic 
education policy reform could come at the state level even in the absence of a federal mandate 
and but that state-level mandates do not always translate into uniform practice at the local level. 







more contentious local politics. Whatever path civic education takes, it will certainly generate a 
different type of politics in America’s local educational trenches than those observed in this 
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Bills Related to Civic Education Enacted post-2018 by State Legislatures 
  
State Year Bill/Description 
Arizona 2020 H2625: Recognizes a specified date in each school year as Sandra Day O’Connor Civics 
Celebration Day 
Arizona 2018 S1444: Adds American civics education as a requirement for graduation from high 
school. 
Arizona 2018 S1520: Appropriations to Arizona State University related to civic education. 
Arizona 2018 H2561: creates the civics literacy state seal to recognize students who graduate from a 
school operated by a school district or a charter school located in this state and who have 
attained a high level of proficiency in civics. 
Arkansas 2019 H1747: Concerns American heritage in public schools, expands the types of historical 
documents and events that may be discussed, read, or posted in a public school building 
or classroom. 
California 2018 HR12:  Requests the Instructional Quality Commission to consider including content on 
the importance of preregistering to vote in local, state, and federal elections, how to 
preregister to vote, both online and by mail, and the requirements for preregistering to 
vote, as appropriate, in that framework. 
California 2018 A24:  
Requires the Superintendent to establish criteria for awarding a State Seal of Civic 
Engagement topupils who have demonstrated specified excellence in civics education. 
Requires the state board to consider,among other criteria, the successful completion of 
history, government, and civics courses, including coursesthat incorporate character 
education, and voluntary participation in community service or extracurricularactivities. 
California 2018 ACR129:  
Recognizes the importance of civic engagement across the state. 
Colorado 2019 H1192:  
Concerns the inclusion of matters relating to American minorities in the teaching of 
socialcontributions in civil government in public schools, establishes the history, culture, 
social contributions, andcivil government in education commission to make 
recommendations to include the history, culture, and socialcontributions of American 
Indians, Latinos, African Americans, Asian Americans, and the intersectionality 




Florida 2019 H807:  
Relates to civics education, requires instructional materials for a certain civics education 
course tobe reviewed and approved by specified entities, requires the commissioner to 
identify errors and inaccuracies instate-adopted materials, requires such errors and 
inaccuracies to be corrected, requires the commissioner toreview and provide 
recommendations for certain instructional materials and test specifications by a 
specifieddate. 
Georgia 2018 HR634:  
Creates the House Study Committee on Civics Education. 
Idaho 2020 S1238:  
Amends existing law to provide that students may satisfy state civics and government 
standardsthrough participation in a certain course and examination, provides that the State 
Department of Education shallmake available funding for certain purposes, revises a 
requirement for flexible schedules, revises a requirementfor early graduation. 
Illinois 2020 H2265:  
Amends the School Code, provides that every public elementary school shall include in 
specifiedgrade curriculum, beginning with a certain school year, at least one semester of 
civics education, specifies coursecontent requirements, requires the education to be in 
accordance with Learning Standards for Social Science,allows school districts to consult 
with civics education stakeholders, as deemed appropriate by the State Boardof 
Education. 
Illinois 2020 H2541:  
Creates the Reentering Citizens Civics Education Act, provides that the Department of 
Correctionsand the Department of Juvenile Justice shall provide a nonpartisan peer led 
civics program throughout thecorrectional institutions of the state to teach civics to soon 
to be released citizens who will be reentering society,provides for the curriculum and 
eligibility for the program, provides that the program shall be taught by peereducators 
who are citizens incarcerated in the Department of Correction. 
Illinois 2019 H2541:  
Creates the Reentering Citizens Civics Education Act, provides that the Department of 
Correctionsand the Department of Juvenile Justice shall provide a nonpartisan peer led 
civics program throughout thecorrectional institutions of the state to teach civics to soon 
to be released citizens who will be reentering society,provides for the curriculum and 
eligibility for the program, provides that the program shall be taught by peereducators 
who are citizens incarcerated in the Department of Correction. 
Indiana 2020 S398:  
Relates to various education matters, establishes requirements relating to patriotic youth 
membershiporganizations, establishes the High School Equivalency Pilot Program to be 
administered in specified schooldistricts to allow an eligible student to enroll and earn a 
high school equivalency, urges the Legislative Councilto assign an interim study 






2018 S2631:  
Promotes and enhances civic engagement, establishes the Civics Project Trust Fund to 
beadministered by the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education, provides 
for the development of thehistory and social science curriculum framework, including 
civics education in underserved communities.  
Minnesota 2020 H1:  
Relates to education, modifies provisions for prekindergarten through grade 12 including 
generaleducation, education excellence, teachers, special education, health and safety, 
facilities, fund transfers,accounting, nutrition, libraries, Early childhood, community 
education, lifelong learning, and state agencies,makes technical changes, makes forecast 
adjustments, requires reports, appropriates money. 
Minnesota 2018 H707:  
Relates to state government, appropriates money from outdoor heritage fund, clean water 
fund, parksand trails fund, and arts and cultural heritage fund, modifies requirements for 
expending money from legacyfunds, modifies and extends prior appropriations, requires 
reports, relates to establishing a dedicated fundingwebsite, relates to the outdoor heritage 
fund. 
Nebraska 2020 L399:  
Changes the name of the Committee on Americanism to the Committee on American 
Civics,provides duties for the State Board of Education and the State Department of 
Education. 
Nebraska 2019 L399:  
Changes the name of the Committee on Americanism to the Committee on American 




2018 S45:  
Provides that a one-half year civics course shall be required for high school graduation. 
New 
Hampshire 
2018 H1496:  
Modifies requirements for performance based accountability for an adequate education, 




2019 HM45:  
Requests the Public Education Department to form a task force to review civics education 
in schoolsand to propose an improved curriculum to prepare students for the 
responsibilities of citizenship 
New 
Mexico 
2018 SM40:  
Requests the Governor to declare a specified date as Student Online Voter Registration 
New York 2018 S7504:  




New York 2018 S7509:  
Amends various taxation provisions, relates to STAR benefits and the STAR income 
verificationprogram, relates to unclaimed funds, relates to tax credits of qualified 
employers, relates to alimonymodifications, relates to calculation of income relating to 
state income tax, provides for charitable gifts trustfunds, establishes an Employer 




2020 H924:  
Clarifies eligibility for extended teacher contracts, requires completion of an economics 
andpersonal finance course as a high school graduation requirement in public schools, 
clarifies requirements forhigh school civic literacy, requires professional development for 
economics and personal finance 
North 
Carolina 
2018 H135:  
Makes organizational and technical changes to the courses of study statutes, provides for 
a standardcourse of study to include core curriculum, a list of textbooks, standards for 
student performance, graduationstandards, a program for remedial education, class size 
recommendations, and staffing ratios, provides for careerand technical education and 
alcohol and drug use prevention education, provides for reproductive health andsafety 
education provided by local school administrative units. 
Oklahoma 2020 S1041:  
Amends, merges, consolidates, and repeals multiple versions of statutes (including civics 
education). 
Oklahoma 2019 S1041: Amends, merges, consolidates, and repeals multiple versions of statutes 
(including civics education). 
Oklahoma 2018 H3311:  
Relates to schools, relates to school curriculum, requires inclusion of content from United 
Statesnaturalization test in standards, provides for availability of test in specified formats, 
mandates emphasis oncivics in United States Government standards, elates to the 
statewide system of student assessments, modifiesemphasis of United States History 
assessment, requires certain percentage of assessment questions on civics education. 
Oregon 2019 H2023:  
Directs the State Board of Education to ensure that academic content standards for certain 
subjectsinclude sufficient instruction on histories, contributions, and perspectives of 
specified classifications ofindividuals, directs District School Boards, the State Board of 
Education, and committees or officers responsiblefor adoption of textbooks and other 
instructional materials, to ensure textbooks and other instructional materialsadequately 
address roles in and contributions thereof. 
Pennsylva
nia 
2018 H564:  
Amends the Public School Code, relates to high schools, requires each school entity to 
administer alocally developed assessment of United State history, government, and civics, 
that include certain curricula,directs the Department of Education to post on its publicly 
accessible website links to the US Citizenship andImmigration Services Test and other 
relevant materials, requires the Department to conduct electronic surveys ofeach school 






2018 S633:  
Alters the membership, reporting protocol, and meeting requirements of the civic 




2018 H6324:  
Alters the membership, reporting protocol, and meeting requirements of the civic 
educationcommission. 
Tennessee 2020 H944:  
Establishes the Governor’s Civics Seal to recognize public schools and local education 
agenciesimplementing high quality civic education programs. 
Tennessee 2020 H1016:  
Requires students to pass a civics test to receive a full diploma upon graduation from high 
school,requires Local Education Agencies to include all questions from the United States 
civics test, increases thepercentage of questions a student must correctly answer to pass 
the civics test. 
Tennessee 2019 H944:  
Establishes the Governor’s Civics Seal to recognize public schools and local education 
agenciesimplementing high quality civic education programs. 
Texas 2019 H1244:  
Relates to the United States History end-of-course assessment instrument administered to 
publichigh school students and reporting requirements for that assessment instrument. 
Utah 2020 H334:  
Creates a civics engagement pilot program to assess the benefits of, and methods for, 
implementinga requirement to complete a civics engagement project as a condition for 
receiving a high school diploma,provides for training of teachers in schools participating 
in the pilot program, requires schools participating inthe pilot program to submit a report 
to the State Board of Education 
Utah 2019 H140:  
Amends provisions regarding civic and character education, repeals one report and 
amends thereceiving entity for another report on civics and character education. 
Virginia 2020 S957:  
Revises the membership of the Commission on Civic Education, repeals the sunset 
provision for theCommission. 
Virginia 2019 H399:  
Relates to school boards, relates to work based learning experiences for students, requires 
eachschool board to implement a plan to notify students and their parents of the 
availability of internships,externships, apprenticeships, credentialing programs, 
certification programs, licensure programs, and other workbased learning experiences. 
Washingto
n 
2020 SR8618:  






2018 SR8618:  
Recognizes the importance of civic education. 
Washingto
n 
2018 H1896:  
Expands civics education in public schools, Require school districts to provide a 
mandatory stand-alone civics course for all high school students and support the 
development of an in-depth and interactiveteacher professional development program to 
improve the ability of teachers throughout the state to providestudents with an effective 
civics education from kindergarten through twelfth grade. 
Washingto
n 
2018 S6032:  
Makes supplemental operating appropriations, relates to the general fund (including 
civics education) 
Wisconsin 2018 A64:  
Relates to state finances and appropriations, revises several appropriation line items 
(including civics education). 
 
















Civic Education Policy Reform, 2014-present 
Reform Type Percentage of States Number of States States 
C3 Framework Only 42% 21 California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware,, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, Vermont 
CEI Only 8% 4 Alabama, Idaho 
Pennsylvania, Texas 




Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire,  North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin 
 
Notes: Five states have not pursued reform in line with the C3 or the CEI, including Alaska, 
Florida, Maine, Rhode Island, Wyoming. The CEI was introduced (with outcome pending) in the 













Interview Protocol for District Administrators 
Opening questions: 
1. I would like to start by requesting first that you state that you offer your consent to be 
interviewed and that you are aware that our conversation will be recorded.  




1. Please provide me with your job title and describe your main responsibilities. 
2. How long have you had his position? Where were you before? What motivated you to 
seek this position?  
3. How are your responsibilities similar or different to your previous role?  
 
On Civic Education General questions 
1. How do you define civic education?  
2. What do you consider to be the district’s position on civic education?   
3. What do you consider to be the state’s position on civic education? What are the goals? 
What has led you to believe this?  
4. What has motivated the state to enact civic education policy reform? 
5. What steps has the state taken to enact this reform? What steps has the district taken? 
6. Can you describe the politics of the recent civic education reform at the state and local 
level?  
On the Recent Civic Education Reform questions 
1. How was civic education delivered in this district prior to the state’s most recent civic 
education reform?  
2. Please share with me the goals of the state’s recent civic education reform as you 
perceive them.  
3. How has civic education changed in the district in response to the recent civic education 
reform?  
4. What communication have you received from state department of education guiding the 
implementation process of the recent civic education reform? 
5. What resources has the state made available to assist your district with the 
implementation of this reform?  





7. Has the district initiated and/or implemented curricula changes to align with the new 
social studies standards? If yes, please describe the changes. 
8. Has the district initiated and/or implemented curricula changes to prepare students for the 
civics exam? If yes, please describe the changes. 
9. Has the district undertaken any professional development initiatives for social 
studies/civics teachers? If yes, please describe the changes. 
10. How did (and with what?) the district communicate to school administrators the new 
civic education policies? Do you have any documents available.  
11. In your opinion, how responsive and supportive were school administrators of this 
reform? Please provide some examples demonstrating this. 
12. Have parents or other community organizations reached out to the district with any 
comments or feedback about the civic education reform? What form did those comments 
take?  Were there groups that stood out among the commentators? 
13. How did members of the board of education respond to the reform? Did the reform align 
with the board’s other primary goals?  
14. What aspects of this reform have been easily implementable? What aspects more 
challenging?  
15. Please identify the factors that you think aided or impinged implementation.  
 
Interview Protocol for State Administrators 
Opening Remarks:  
1. I would like to start by describing briefly the objectives of this study (offer description). 
Description: My research focuses on the recent civic education policy reforms enacted at 
the state level in 43 states across the United States. I am interested in understanding how 
this reform is unfolding at the local level and the degree to which implementation of the 
policy at the district level was affected by the local and state politics.  I am not seeking to 
evaluate the effectiveness of state or local district practices of civic education, but to 
understand the factors that affected the local implementation of the state policy. 
2. Allow me also to review the confidentially procedures of this study (researcher reviews 
procedures).  
3. Please do state that you offer your consent to be interviewed and that you are aware that 
our conversation will be recorded. If you do not wish for this interview to be recorded, 
please do tell me and I will take notes by hand or computer. Please do tell me if you have 
any questions pertaining to the IRB process. 
4. I also would like to emphasize that if you wish to terminate the interview for any reason 
at any point, you may simply do so. And, I also wish to note that you may ask questions 







1. Please provide me with your job title and describe your main responsibilities. 
2. How long have you had his position? What motivated you to seek this position?  
 
On Civic Education (general questions): 
1. How do you define civic education?  
2. What do you consider to be the state’s position on civic education? What are the goals? 
What has led you to believe this?  
3. What has motivated the state to enact civic education policy reform? 
4. What steps has the state taken to enact this reform?  
5. Can you describe the politics of the recent civic education reform at the state level?  
On the Recent Civic Education Reform questions 
1. How was civic education delivered in this state prior to the most recent civic 
education reform?  
2. Please share with me the goals of the state’s recent civic education reform as you 
perceive them.  
3. How has civic education changed at the state level as a result of the recent civic 
education reform?  
4. What communication has the state department of education provided to districts to 
guide them with the implementation process of the recent civic education reform? 
5. What resources has the state made available to assist districts with the implementation 
of this reform?  
In your opinion, how responsive and supportive were district administrators of this 
reform? Please provide some examples demonstrating this. 
6. Have teachers, parents, or other community organizations reached out to your 
organization with comments or feedback about the civic education reform? What 
form did those comments take?  Were there groups that stood out among the 
commentators?  
7. What aspects of this reform have been easily implementable? What aspects more 
challenging?  






Interview Protocol for Teachers 
Opening Remarks:  
1. I would like to start by describing briefly the objectives of this study (offer description). 
Description: My research focuses on the recent civic education policy reforms enacted at 
the state level in 43 states across the United States. I am interested in understanding how 
this reform is unfolding at the local level and the degree to which implementation of the 
policy at the district level was affected by the local and state politics.  I am not seeking to 
evaluate the effectiveness of state or local district practices of civic education, but to 
understand the factors that affected the local implementation of the state policy. 
2. Allow me also to review the confidentially procedures of this study (researcher reviews 
procedures).  
3. Please do state that you offer your consent to be interviewed and that you are aware that 
our conversation will be recorded. If you do not wish for this interview to be recorded, 
please do tell me and I will take notes by hand or computer. Please do tell me if you have 
any questions pertaining to the IRB process. 
4. I also would like to emphasize that if you wish to terminate the interview for any reason 
at any point, you may simply do so. And, I also wish to note that you may ask questions 




1. Please provide me with your job title and describe your main responsibilities. 
 
On Civic Education (general questions): 
1. How do you define civic education?  
2. What do you consider to be the district’s position on civic education?   
3. What do you consider to be the state’s position on civic education? What has led you 
to believe this?  
4. What has motivated the state to enact civic education policy reform? 
5. What steps has the state taken to enact this reform? What steps has the district taken? 
6. Can you describe the politics of the recent civic education reform at the state and 
local level?  
On the Recent Civic Education Reform questions 
1. How was civic education delivered in this district prior to the state’s most recent civic 
education reform?  
2. Please share with me the goals of the state’s recent civic education reform as you 
perceive them.  





4. What communication did district administrators receive form the state department of 
education guiding the implementation process of the recent civic education reform? 
5. What resources has the state made available to assist your district with the 
implementation of this reform?  
6. Please describe the implementation process of the recent civic education reform in your 
district. 
7. Has the district initiated and/or implemented curricula changes to align with the new 
social studies standards? If yes, please describe the changes. 
8. Has the district initiated and/or implemented curricula changes to prepare students for 
the civics exam? If yes, please describe the changes. 
9. How did (and with what?) the district communicate to school administrators the new 
civic education policies? Do you have any documents available that you would be 
willing to share with me for us of this study?   
10. How did the school administrators communicate to members of the teacher union the 
new civic education policies?  
11. Has the district undertaken any professional development initiatives for social 
studies/civics teachers? If yes, please describe the changes. 
12. In your opinion, how responsive and supportive were school administrators of this 
reform? Please provide some examples demonstrating this. 
13. In your opinion, how responsive and support were teachers of this reform? Please 
provide some examples demonstrating this.  
14. Have teachers reached out to your organization with comments on this reform?  
15. What aspects of this reform have been easily implementable? What aspects more 
challenging?  
16. Please identify the factors that you think aided or impinged implementation.  
 
 
 
 
